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PART ONE :INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
In this thesis I wanted to consider the responses in 
Britain to refugees from Eastern Europe who arrived in 
Bri tain after 1945. This was a large subject, too vas t 
to be covered sufficiently in a thesis of this size. As a 
result, I decided to narrow it down to three groups, the 
Poles and the Ukrainians who came to Britain as a result 
of the Second World War, and the Hungarians who arrived 
in 1956. 
The Poles were chosen as an example of victims of change 
in an Allied country. During the Second World War Polish 
forces and administrators had arrived to help in the 
fight against Germany and thus free their homeland from 
the Fascist yoke. However, after the conclusion of 
hostilities it was decided by the three Powers, the 
Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain, that 
Poland should fall under the Soviet sphere of influence. 
However, many of the Poles who had been displaced during 
the course of the war were unwilling to return to a 
Communist, Soviet-dominated Poland. 
The Ukrainians also arrived in Britain as a result of the 
Second World War. Some of this group came as Displaced 
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Persons from Europe unwilling to return to a homeland 
under Russian control. For the nationalistic Ukrainians, 
it was not just that their land was under Soviet 
domination, but also that this regime was dictated to by 
Russian national interests, with little, if any, 
concessions being made to the interests of the many other 
nationalities of the Soviet Union. Other Ukrainians 
arrived as prisoners of war having fought with the Axis 
forces during the hostilities. These men were unwilling 
to return because of the likelihood that they would be 
executed as traitors once they came under the 
jurisdiction of the Soviet authorities. 
The Hungarians who entered Britain in 1956 were also 
seeking refuge from a country subordinated to the 
Communist influence of the Soviet Union. Again, many 
feared reprisals for trying to break free from this 
situation. This group, which arrived at a later date 
than the Poles and Ukrainians, enables a comparison to be 
made between responses in 1945 and those in 1956 in 
order to discover if, and in what ways, reactions were 
different. 
A fully detailed view of the reactions of both the 
Bri tish authori ties and the general public was also a 
task too large for this thesis, therefore I decided that 
in addition to providing a national overview I would also 
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provide a case study of responses in Yorkshire. This 
exercise has been carried out by examining responses in 
two contrasting cities, Bradford and Sheffield. Bradford 
was chosen as a city traditionally attractive to 
immigrants, 
industry. 
with an economy based on the textile 
Sheffield was not known as an established 
receiver of immigrants and, up to 1956, was economically 
rooted in the steel and engineering industries, wi th a 
number of coalmining communities in its surrounding 
areas. 
I hope to produce a representative survey of responses to 
post-war East Europeans in Britain, concentrating 
particularly on Yorkshire. It should be stressed that 
the major sources which are used in this research, in 
other words newspapers and the interview transcripts of 
the Bradford Heritage Recording Unit, often provide only 
partial information. Themes sometimes appear and then 
disappear. This is inevitable in view of the nature of 
the evidence. Nevertheless, through the deployment of 
such material it is possible for the first time to 
provide a full account of the Poles, Ukrainians, and 
Hungarians, who came to Bri tain after the Second World 
War, concentrating particularly on settlement patterns 
and responses in the North of England. This theme, 
concentrating on the North of England, has previously 
remained unexplored. It should be emphasized, finally, 
Page 9 
that no attempt has been made to investigate and 
incorporate the official documents stored in the Public 
Record Office. That project would be a thesis in itself. 
The coverage of the resettlement of East European groups 
in Britain, in both the media and official sources, 
diminishes with time and consequently this thesis 
concentrates on the period 1945-1961 for which evidence 
is more accessible. However, marginal references are 
made to dates outside this period when relevant. In 
particular, with reference to the Ukrainians in Britain 
there is a short examination of how they were affected by 
the War Crimes debate in the 1980s. 
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2. EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE 
Before making any consideration of the responses to post-
war East European refugees it is necessary to undertake a 
brief survey of the general situation in Eastern Europe 
which caused so many people to leave their homelands for 
a new life elsewhere. By understanding why at certain 
times particular groups of East Europeans sought refuge 
abroad we should also gain some insight into both the 
expected and actual responses of the receiving community. 
This study is concerned with the responses to the three 
largest groups of East Europeans to settle in Britain 
since 1945 the Poles and Ukrainians who arrived 
immediately after the Second World War, and the 
Hungarians who came following the crushed uprising of 
1956; so, it is to the relevant history of Poland, the 
Ukraine, and Hungary that I shall now turn. 
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3. EVENTS LEADING TO POLISH DISPLACEMENT 
German-occupied Poland 
Although many Poles settled permanently outside their 
homeland after the Second World War, their journey had 
often begun as a temporary measure following the 
partition of Poland undertaken by the Soviet Union and 
Nazi Germany in September and October 1939. 1 Of the 
Western half of Poland which was brought under German 
control one part was annexed to the Reich whilst the rest 
was placed under the control of the 'General 
Gouvernement'. Approximately one third of Poland's pre-
war terri tory and 45 per cent of her population were 
accounted for by the General Gouvernement. 
This area provided a source of enforced labour for German 
industry; 400-480,000 Polish prisoners-of-war and 
concentration camp inmates carried out work for the 
Germans, a t leas t 85 per cent of these people being 
forced to do such work rather than volunteering for it. 2 
Polish prisoners-of-war in Germany were used as labour 
troops, known as Arbeitstruppen, and forced to perform 
agricultural work. In return they were given no money 
wages but dockets which could be exchanged for approved 
goods only at specified traders. The Germans also broke 
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international law by incorporating large numbers of 
Polish prisoners-of-war into their own army. 
Excluding prisoners-of-war, and in clear breach of the 
Hague Convention of 1907, over one million Poles were 
taken to work in Germany without compensation for being 
evicted from their properties. 3 During the war 
approximately 1,600,000 Poles, both male and female, 
suffered enforced resettlement, 1,500,000 of these being 
in the first year of the war. They were allowed to take 
little luggage or cash with them and were transported by 
cattle truck. Many of the leading Poles were simply sent 
to concentration camps and made to carry out work whilst 
imprisoned. 
In addi tion to the demographic measures of popula tion 
transfers and resettlement, the Germans also resorted to 
extermination. The advancing German army had been 
followed into Poland by Himmler' s Einsatzgruppen4 who, 
armed with lists of who to kill, moved around the country 
systematically draining Poland of what were considered to 
be its "life-forces"5 i.e. officials, doctors, teachers, 
the clergy and nobility. Public executions were 
frequent. Some of the executions were reprisal measures; 
for example it was reported in August 1940 that ten 
Polish girl guides had been executed near Skarzysko in 
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retaliation for the disappearance 
munitions from the district. 6 
of some Germa 
The 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 Jews in pre-war Poland7 weI 
treated particularly severely; some of the Jews weI 
forced to live in ghettos while the even more unfortunat 
were transported to one of the Nazi death camps, c 
which, eventually, there were six in Poland. 8 ] 
undertaking this policy the Germans were able to buil 
upon the culture of antisemi tism already in existenc 
amongst sections of Polish society.9 
The Polish campaign lasted only two months, yet durir 
this time 20,000 Poles were executed. 10 Moreover, lossE 
continued to accumulate throughout the Second World Wat 
Polish losses, including Jewish and military deathf 
accounted for over six million Poles, in other words 17, 
per cent of the population11 were killed, the large~ 
proportion of which were civilians. However, this d: 
not deter the Poles from forming a powerful resistan( 
movement both inside and outside their country, the t1 
most apparent displays of this opposition were reveal~ 
in the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of April 1943 and the 19· 
Warsaw revolt by the Polish Home Army. 
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After peace had been declared in 1945 all of these 
factors played some part in the decisions of certain 
Poles not to return to their homeland. 
Soviet-Polish relations 
Hostility towards Russia was also a major factor in the 
reluctance of many Poles to return to their homeland. 
Russia and Poland had traditionally been enemies for many 
centuries and Polish mistrust of the Russians was 
inherited by successive generations. This mistrust was 
strengthened at the outbreak of the Second World War by 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact and subsequent partitioning of 
Poland by Germany and the USSR. Thousands of Polish 
citizens who now found themselves under Soviet occupation 
were deported to the remote Asia tic regions of the 
Soviet Empire. Estimates of the numbers affected by 
these deportations vary between one and a half to two 
million. 12 However, many faced a fate worse than 
Siberia, Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan; mass executions were 
not uncommon. After June 1941 the Soviet Union and 
Poland officially became allies and diplomatic relations 
between the two states were restored. The clauses of the 
Soviet-Polish agreement caused some of the ministers of 
the Polish government-in-exile to resign in protest, 
although at this stage few opposed the idea in principle 
as it was recognised that Poland could not possibly win a 
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war on two fronts against both Soviets and Germans .13 
One clause of the agreement stipulated that the Poles in 
the Soviet Union were to be released and to be allowed to 
form the Second Polish Corps, of which it was agreed that 
General W. Anders would be appointed commander. 14 
However a deeprooted mistrust between the two states 
remained, particularly amongst those Poles who had 
suffered at the hands of the Soviets for the previous two 
years. 
This hostility was further reinforced by the 
announcement made by the Germans in April 1943 of the 
discovery of the mass graves marking the massacre at 
Katyn of over 10,000 Polish officers who had been 
deported to the Soviet Union in 1939. 15 The Soviet Union 
blamed the Germans for this atrocity but the Poles, 
rightly, suspected that the perpetrators were in fact the 
Soviets. The Polish Government-in-exile called for an 
international Red Cross enquiry, the Soviets refused and 
diplomatic relations between the two countries were 
severed. There were hopes in Britain that the diplomatic 
si tuation between Poland and the Soviet Union could be 
repaired but these hopes were dashed when on 4 July 1943 
the Polish leader General Sikorski was killed in a plane 
crash. Sikorski had been one of the few Poles involved 
with the government-in-exile who had recognised the 
importance of maintaining a reasonably friendly 
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relationship with the Soviet leadership. This severing of 
diplomatic relations with the exiled Polish authorities 
proved convenient for the Soviet government which was 
already determined tha t there should be no independent 
Poland after the war. The USSR wanted instead to 
establish a Polish government which would be more 
congenial to Soviet influence and which would allow for 
the incorporation into the Soviet Union of the Polish 
Ukrainian territories. In terms of the Bri tish 
Government's response to the discovery of the mass graves 
at Katyn, there was a great deal of reluctance to blame 
their wartime ally for the atrocity. Even in 1976, when 
the Polish communi ty in Bri tain unveiled a memorial to 
those who lost their lives there, the British government 
refused the invitation to have an official presence at 
the opening ceremony on the grounds that it would imply 
Sovie t gUil t. It was not until 28 July 1988 that the 
British government acknowledged for the first time that 
there was substantial circumstantial evidence that the 
perpetrators of the Katyn massacre were the forces of the 
USSR. 16 
Although Stalin paid lip service to the idea of an 
independent Poland after the end of the war, this was in 
fact contrary to his real aim of creating buffer states 
between the Soviet Union and the threat of German 
expansionism. A Polish state willing to placate the 
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Soviet Union would also enable the Soviets to claim the 
eastern Polish lands which it wanted to include in its 
own terri tory. However, it was clear tha t the Poles in 
London would not agree to this plan and subsequently, the 
Red Army entered Poland in January 1944 wi thout first 
gaining the prior approval of the Polish government-in-
exile. This was a clear rejection of the authori ty of 
the exiled Polish leaders. The Soviet Union went further 
in realising its desire for a pro-Soviet Polish 
government by initiating the formation of the Committee 
of National Liberation on 22 July 1944, and it was this 
Committee which was to become the basis for the Polish 
Provisional Government. Both the Committee and the 
subsequent Provisional Government which arose out of it 
were totally under Communist domination. This political 
manoeuvring on the part of the Soviet authorities 
antagonized many Poles living in exile who still 
considered the London-based government-in-exile to be the 
true government of Poland. On 21 April 1945 a twenty-
year treaty of "friendship, mutual assistance and post-
war co-operation" was signed by Poland and the USSR. For 
the majority of Poles, however, the Red Army's liberation 
of Poland at the end of the war represented not freedom 
but another occupation by a foreign power. 
Not only was Poland itself to come under Soviet 
domination but parts of its pre-1939 eastern territory 
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were actually incorporated into the Soviet Union. This 
was justified by the Soviet Union on the grounds that the 
territory was inhabited not primarily by ethnic Poles 
but chiefly by ethnic Ukrainians, Byelorussians and 
Russians, and that these groups would prefer to join with 
their own ethnic groups in the Soviet Union rather than 
to remain minori ty groups wi thin Poland. In the 1931 
census it was shown that only 68.5 per cent of Poland's 
total population of 32,100,000 were ethnic Poles. 17 The 
Soviet Union accused Poles who opposed the boundary 
changes of having imperialist aims in not recognizing the 
rights of Ukrainian and Byelorussian nationalities. The 
Polish government-in-exile rejected these charges. After 
1945, Poles from the country's eastern terri tory faced 
the choice either of returning to the reconstituted 
Polish state, but not actually to their home territory, 
or returning to the areas in which they had lived, 
previously part of Poland but now part of the USSR. The 
former Polish citizens affected by these border changes 
included the Polish Ukrainians. There was a repatriation 
agreemen t signed in July 1945 be tween the Sovie t Union 
and Poland which enabled Poles from this territory to be 
repatriated to the new Polish state. However, this 
agreement did not cover other nationalities, for example 
the Ukrainians and Byelorussians who were to be classed 
as Soviet citizens regardless of previous citizenship. 
The only exceptions to this were the Jews who were also 
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allowed to seek repatriation elsewhere. Nationalistic 
former Polish citizens, particularly the Ukrainians, 
often preferred to live in exile than under the Soviet 
rule agains t which some of them had undertaken armed 
resistance during the Soviet occupation throughout 
various periods during the course of the war. 
In agreeing at the Yalta conference, held in February 
1945 to discuss post-war settlements, that Poland, 
although nominally an independent state with a right to 
free elections, was to come under the Soviet sphere of 
influence in the post-war world, Britain and the United 
States of America to some extent shared indirectly in the 
responsiblity of the Soviet Union for the impOSition of a 
Communist system in Poland. After giving guarantees of 
Polish independence in the early stages of the war this 
left many exiled Poles, not surprisingly, feeling that 
they had been betrayed by the West. However, a great 
number of these Poles still chose to remain in the West 
ra ther than re turn home a t the end of the war because 
they felt that living free in a country which had 
betrayed them was preferable to returning to a homeland 
under the shackles of a Communist regime. Thus, the 
impOSition of Communism in post-war Poland resulted in 
the continued existence of political exiles. Having fled 
the totalitarian Nazi regime Polish liberals had no 
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desire to return to a country now in the grip of a 
totalitarian Communist regime. 
Post-war Poland 
The Communist system resulted not only in political 
exiles but also in economic migration from Poland. This 
process was exacerbated by the economic devastation of 
Poland in the course of the Second World War. The 
country's resources had been plundered by both the 
Germans and the Soviets. There were already reports as 
early as 1940 that food was scarce in most parts of 
Poland. It as been estimated that by the end of the 
Second World War more than half the country's livestock 
had been destroyed. 18 In addition, the country had also 
suffered from the economic disruption and destruction 
that results from all wars. The transport system was in 
chaos. This situation was made even more chaotic by the 
forced migrations resul ting from Poland's boundary 
changes. The Polish government originally accepted the 
offer of the United States government to receive economic 
aid as part of the Marshall Aid Plan but were forced to 
retract their earlier acceptance when put under pressure 
to do so by the Sovie t government. It is not at all 
surprising that many already disp13ced Poles were 
reluctant to return home to face this economic chaos.1 9 
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The imposition of Communism in post-war Poland also gave 
many Poles another reason for not returning to their 
homeland they faced a situation in which there was a 
lack of religious freedom and a genuine fear of 
persecution. The majority of Poles are Catholics and by 
1945 the Soviets' oppression of the Catholic church in 
their own country was already well known. The pre-war 
Polish Communist Party had also been known to have 
atheistic views, something which had in the past been 
partly responsible for its lack of support. Thus, after 
1945, many Catholic Poles chose not to return to a 
Communist Poland. The only statistics relating to the 
religious beliefs of the post-1945 Polish community in 
Britain are of those of the Polish Resettlement Corps in 
1948 which revealed nearly 86 per cent of its membership 
to be Roman Catholic. 
For the same reason many of the Polish Jews who had 
managed to survive the extermination policy of the Nazis 
also chose not to return, although for Jews this was not 
the only religious reason for seeking a new life 
elsewhere. The German occupation of Poland had 
emphasized the antisemitism of a significant element of 
the Polish people; one of the reasons for situating some 
of the Nazi death camps there was because the Germans 
knew the Poles would be more tolerant of the 'final 
solution' than certain other nations. 20 Not 
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surprisingly, many displaced Polish Jews were reluctant 
to return to their homeland at the end of the war. Many 
of them went to live in the newly formed state of Israel. 
Between 15 May 1948 to the end of 1951 it has been 
estimated that 106,125 Jews of Polish origin chose to 
emigrate to Israel, but a small number of Polish Jews 
did choose to live in Britain. 21 However, of those who 
did decide to reside in Britain some disassociated 
themselves from the Polish communi ty here and instead 
involved themselves in the local Jewish community. 
Figures for the Polish Resettlement Corps showed only 2 
per cent of its members to be Jewish, an indication that 
even at this early stage few Polish Jews associated 
themselves with the Polish rather than Jewish community. 
In view of the antisemi tic policies evident in Poland 
before the outbreak of the war, which had encouraged 
Jewish migration from Poland, and the Polish Jews' 
experiences under German occupa tion, it is no surprise 
that many chose not to return. 
Displaced Persons 
For many of the Poles who did not return at the end of 
the war the decision to remain in Britain was made easier 
by the fact that by 1945 they were already displaced 
persons. The route to Britain for most Poles had been far 
from direct, the majority having passed through several 
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countries during the course of the war. Over one million 
Poles, excluding prisoners of war, had been 'resettled' 
by the Nazis and used as forced labour and at the end of 
the war found their way to displaced persons' camps 
rather than trying to return home directly. For those 
who found themselves in camps run by the Western Allies 
they had the choice of going home or settling abroad as 
it had been decided before the end of the war that there 
would be no forced repatriation of pre-war Polish 
citizens. Over 21,000 Polish ex-prisoners of war were 
brought to the United Kingdom from German camps, 
including just over 2,000 political prisoners from the 
German concentra tion camps. 22 In addi tion there were 
also 14,000 Poles who came to Britain directly from the 
Displaced Persons' camps as part of the European 
Volunteer Workers' scheme. 23 
A significant number of these Poles may have been 
persuaded not to return home to Poland by the 150 Polish 
repatriation officers operating in the western camps who 
were under the control of the London-based government-in-
exile and therefore were less than posi ti ve about the 
conditions prevailing in Poland to which repatriates 
would return. 24 There were attempts, nevertheless, by 
UNRRA and the British and American military to persuade 
the Poles to be repatriated. The amnesty declared by the 
Polish government was given publicity by the Allied 
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government sand it was made clear tha t al though there 
would be no forcible repatriations it was the opinion of 
the Allies that the Poles should return to their country 
to help in the task of its post-war reconstruction. 
There were even material attempts at persuading the 
displaced Poles to return, at one stage, for example, a 
sixty day ration advance was offered to repatriates. 
However, despite all these attempts, as time passed and 
anti-Communist propaganda spread, the number of Poles 
willing to accept repatriation diminished. 
Poles in Britain 
(a) The Government-in-Exile 
Not only were a large number of Poles already displaced 
but many were already in Britain and this made the 
country an obvious place of resettlement for those 
refugees not wishing to return to Poland. The Polish 
Government-in-exile had originally been formed in France 
under General Sikorski but after that country's fall in 
June 1940 the Poles moved their base to London for the 
remainder of the war. 
However, the Polish Government in London had lost most of 
its influence in Poland after the cynical tactics of the 
Red Army caused the failure of the Warsaw rising in 1944. 
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It also began to lose control after the Soviets had 
installed the Polish Provisional Government under their 
own tight control at Lublin in 1944 and, on 5 July 1945, 
it was this Lublin government that the British and 
Americans recognized as the legal government of Poland. 
Churchill had already decided in 1944 that he would only 
support the Polish government-in-exile if it was prepared 
to accept the post war boundary changes and merge itself 
with the Lublin-based government, both of which it 
refused to do. Indeed, the Polish government-in-exile 
had been steadily losing the support of the British 
government following the death of its leader General 
Sikorski, who, unlike many of his colleagues who 
succeeded him, had been prepared to take a pragmatic view 
towards relations with the Soviet Union. 
Most of the London Poles did not return immediately after 
the war because of both the political situation and the 
wartime experiences of their country. The majori ty of 
the Poles in exile were immediately suspicious of claims 
of political freedom in Poland. Their fears seemed to be 
confirmed by numerous reports in 
incidents of politic3l suppression. 
there were reports of attacks on 
the British press of 
For example, in 1946 
the Peasant Party in 
Poland, including the prohibition of its activities and 
the arrests of a number of its leaders. Some of the 
prominent London Poles did go back to Poland to take part 
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in the promised free elections however, but these did not 
take place until 1947 and left-wing intimidation was used 
to ensure a victory for the pro-Soviet groups. By 
December 1948 the Communist takeover of Poland had been 
completed. Not surprisingly a large number of exiled 
Poles felt disillusioned and betrayed by the role of the 
Allies in creating a Communist-dominated Poland in the 
post-war settlement. 
(b) Polish troops in Britain 
The politicians who formed the Government-in-Exile were 
also followed by the Polish troops who had escaped to the 
west and been organised under General Sikorski in France; 
again after that country's fall they moved to Great 
Britain. Approximately 35,500 members of the Polish 
armed forces arrived in Britain at this time and were 
accompanied by their wives and families who constituted a 
further 3,000 people. 25 They were also joined in 1941 
by those Poles released by the Soviets who preferred to 
join the Polish Air Force and Navy based in England and 
units of the Polish Army based in Scotland rather than 
becoming members of the Anders Army/Polish Second Corps. 
Throughout the war these numbers were supplemented by 
further recruits, for example, 89,300 Poles who were ex-
members of the Wehrmacht and Todt organization who had 
deserted or been captured by the Western forces, and also 
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21,750 Polish prisoners of war liberated from German 
camps.26 A large number of the Polish forces had settled 
quite well in Britain, having already made friends here. 
There were large number of Poles who had been part of the 
forces under Western Command during the war. The Poles 
under Western command, wherever they were stationed at 
the end of the hostilities, were brought to Britain to be 
officially demobilised. 
The Polish-Soviet amnesty had resulted in the release of 
approximately 1,500,000 Poles, with 100,000 of these men 
joining the Polish Second Corps. In 1946 the entire 
Polish Second Corps was brought to Britain for 
demobilization, many of whom remained, to be followed by 
their rela ti ves who had been exiled in the Middle East 
and in Africa for much of the war after having themselves 
been released from captivity by the Soviet Union. 
Over 110,000 Poles came to Britain to be demobilised, all 
of them having the choice between repatriation and 
reset tlement, and fewer than one half of them finally 
chose to return to Poland. However, not all of these men 
stayed in Britain; the Uni ted Sta tes, Canada and 
Australia were all popular places of resettlement. When 
their resettlement in Britain became permanent in the 
eyes of the British authorities, although not necessarily 
from the viewpoint of the Poles themselves, those wi th 
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dependant relatives still in Poland were allowed to send 
for them and between 1945-50 such people accounted for 
33,000 new arrivals in Britain. 27 
Concluding comment 
A Polish community had already existed in Britain before 
the arrival of the wartime Poles but those who arrived 
between 1941 and 1950 greatly strengthened the exiled 
Polish community based in Britain. Although restricted 
by Poland's emigration laws, Polish immigration to 
Britain has continued with some Polish political exiles 
seeking refuge in Britain. According to the 1971 Census 
13,470 Poles, 75 per cent of them women, had arrived in 
Britain 1950-71. Since that time several hundred Poles 
have emigrated to Britain each year. 
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4. EVENTS LEADING TO UKRAINIAN DISPLACEMENT 
Ukrainian nationalism within the Soviet Union 
In the aftermath of the Second World War it was estimated 
that of all those people who had held Soviet citizenship 
before 1939 and had escaped repatriation to the Soviet 
Union, 52.6 per cent were of Ukrainian nationality.1 The 
most important factor in Ukrainian reluctance to return 
to the homeland was fear of Soviet persecution. The 
majority of the population of the USSR were not Russian 
nationals, the largest single group of the non-Russians 
being the Ukrainians. In the Soviet Union's second 
census, conducted in 1926, of the 146,811,563 inhabitants 
of the entire Union, 29,018,187 lived within the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 31,194,778 claimed 
to be of Ukrainian nationality, and 27,572,289 reported 
that Ukrainian was their primary language. 2 There were 
also substantial numbers of other non-Russian ethnic 
groups. Consequently, because of such high proportions 
of non-Russians within the population, the controlling 
Russian minority found it necessary to keep the other 
nationalities firmly in their place by whichever means 
considered to be the most effective. 
The Ukrainians are fiercely nationalistic and the 
struggle for an independent Ukraine has been constant. 
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Following the revolution of 1917, the Ukraine declared 
its independence but, during the course of the ensuing 
civil war, it was over-run by the Bolsheviks who, 
although they had the support of just ten per cent 3 of 
the popula tion in the area, took control and imposed 
their own state apparatus on the country. Until August 
1991 Ukraine was the largest nation in the world without 
independence. 4 The Ukrainians never fully accepted their 
subsequent involuntary incorporation into the Soviet 
Union in 1922/3 and as a result they were unpopular with 
the Russians and were frequently persecuted. In the 
1930s the cultural freedoms enjoyed in the previous 
decade were brought to a halt and there was an 
intensified effort by the Soviets to Russify the Ukraine. 
The Ukrainian peasantry suffered from Stalin's at tempts 
to destroy the kulaks as a class. There was also 
suppression of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as 
religious differences with the Russians further 
underlined their separate national identity. This was 
accompanied by the horrific man-made famine of 1932-3 in 
which Stalin deliberately starved the people of Ukraine 
by confiscating their supplies of grain. Stalin denied 
the existence of this famine and, when it did become 
known to the outside world, he refused to allow 
international relief into the area. It has been 
estimated that the resulting deaths numbered between five 
and eight million. 5 There were also purges and political 
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trials, even affecting members of the Communist Party 
itself, which enabled the secret police to create an 
atmosphere of terror and oppression. As a result of the 
famine, the political liquidations and fierce battle for 
Ukraine during the Second World War, in which 5,500,000 
Ukrainians died, the Ukraine lost 25 per cent of its 
population between 1930 and 1945. 6 
A resurgence of Ukrainian nationalism at the outbreak of 
the Second World War led to fighting with the Soviet 
troops. The Soviet authori ties a t tempted to deny the 
existence of strong nationalist feelings amongst the 
Ukrainians; for example in May 1942, amidst heavy 
fighting between Soviet and Nazi troops in Ukraine, 
despatches from the front were issued which described 
Ukrainian peasants "bringing out red flags that they had 
concealed behind stoves and under floors to greet the 
advancing army" 7 • At the same time the Soviets were 
deporting and executing known Ukrainian nationalist 
leaders. In 1941/2 the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was 
formed to fight against both the Russian and German 
armies. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists also 
played a part in this civil war, particularly in the 
previously Polish-dominated territory of western Ukraine 
where it had already been in operation during the 1930s. 
After the spring offensive of 1944, when the Red Army 
cleared the Ukraine of its German invaders this fight 
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against the Soviet forces did not end but was to continue 
until after the end of the war, well into the 1950s. 
Although most hoped one day to return to an independent 
Ukraine, the fear of reprisals kept some displaced 
nationalist Ukrainians from returning after 1945 to a 
homeland within the Soviet Union. In addition, between 
1947 and 1949, some groups from the Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army crossed over to the Western Allied zones of Germany 
in order to surrender. 
Ukrainians during the Second World War 
Nationalist feeling caused some Ukrainians to enrol in 
t he Uk r a i ni an Fir s t D i vis ion 0 f the Wa f fen S • S ., a Iso 
known as the Halychyna Division, which had been formed by 
the German army in 1943 as a means of controlling the 
Ukrainians' fight against the Russians. This uni twas 
used only for the fight on the eastern front, it was 
never intended to use it against the western allies. 
Many Ukrainians were led by the Germans to mistakenly 
believed that Hitler would support, or at least tolerate, 
an independent Ukraine if this meant that Soviet power 
was broken. However, when in June 1941 the faction of 
the OUN led by Stepan Bandera declared an independent 
Ukraine, the Germans reacted by sending the Ukrainian 
nationalist leaders to concentration camps. The 
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Ukrainians had badly misjudged 
something which only became clear 
Germans began to replace the idea 
Hitler's motives, 
to them when the 
of liberation with 
their own methods of police control. The Ukrainians had 
believed one of the major motivating factors behind 
Hitler's invasion of Ukraine was his fear and hatred of 
Bolshevism but Hitler also had a racial hatred of Slavs 
and wanted to exterminate them. He was therefore not at 
all predisposed to 
continued declarations 
Ukrainian independence despite 
to the contrary throughout the 
course of the war • The German interest in Ukraine lay 
not in achieving independence for its people but in 
exploiting its rich economic resources. A further reason 
behind the invasion was the desire for 'Lebensraum' or 
'living space' for the Aryan race and this meant 
subjugation, not independence, of other nations. 
the 
The 
Nazi invasion of the Ukraine when seen in hindsight as 
part of Operation Barbarossa was clearly never going to 
pave the way for an independent Ukraine to be tolerated 
by the Reich. 
Most of the Ukrainians in the German army were therefore 
not believers in the fascist cause but nationalists. 
However, they fought fiercely and if they had gone back 
to a Ukraine which was s till part of the Soviet Union 
they would have been condemned as war criminals and 
traitors and as such would have faced persecution and 
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possibly even death. This view was reinforced by the way 
in which they knew their compatriots still in the Soviet 
Union to have been treated, some of whom had been 
deported to the east on charges not of fighting for the 
Germans but merely in failing to resist the German 
occupation. Soviet reprisals on the Ukrainian population 
were also known to have taken a more brutal form than 
deportation, for example, 95 mass graves had been found 
at Vinnytsya in 1943 which contained the bodies of 9,439 
people who had been shot by the Soviet secret police, the 
NKVD, mostly during the period 1938-1940. The Soviets 
were very keen to have those people who had fought for 
the Germans repatriated but were not always successful in 
their attempts to have this done. For example, in March 
1947 the Soviet pressure for the return of 8,400 
Ukrainians who had been members of the 14th Waffen-SS 
Division held at a prisoner of war camp in Italy at 
Rimini after their surrender to the Western Allies at the 
end of the war resulted instead in the British government 
transferring them to Britain. 
Another group of Ukrainians who feared persecution if 
they returned home at the end of the war were those who 
had been taken by the Germans as Ostarbeiter, considered 
by the Germans as the lowest form of foreign workers and 
used for forced labour. The Germans had large parts of 
Ukraine under occupation for long periods of the war and 
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deported large numbers of Ukrainians into Germany, 
manpower being considered just one more of Ukraine's 
na tural resources available for exploi ta tion. An 
efficient maximization of manpower was the aim, and to 
this end the Germans generally took only the young and 
heal thy. At the end of the war there were be tween 
2,500, 000-3, 000, 000 Ukrainians in Germany and Austria, 
approximately 2,300,000 of these were males under the age 
of thirty who had been used as enforced labourers. 8 
Although they had not volunteered for this work, they 
feared that the Soviet authorities would still see them 
as collaborators and traitors. Their fears had some 
justification as leaving the Soviet Union was classified 
as a treasonable offence in Soviet law. Many of the 
Ostarbeiter who returned after 1945 were not allowed to 
return to the Ukraine but were deported to Siberia and 
the eastern provinces of the USSR. The Soviets, fearing 
potential troublemakers, were determined that Soviet 
citizens who, for whatever reason, had come into contact 
with the West and its ideals should be isolated from the 
rest of the population. Even those refugees who were not 
officially punished and allowed to return to their homes 
risked the unfavourable reactions of the local population 
who had been told that all those remaining in Germany at 
the end of the war were collaborators and traitors. 
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Even those who had been part of the Polish or Soviet 
forces who been captured as prisoners of war were not 
safe. A similar suspicion of collaboration was also felt 
by the Soviets towards these men as it was felt that they 
should have preferred death to prisoner status. Indeed, 
Soviet soldiers were ordered to commit suicide if it was 
the only means possible to avoid capture. The Communist 
authorities spread rumours that even if these men had not 
been collaborators at the time of capture it was possible 
that they had been recruited as spies against their 
compatriots whilst confined in the prisoner of war camps. 
Some suffered worse fates than the the propaganda-induced 
hostility of neighbours; some were refused permission to 
return home and were instead exiled to Siberia, whilst 
others were executed as soon as they returned to the 
Soviet Union. It has been estimated that approximately 
300,000 returning Soviet citizens were sentenced in this 
way.9 
Polish Ukrainians 
However, not all Ukrainians were from the Soviet Union, 
some had lived in parts of the Ukraine which were 
territorially in pre-war Poland. Indeed, the 4,500,000 
Ukrainians10 living in inter-war Poland were the 
country's largest national minority group accounting 
for 13.8 per cent of Poland's population in the census of 
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1931. 11 The changing of the Polish-Soviet boundaries in 
1945 meant that this was no longer the case. These 
Ukrainians, if they had returned home, would still have 
been living on the same land but would have been under 
the jurisdiction of a different country. With the 
knowledge tha t Stalin had already tried to starve to 
death many of their Ukrainian compatriots in the previous 
decade it is unsurprising that many of them decided to 
seek a new life elsewhere. Large numbers had already 
experienced such repression for themselves at the hands 
of the Soviet army when, after the signing of the Nazi-
Soviet Pact, the USSR had invaded eastern Poland and 
between 1939-41 imposed their own strict regime which 
included widespread deportations and murders. The 
Soviets had formerly described this annexation as "an act 
of self-determination on the part of the local 
population"12 and maintained that it was popular amongst 
the majority of the population with Khrushchev, then 
secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, claiming that 
workers and intellectuals were now united in one body and 
"if anyone tries to stop us, we will knock them into a 
cocked hat".13 
The Ukrainians were also unable to continue to reside in 
Poland because the new Polish Government were unwilling 
to have them back as their nationalism was considered 
troublesome and the Poles had no desire to repeat the 
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minorities' problems they had experienced in the inter-
war period. During this period the ethnic minorities 
within Poland had suffered discrimination in religious, 
cultural and economic activity. State-controlled 
employment, including teaching, the police and the 
judiciary, was generally reserved for people of Polish 
ethnic origin, who had already benefited from such ethnic 
discrimina tion in all levels of educa tion. The Polish 
government had encouraged colonization of Ukrainian lands 
by ethnic Poles. In addition many non-Polish national 
political and cultural organizations were banned, and 
both the Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic 
Churches were discriminated against. 
The Ukrainians had also long been suspected by the Poles 
of being sympathetic to the Germans. An indication of 
such feelings can be found as early in the war as 1939 
when, immediately preceding and following the German 
invasion, many Ukrainians were evacuated eastwards to 
prevent their collaboration with the invading German 
forces. The Poles' suspicions of pro-Germanism amongs t 
the Ukrainians was reinforced by the Nazis' treatment of 
the Ukrainian population in German-controlled areas of 
Poland after the outbreak of war in 1939. The Ukrainians 
were allowed better education and better jobs than other 
sections of the population by the German authorities. 
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They were even allowed to form their own 8, 000 strong 
militia, the Sitch strilki. 14 
However, as the war progressed there was some recognition 
by the Polish authorities that Ukrainians were not all 
under suspicion and it was proposed that they, like the 
Polish Jews, should have two representatives on the 
Polish National Council. This proposal, made in February 
1942, can also be seen as an attempt to placate the 
Soviet Union with whom Poland had signed a declaration of 
friendship and mutual assistance only two months earlier. 
In September 1944 the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the 
Polish Committee of National Liberation signed an 
agreement concerning transfers of population and between 
1945 and May 1947, as Europe began to assume its new 
form, many Ukrainians found remaining in Poland were 
handed over to the Russians, with the use of force when 
necessary, by the Polish authorities who were coming 
under increasing Communist Party domination. The Polish 
Communist Party had long advocated Ukrainian "self-
determination" within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. 
Subcarpathian Ruthenia 
There were also Ukrainians in Subcarpathian Ruthenia 
which was ceded to the Soviet Union, becoming part of the 
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Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine in 1945. It has 
been estimated that approximately 500,000 Ukrainians 
lived in this area. 15 Since 1919 Subcarpathian Ruthenia 
had been under the control of Czechoslovakia but in 1939 
it became independent under the name of Carpatho-Ukraine. 
The reality of its independence was of short duration as 
it was quickly overpowered by Hungarian armed forces, 
encouraged by their German allies. Desirous of 
unification with its ethnic motherland of Ukraine it did 
not however want this to occur under Soviet domination. 
If Carpatho-Ukraine was to again lose its independence in 
1945 the 75 per cent of the population who were 
Ukrainian16 were generally not keen for this to mean 
Soviet domination as many could still remember the Soviet 
suppression of the Ukrainian Republic in 1919. A return 
to Czech rule was viewed as preferable as this was known 
to be not as harsh as that of the Soviets. When the 
Soviet Union assumed control of Carpatho-Ukraine it was 
determined that Ukrainian nationalism was not to become a 
force wi thin the area. Many of the Ukrainians in the 
area chose or were forced to remain but an estimated 
30,000 ethnic Czechs and Ukrainians left Carpatho-Ukraine 
during 1945-1946, infiltrating themselves into the 
Czechoslovak Republic .17 It is possible that some of 
these Ukrainians re-emigrated elsewhere from 
Czechoslovakia. 
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Attitudes towards Communism 
Whether the Ukrainian refugees came from the Soviet Union 
or Poland after the Second World War a dislike of 
Communism was common. The Ukrainian peasantry had 
traditionally had possession of their own homes and land 
therefore Communist seizures and redistribution via 
collectivization did not appeal to them. Eastern Ukraine 
had been collectivized prior to the Second World War and 
between 1946-49 there was a vigorous collectivization 
programme in Western Ukraine to bring its economic system 
into line with the rest of the Soviet Union. There was 
the confiscation of land and its redistribution, and the 
nationalization of banks and big businesses. 
although western Ukrainians had suffered 
Also, 
Polish 
discrimination during the inter-war period, they knew 
that Soviet political and cultural persecution could be 
far worse than anything experienced under Polish rule. 
This dislike of Communism and Communists was particularly 
evident in the displaced persons' camps where anti-
Communist sentiments were often openly expressed by the 
residents, sometimes the expression of these feelings 
exploded into full scale demonstrations, for example that 
of Ukrainian and Baltic refugees in Munich on 10 April 
1949 which American troops had to resort to the use of 
teargas to disperse .18 In some instances there were 
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physical attacks on Soviet repatriation officers. There 
was also a case of Russian journalists having stones and 
tomatoes thrown at them by Ukrainians in a spontaneous 
demonstration at the displaced persons' camp in Hanover 
which the journalists had asked to be shown around by the 
British. 19 The quote "I fought for myself, for my 
people, not for Stalin"20 epitomises the thoughts and 
feelings of all the nationalities seeking refuge from the 
Soviet regime at the end of the Second World War. 
Economic factors 
Although political factors were the primary motivation, 
economic factors also dissuaded some Ukrainians from 
returning at the end of the war. During the course of 
the Second World War the terri tory of Ukraine had been 
bitterly fought over and as a result had suffered 
economic devastation. This was partly a result of the 
fighting itself and partly related to the destruction 
caused by the scorched earth policy which had been used 
by both the German Army and the Red Army when in retreat. 
The purpose of this policy was to deny the advancing 
enemy the use of local resources, particularly buildings, 
food, and industrial and agricultural machinery. 
Immediately after the war the Ukrainians were also forced 
to make make large gifts of grain and other food supplies 
to the Soviets as a sign of their gratitude for being 
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liberated from the German occupation. Although Ukraine 
did receive material aid from the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration, it received one of the 
lowest allocations despite being one of the most 
economically devastated areas of Europe. 21 Ukrainians 
from the Soviet Union who had been living in the Wes t 
during the war had observed that although the West itself 
had undergone hardships during the course of the war the 
economic situation there was still preferable to that in 
the USSR. Also, many of the Soviet nonreturners were of 
kulak origins,22 who would clearly have never been 
enamoured by the Soviet agricultural system of 
collectivization by which the State repossessed their 
families r land, and of western Ukrainians had also had 
some experience of this system during the Soviet 
occupation of Poland's eastern provinces 1939-1941. For 
Ukrainians who had been living outside the Soviet Union 
before the outbreak of the Second World War the Communist 
economic system, with agriculture, commerce and industry 
all under government control, was unlikely to appeal to 
all. 
Forcible repatriations 
For those Ukrainians who found themselves displaced at 
the end of the war some were fortunate enough to have a 
choice between repatriation and resettlement. 
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However, 
Ukrainians in the Soviet zones of immediate post-war 
Europe were forcibly repatriated, including the 
'repatriation' to the USSR of Polish Ukrainians. In 
September 1945 the Soviet forces found themselves 
responsible for the care and repatriation of some 
6,869,660 people of Sovie t, Polish, Hungarian and Czech 
nationality23 and although there are no official 
statistics there would have been a significant number of 
Ukrainians amongst this figure. 
In the first months following the cease-fire the Western 
zones also forcibly repatriated Ukrainians and other 
Sovie t ci tizens as had previously been agreed a t the 
Yalta conference. However, the Western Allies soon began 
to find adherence to this policy undesirable. It soon 
became apparent tha t physical force would be necessary 
for the repatriation of thousands of people to Soviet 
controlled lands. Amongst these were more than 200,000 
Ukrainians, one-third of them from the Soviet Union and 
two-thirds from other East European countries, primarily 
Poland, 
zone. 
who were refusing repatriation from the western 
The majority of these Ukrainians were in the 
American zone of Germany, al though 54,580 were to be 
found in the Bri tish zone. 24 Those trying to avoid 
repatriation were aided by the shortage of available 
transport to return them to the Soviet Union. At the 
same time, growing public concern over the treatment 
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these people would face following repatriation and 
knowledge of disturbances and suicides committed by 
refugees desperate to avoid returning made the policy 
increasingly unpopular. As the Cold War set in, these 
forcible repatriations by the Western Allies ceased, 
although voluntary repatriation was still to be 
encouraged. Despite this, in the poll taken by UNRRA in 
May 1946 the Ukrainians in the displaced persons' camps 
in Germany answered overwhelmingly that they did not wish 
to be repatriated. 25 The substantial number of non-
returners and the decline in east-west diplomatic 
relations led to accusations from the Soviet government 
that the British and American authorities were placing 
obstacles in the way of Soviet citizens in the western 
zones of Germany wishing to return to their homelands. 
These allegations were refuted by both the British and 
the Americans who reiterated that although repatriation 
was encouraged they would not forcibly repatriate people 
who claimed not to have been Soviet citizens before 
1 September 1939. 
When the treatment of displaced persons became more 
organised in late 1945, following the initial confusion 
after the cessation of hostilities, only those people who 
identified themselves as Soviet citizens were to be 
trea ted as such. However, those who claimed Ukrainian 
nationality would be classed as Soviet citizens as, due 
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to Ukraine not being an independent state before the war , 
their own separate nationality was not officially 
recognised. Consequently, any Ukrainians wishing to 
avoid repatriation to the Soviet Union would have to 
claim the nationali ty of another country, for example 
Poland, or be classified as stateless or of undetermined 
origin. Falsification of documents by the Ukrainian 
communi ty inside the camps was common. According to 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
s ta tis tics, there were 9,190 Ukrainians claiming Polish 
citizenship in December 1945, by June 1947 this figure 
had risen to 106,549. 26 Soviet repa tria tion officers 
were not pleased by this shift in policy and often made 
claims that some of the displaced persons in the western 
zones of Austria and Germany were indeed Soviet citizens 
but, except in the case of war criminals, these claims 
were generally ignored. After the Second World War there 
were some two million Ukrainians living outside their 
homeland. 27 However, there were 2,272,000 Soviet 
citizens who had been transferred, whether forcibly or 
not, to the control of the Soviet forces. 28 These 
repatriations were largely completed within the first two 
years after the end of the war. Between 1 July 1947 and 
31 December 1951 there were a mere 1,836 Soviet 
repatriations from the western zones. 29 However, it is 
the displaced Ukrainians who took advantage of the 
European Volunteer Worker schemes and sought resettlement 
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in Britain who are the concern of this particular 
study.3D 
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5. THE EVENTS IN HUNGARY LEADING TO THE FLIGHT ABROAD 
The Communist takeover of Hungary 
In April 1945 Soviet troops replaced the Axis forces as 
the occupying power in Hungary. The indigenous German 
minority amongst the Hungarian population was then 
forcibly expelled from the country under the instigation 
of the Hungarian Communist Party, despite the disapproval 
of non-socialist opponents. The Soviets were thus in a 
perfect position from which to exert their influence over 
the Hungarians, a situation which had been agreed upon by 
the major Allied powers in negotia tions concerning the 
political character of post-war Europe. 
Immediately after the cessation of hostilities a 
Hungarian Popular Front was established to rule the 
country. By far the largest single party in this 
organization was the Independent Smallholders' Party, 
which had gained 245 of the 421 seats in the 1945 
parliamentary elections. 1 However the Smallholders were 
unable to take advantage of this numerical dominance as 
they were quickly hit by internal divisions which 
ultimately resulted in the Party crumbling away to 
nothing. Although the Communists were not the largest 
party in the Front, it came to be manipulated by them 
and, through skilful political manoeuvring and a series 
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of underhand measures, they were able to also seize 
control of Hungary itself. 
This was despi te the fact tha t they in no way had the 
full support of the people. In November 1945 the 
Communists gained only 17 per cent of the vote 2 in the 
free elections which had been demanded by the Western 
Allies and, regardless of a new Communist-inspired 
electoral law, intimidatory tactics and fraud, they could 
still gain only 22 per cent of the vote in the August 
1947 elections. 3 These were the last democratic 
elections to take place in Hungary before 1990. Having 
achieved political dominance by the summer of 1948, the 
Communis t Party, now officially known as the Hungarian 
Workers' Party after its merger wi th the Social 
Democrats, set about consolidating its position through 
the use of systematic terror, in which it was ably 
assisted by the secret police, the AVH. When more 
elections took place in 1949 the Communists ensured that 
there were no opposition candidates to its 'Independent 
People's Front'. 
The Hungarian Communist Party's Stalinist leader, Matyas 
Rakosi, who had been resident in Moscow throughout the 
war, introduced forced collectivization of the land into 
Hungary and embarked upon a policy of rapid 
industrialization, following the Soviet model of economic 
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growth, which resulted in an increase in production 
levels but a severe decline in quality. This was 
accompanied by fear and terror of the secret police who 
deported and executed at will. All sections of the 
community, including Party members, suffered. Following 
orders received from Moscow in 1948, show trials of eight 
Communist Party members were conducted in 1949, the most 
prominent victim being Laszlo Rajk. Of the eigh t on 
trial, five were executed. Subsequent to the show 
trials, there were a number of secret trials of so-called 
Rajkists, which resulted in more executions. 4 In 1951/2 
tens of thousands of people were deported to mines, state 
farms and concentration camps, it having been estimated 
that one family in five had one of its members or a close 
friend deported. 5 However, this policy of fear was not 
entirely successful as instead of achieving 
indoctrination of the population it spread hatred of the 
Communists, and created a fertile atmosphere for revolt. 
Following Stalin's death in 1953 and the subsequent 
unrest in East Germany the Soviets thought it prudent to 
replace the slavish Stalinist Rakosi with the more 
liberal Imre Nagy. 
Nagy's first attempt at reform 
Nagy, although a Communist, had been critical of Rakosi's 
economic and political methods and once in power he 
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embarked on a series of policies collectively known as 
the 'New Course' which were designed both to improve the 
economy and to reduce the amount of terror in society. 
The introduction of this programme of liberalization was 
done under the auspices of the authori ties in Moscow 
which had launched a similar programme in the Soviet 
Union. Hungary's 'New Course' 
rehabilitation of those imprisoned and 
Rakosi 's regime. Many of these people 
vociferous opponents of the system 
included the 
deported under 
were to become 
once released. 
However, the removal of Malenkov from power in the Soviet 
Union in February 1955 undermined Nagy's position in 
Hungary. The Soviets disliked the pace of Nagy's reforms 
and in April 1955 he was replaced as Prime Minister by 
Andras Hegedus. Real power however was returned to 
Rakosi. Yet although he returned to power Rakosi found 
it impossible to reimpose the tight control over the 
country he had previously had. This was the resul t of 
both internal and external developments. In Hungary 
itself his position was weakened by the continuing 
economic difficulties and, as a result of the resurgence 
of the purge victims, by division and criticism from 
within the Party. Externally his position was undermined 
by changes in Soviet policy where Khrushchev proceeded to 
denounce Stalinism and attempted to normalize relations 
wi th Yugoslavia. After riots erupted in Poland on 22 
June 1956 the Hungarian Communist Party became 
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apprehensive about its own increasingly precarious 
dominance over the people of their own country and issued 
a warning to workers to be vigilant against demagogues 
and demonstrations. The Soviets, fearing that the 
situation in Poland might reproduce itself in Hungary, 
forced the resigna t ion of the unpopular Rakosi on 18 
July. 
The 1956 uprising 
Rakosi was replaced as Party Secretary by his close 
associate, and fellow 'Muscovite', Erno Gero. This was a 
far from popular choice amongst Hungarians. Discontent 
continued to grow and on 23 October 1956 a march was 
planned which was meant to express Hungarian solidarity 
with the Poles who had just achieved the reinstatement of 
the popular leader Wladyslaw Gomulka. This primarily 
student demonstration grew rapidly in size until 
thousands of workers were also involved. Furthermore, 
the large crowd was joined by police and soldiers as the 
march progressed. The students' demonstration had 
"set the masses in motion by providing a 
physical stimulus and an emotional 
appeal. It triggered an unplanned and 
unforeseeable chain reaction.,,6 
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By nightfall the violence and shooting had begun, 
instigated by the AVH who shot at the peaceful 
protesters from the inside of the radio station and with 
this action turned the demonstration into the 
I revolution I. The Party leadership reacted by making 
Nagy Prime Minister, in the hope of appeasing the 
insurgents, and calling in the Soviet troops, in the hope 
of controlling them. On 24 October the Hungarian 
Government was forced to declare a state of emergency and 
the introduction of martial law. 
The uprising very quickly developed an anti-Soviet 
character as "the entry of the Russian army gave the 
Hungarians a clearer purpose and a visible enemy,,7 and 
the excesses of the 'liberating' Red Army in 1945 had 
also not gone unforgotten. Nagy did not get involved in 
this anti-Soviet sentiment and, whilst announcing the 
commencement of negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops on 28 October, he recognized that Hungarian-Soviet 
friendship was a necessi ty if his reforms were to be 
successful. It was also on 28 October that the Party 
leadership began to describe the uprising as a national 
democratic revolution rather than as a counter-
revolution, which had been the original official 
definition of the situation. On 30 October Nagy, under 
pressure from the Hungarian people who no longer wanted 
the dominance of the Party, announced that a coa1i tion 
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government was to replace the existing single-party 
system. 
When on 31 October Nagy announced his intention to 
withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact the Soviets, who 
had been watching events very closely, decided that the 
pace of reform in Hungary was far too rapid and that 
intervention had become a necessity. On 1 November 1956 
the Soviet troops which had been retreating began to move 
back towards Budapest. Nagy reacted by sending a message 
to the Uni ted Na tions Secretary General asking for the 
'Hungarian question' to be put on the agenda. 
The Hungarians still hoped that the West would intervene 
but the primary concern of the West remained with events 
in Suez. This preoccupation of the West with Suez 
concurrent with events in Hungary was still seen as 
regrettable by many in Britain over thirty years later, 
including a number of Labour Party politicians. 8 Also, 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
during this period of the Cold War would have made such 
an act of intervention by the West unlikely. On 3 
November the Soviets captured the Hungarian Defence 
Minister Pal Maleter and on the following day, as Soviet 
troops attacked Budapest, Imre Nagy was forced to seek 
refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy. Also on 4 November Janos 
Kadar, Communist chief of the renamed Hungarian Socialist 
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Workers' Party, who had been released from gaol in 1954 
as a result of Nagy's 'New Course' premiership, announced 
the formation of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and 
Peasants' Government which was to be led by himself and 
which had the support of the Soviet Union. It was this 
government led by Kadar which the Sovie t Union claimed 
called for their intervention to restore order to the 
situation. By 14 November all armed resistance had 
ceased9 and, although strikes and demonstrations led by 
the newly formed Workers' Councils continued for some 
months afterwards, the uprising was effectively a t an 
end. 
The Hungarian refugees 
It was when the Soviets started their second attack on 
Budapest and began the savage reimposition of Soviet 
domination that the "mass exodus,,10 from Hungary of what 
is generally accepted to have been approximately 200,000 
people, or two per cent of the population, began. 
The Austrian and Yugoslav border guards would have had 
no difficul ty in stopping the refugees but instead 
helped them as far as possible. Some of the Hungarian 
border guards were also helpful towards the refugees. In 
their rush to escape from the arrests and reprisals which 
they knew would follow based on their past experiences of 
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the Communist secret police, the refugees could take with 
them only what they could carry, all their other 
belongings had to be left behind. One refugee, now 
resident in Sheffield, remembers how he gave the border 
guard a packet of cigarettes to let him through to the 
West, that packet of cigarettes and the clothes he wore 
being all he took with him as he left. The border with 
Austria was open for a time before the barbed wire and 
minefields returned, Pryce-Jones believes it is possible 
that the Hungarian authorities allowed these discontented 
people to leave as their absence from the country would 
reduce the likelihood of a further uprising. 11 
However, not all the fleeing refugees were fortunate 
enough to escape. In November 1956, it was reported that 
four Hungarian refugees, including a woman and child, had 
been shot dead only 50 yards from the Austrian border by 
a member of the Hungarian secret police on a motorbike 
"steering wi th one hand and wi th a tommy gun in the 
other" .12 The Austrian border guard reacted by rushing 
forward to shield six other refugees who were also 
crossing. There was also an incident in which Austrian 
border guards shot dead one armed Soviet soldier and 
wounded and arrested another who had crossed over into 
Austrian territory in pursuit of a group of refugees and 
had refused to halt when instructed to do so by the 
Austrian border guards. By late November 1956 Soviet 
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tanks had the border sealed although refugees could still 
escape by night, if they had not been captured hiding in 
the woods during the day, as the Soviet troops left their 
positions after dark fearing attacks by Hungarian rebels. 
By mid-December, as crossing to the West became 
increasingly difficult, the majority of the refugees who 
escaped Hungary had already left for their new life 
abroad. 
It is estimated that approximately 85 per cent of those 
that left Hungary after the events of 1956 were under the 
age of forty-five,13 a large proportion of whom had 
actively participated in the uprising. There were even 
reports of unaccompanied children crossing the border 
with labels tied around their necks carrying messages 
such as "Take good care of me, my daddy has gone back to 
fight for Hungary." 14 However, their presence among the 
refugee numbers does seem to have been over-emphasized. 
Also, not all those who left were politically committed 
young people or writers and other members of the 
intelligentsia. Towards the end of 1956 many of those 
leaving for a life in the West came from the middle 
classes15 , as well as blue collar workers and peasants,16 
and were probably influenced as much, if not more 
so, by economic than political factors. Hungarian 
historians Balogh and Jakab, writing whilst Hungary 
remained under Communist rule, claimed that part of the 
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people "had been temporarily confused but were otherwise 
innocent" and then later returned to Hungaryl7, but in 
fact only about ten per cent of the refugees of 1956 ever 
returned. 18 Among the refugees there was also another 
group which fled to the West which could never have 
returned to Hungary, these were the criminals who had 
been released from gaol in the confusion of event s in 
October 1956. 19 
The West may have been of little actual help to the 
Hungarians during the uprising but its attitude to the 
refugees was far more positive. The Hungarian revolution 
was seen by the West as having been a "brave and tragic 
cause, an appeal of the just few against the tyrannical 
many,,20, and as such the Hungarian refugees were viewed 
wi th high regard. This was reflected in the 'Time' 
magazine "Man of the Year" award for 1956 being given to 
the "Hungarian Freedom Fighter". Wi thin six months of 
the first refugees arriving in Austria thirty-five 
countries had offered Hungarians permanent asylum. 21 Of 
the 180,000 refugees in Austria 154,000 of them left for 
other countries. Approximately one-half of these went 
overseas, the rest remaining in Europe. Of those who 
remained in Europe more than two-thirds were dispersed 
among the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 
Switzerland. The Uni ted Kingdom received over 21,000 
refugees, one-third of whom later left to seek permanent 
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resettlement elsewhere. The vast majority of the 
refugees who settled overseas went to the United States , 
Canada, and Australia. 22 
Hungary after the uprising 
Within Hungary the new Kadar government quickly renounced 
Nagy's policies. The government's attitude to the events 
of October 1956 were that they constituted a counter-
revolution. By 9 November 1956 workers were already 
being told that if they did not end their strikes and 
return to work they would lose their jobs. Shopkeepers 
were informed that if they did not open their shops then 
anyone who was prepared to break in and open it 
themselves would be recognized as the new legal owner. 
Throughout December 1956 many civil servants, teachers, 
journalists and trade union officials thought to be loyal 
to the ideas behind the rising were removed from their 
posts having been termed 'unreliable'. On 11 January 
1957 the government declared its opposition to the 
proposals to set up a United Nations investigation 
committee on the 'Hungarian question' and on 27 May 1957 
an agreement was signed with the Soviet Union which gave 
legal status to Soviet troops provisionally stationed in 
Hungary. A reorganization was also made of the Hungarian 
police and army, and a workers' militia was created to 
help defend Hungary against further counter-revolution. 
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However, this did not prevent the United Nations Special 
Committee on Hungary producing its report in June 1957 in 
which it concluded that the events in Hungary in October 
1956 had indeed constituted a spontaneous national 
uprising. 
For those people involved in the uprising who had stayed 
in Hungary there were serious consequences. Thousands 
were arrested and, on police recommendation, it was 
possible for them to be detained without trial. Others 
found themselves being deported to the Soviet Union. In 
Britain it was reported that those being deported 
included anyone considered old enough to carry weapons 
which included any boys more than eight years old. 23 A 
number of Hungarians were executed for their part in the 
"counter-revolution". Many of these executions took 
place without any formal trial and of the trials of 
rebels which did take place most were carried out in 
secret. According to official figures, approximately 
2,700 people were killed, 20,000 wounded, and 20,000 
imprisoned in the repression of the 1956 uprising. 24 It 
has also been estimated that more than 450 people 
received death sentences for their part in the 
uprising. 25 Among them were Nagy, Maleter and other 
leading persons in the uprising who, despite assurances 
from Kadar of safe passage from the Yugoslav embassy, 
were abducted by the Soviets who then forced the 
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Hungarian government to hold a secret trial and execution 
of these men in June 1958. In the Spring of 1959 an 
amnesty was announced for those who had been sentenced 
after having been found guil ty of counter-revolutionary 
actions, and a considerable number were released from 
prison. By 1962 more than 95 per cent imprisoned for 
their part in the uprising had been re1eased. 26 
Although Kadar had initially renounced Nagy's policies in 
1956 in the following decades he was himself to gradually 
reform Hungary to a certain extent under the guise of "He 
who is not against us, is with us", a phrase first used 
by Kadar himself in December 1961. This was tolerated by 
the Soviet regime under Leonid Brezhnev as at no time did 
any of these reforms threaten the Communist domination of 
the state. Kadar used his reforms to quickly consolidate 
his position of power; economic policy was made to be 
more responsive to living standards and the extent of 
secret police terror was reduced. Travel to the West was 
also made easier; in 1953 only 1132 Hungarians, mainly 
sportsmen and officials, were allowed to do so, in 1958 
this figure had risen to 21,000, by 1962 to 65,000, in 
1963 to more than 120,000 and to 708,000 in 1986. 27 The 
anniversary of the uprising was officially ignored in 
Hungary until 1966 when the Party newspaper Nepszabadsag 
referred to the counter-revolution, blaming it on the 
conditions created by Rakosi, the treason of Nagy and the 
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Roman Catholic Cardinal Mindszenty, and "international 
imperialism led by the United States". The article also 
described the Soviets as Hungary's "tried and true 
friends" and "whose soldier sons shed their blood in 
saving the regime".28 The events of 1956 were not 
mentioned by Kadar himself until May 1972 when in his 
birthday speech he referred to the "counter-revolution" 
as a "national tragedy - a tragedy for the Party, for the 
working class, for the Hungarian people and also for 
individuals".29 It was not until after Kadar's fall 
during the upheavals which took place in Eastern Europe 
in 1989 that the Hungarian government finally fully 
rehabilitated the leaders of 1956, giving them a state 
reburial, and ceased officially to term the uprising as a 
counter-revolution. 
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PART TWO : THE RESPONSES TO THE REFUGEES ON A NATIONAL 
LEVEL 
6. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE RESPONSES OF POST-WAR BRITAIN 
TO EAST EUROPEAN REFUGEES 
Introduction 
One of the greatest problems left behind in the aftermath 
of the Second World War was the large number of people in 
Europe who had been left displaced by the events of the 
previous six years. The scale of the refugee problem was 
unprecedented in Europe. l For many their greatest desire 
was to return horne but in some cases that hope was 
frustrated whether as a result of their own actions 
during the war or because of the territorial settlements 
agreed upon by the Allied powers as part of the peace 
settlement in Europe. This was particularly true of 
displaced persons (DPs) from Eastern Europe. Initially 
there were a number of forcible repatriations, 
particularly to areas under the post-war jurisdiction of 
the Sovie t Union, but shift s in foreign policy, as the 
cold war took hold of the popular imagination and co-
operation between the West and the Soviet Union was 
replaced by confrontation, resulted in the cessation of 
such forcible repatriations as western governments became 
unwilling to return people to what was increasingly seen 
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as a Communist dictatorship abhorrent to the western 
democracies. Subsequently, international responsibility 
for the welfare of the displaced persons and their 
eventual resettlement was brought to bear on the West. A 
number of countries accepted refugees, the largest 
numbers being absorbed by the United States of America, 
Canada, Great Britain and Australia. 
The manpower shortage 
However, humani tarian concerns were not the overriding 
feature of the post-war population resettlements. The 
change in attitude towards the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent policy shift away from forced repatriations 
was beneficial to the post-war manpower drive as refugees 
unwilling to return to the Soviet Union represented a 
useful source of additional labour available to the 
Western economies which were undergoing a desperate 
process of post-war reconstruction. By using the labour 
of the displaced persons the Western powers were also 
able to ease the economic burden of the administration 
and maintenance of the DP camps. 
There was particular interest in using these sources of 
labour in agricul tural work due to concern tha t there 
would be insufficient manpower in this sector of the 
economy after the prisoners of war held in Britain, the 
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majority of whom had been used in essential agricultural 
work, were repatriated. Prisoners-of war in Britain 
had ei ther to have been repatriated or conferred wi th 
civilian status by 31 December 1948. In addition to the 
new influx of displaced persons from Europe the ex-
prisoners of war were also given the option of remaining 
in Britain for an initial period of a further six months 
to continue with essential work, mainly in agriculture. 
There were also concerns about supplying industries 
essential to the reconstruction of Britain and its 
economy with sufficient labour. This was also true of a 
number of other countries who accepted refugees, for 
example, Belgium's contribution to the refugee problem 
was to accept 20,000 miners and their families from 
amongst the Poles and inhabitants of the displaced 
persons camps.2 In Britain two of the first industries 
in which an agreement about the employment of EVWs was 
reached were the cotton and wool industries. These were 
thought to be essential industries in that they greatly 
contributed to the export drive Britain required to gain 
foreign currency. However, by 30 June 1947 of the 6,300 
EVWs who had been placed in employment since 1 January 
1947, only 564 had been placed in textiles, the most 
common employment being agriculture with 2,268 European 
Volunteer Workers and hospi tal work wi th 1,836 EVWs. 3 
One of the main reasons for their slow absorption into 
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the textile industry was the lack of suitable 
accommodation in the areas where work was available. 
More women were encouraged to take advantage of the 
labour schemes than were men because many of the labour 
shortages were in jobs traditionally thought of as 
women's employment. This was particularly the case in 
the textile industries. These shortages were often due 
to British women who had worked during the war returning 
to the home when it ended. Female refugees were also 
thought to be less troublesome than men and easier to 
absorb into the British community. Despite this, women 
accounted for only one-quarter of all refugees who 
entered Britain as part of the EVW schemes. 4 
The foreign labour schemes 
The first foreign labour scheme to be undertaken in 
Britain to deal with these labour shortages was the BaIt 
Cygnet scheme which involved the employment of Baltic 
women. The largest foreign labour scheme was entitled 
Wes tward Ho! and ini t ially involved the recrui tment of 
BaIts and Ukrainians in the British zones of Germany and 
Austria. This scheme was later expanded to the 
recruitment from the British, American and French zones 
of displaced persons of any nationality, including large 
numbers of Poles. Other labour schemes were the North 
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Sea scheme, which brought 10,000 German women to Britain , 
the Blue Danube scheme which recruited 2,000 Austrian 
women, and the recrui tment of 5,000 Italians of both 
sexes. 5 These schemes were all ended in 1950, with the 
exception of the recruitment of Italian women which 
continued until March 1951. 
The first foreign labour scheme, entitled BaIt Cygnet, 
was introduced in 1946 and involved transporting to 
Bri tain women prepared to take employment in hospi tals 
which were in desperate need of more labour. The scheme 
was then expanded to the recruitment of BaIts and 
Ukrainians as unskilled industrial workers and became 
known as the Westward Hol scheme. The first volunteers 
under the scheme arrived in April 1947. Male displaced 
persons were also allowed into the country as part of 
this scheme. Initially Poles were not recruited under 
this scheme as it was felt necessary to settle the large 
numbers in the Polish Resettlement Corps first, but as 
the demand for labour remained unsatisfied displaced 
Poles also became eligible for EVW status. Up to the end 
of October 1947 the cost of administering the Westward 
Hol scheme had been £780,000, by the end of October 1948 
this total figure had risen to £2,750,000. 6 This 
represented the cost of selecting of EVWs in Germany and 
Austria, transporting them to Britain and maintaining 
them until placed in employment. 
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In addi t ion to being 
maintained free of charge in the camps whilst unemployed, 
the refugees were also given a money allowance of £1 on 
arrival plus a further five shillings pocket money per 
week whilst waiting to be placed in employment. 
Clothing coupons were also issued. Once placed in 
employment the travelling costs of a refugee to his/her 
place of employment, if some distance away from the 
refugee's accommodation, was also borne by the 
Government. The costs for 1948 also included the costs 
of approximately 3,000 dependants who had also been 
brought to Britain. 
Provision was made for the possible deportation of any 
EVWs who proved unsuitable or unsatisfactory workers and 
undesirable residents in Britain. Deportation would take 
place to the country from which the refugee had been 
brought to Britain. However, as will be outlined later, 
deportation was only used with reluctance against 
recalcitrant workers and those who adhered to the terms 
of their employment were allowed to settle permanently in 
Britain. The permanency of their settlement was 
recognized by the Minister of Labour and National 
Service, George Isaacs, in 1948 who stated in the House 
of Commons: 
"This is settlement of a permanent 
character. These people come here, 
Page 69 
working their 
citizenship.,,7 
passage to British 
There was some misunderstanding and misapprehension 
amongst the EVWs about possible time limits being imposed 
upon their stay in Britain and to counter this the 
Bri tish Government found it necessary to circulate a 
leaflet in several languages which stated quite clearly 
that no such time limit existed. 
Selection, suitability and security 
The displaced persons were interviewed by Ministry of 
Labour officials whilst in the camps in Europe to assess 
their industrial suitability. However, the refugees 
were assessed for general suitability rather than for 
specific occupations. The volunteers were not told which 
jobs they would be given until after their arrival in 
Britain. For example, many former agricultural workers 
were placed in industrial employment in Britain, whilst 
many former industrial workers found themselves being 
employed in agriculture. Industrial workers finding 
themselves in agriculture often took the first 
opportunity to leave and to resume industrial employment. 
Former agricul tural workers were less likely to leave 
industrial employment for farm work on account of the 
generally higher wages in the industrial sector and, in 
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addition they had already tended to find themselves 
comfortable living accommodation. 8 
Selection was carried out mainly on the general 
suitability for labour but other criteria were also 
imposed. There were age limits of 50 for men and 40 for 
women; those intended for the textile industry were not 
normally accepted if over 35 years old. These age limits 
were not always strictly adhered to and some EVWs over 
the age of 50 were allowed into Bri tain. A general 
medical examination and an X-ray examination to detect 
tuberculosis was required of all volunteers for the 
labour schemes. Unfortunately, medical facilities in 
Germany were often inadequate for effective screening to 
take place. The main official concerns about the 
physical health of the EVWs were tuberculosis, venereal 
disease and pregnancy. Interviewers were also asked to 
look for signs of 'good character' as 'bad types' were 
undesirable as potential long-term settlers. However, 
all these checks were not enough to ensure that all the 
workers were a good long-term prospect, as a number who 
were accepted later showed to have psychological problems 
which had resulted from their experiences during the 
Second World War and prolonged residence in the displaced 
persons camps. There was official concern over the 
mental health of volunteers but effective screening was 
not possible in the context of the facilities on offer in 
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Germany and the short period of time which could be given 
to the individual screening of each potential EVW. The 
screening issue was to re-emerge later in the debates on 
the possible existence of war criminals of East European 
nationality resident in Britain. 
The accommodation problem and the transport shortages led 
to a preference for accepting onto the labour schemes 
people without dependants. However, during the first six 
months of the Westward Ho! labour scheme dependants were 
allowed into Britain, although families were often 
resident in different parts of the country. 
Approxima tely 1,500 EVWs were admi t ted wi th dependant s 
due to follow them as soon as possible 9 before 
accommodation difficulties resulted in the decision to 
limit recruitment to single persons only, which was 
effective from 1 July 1947. 10 These recruits were 
required to sign a declaration that they were single and 
had no dependant relatives. 
As far as security screening was concerned, it was 
assumed that they had already been screened by the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the 
Control Commission in order to be given displaced person 
status. Such interviews often involved little more than 
asking the displaced persons to confirm details about 
their home town or to show some knowledge of the language 
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of their claimed country of origin. The large numbers of 
people who required screening meant that a number of 
wartime collaborators managed to slip through the net as 
did still undetected numbers of war criminals. Due to 
the pressure to allow EVWs into Britain and get them 
working, by 14 July 1947 16,488 EVWs had arrived in 
Britain, 8,863 already being in employment,ll further 
screening was also less than diligent. Arrangements were 
made in 1950 for individual interviews to be conducted 
with those who entered Britain in large groups during and 
after the Second World War, as this had not been possible 
at the port of arrival due to the large numbers involved. 
Again, such interviews were not as extensive as 
originally intended and demanded in some quarters. 
Concern about the efficiency of security screening 
continued to be expressed. In April 1950 the Home 
Secretary, James Chuter Ede, had still been finding it 
necessary to reassure his colleagues in Parliament that 
securi ty checks had been carried out on the refugees 
after questions were raised about the possibility of 
"saboteurs" amongst the 100,000 EVWs who had been 
admitted to Britain in the previous five years.12 
Questions of security continued to be expressed 
throughout the following decades, culminating in the War 
Crimes Enquiry carried out by Thomas Hetherington and 
William Chalmers in the 1980s. 
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Some of the security measures included an element 
designed to protect the refugees. For example, although 
refugees were obliged to register their address with the 
police, this address remained confidential and let ters 
could not be forwarded through this source except on 
compassionate grounds. In such cases the name and 
address of the person sending the letter was taken and it 
was made clear to the refugees that they were under no 
compulsion to reply. It was hoped that this would cut 
down on the number of threats which could be sent to the 
refugees, the mailing of threats being a popular scare 
tactic of the Communist secret services in Eastern 
Europe. It was also made clear to worried refugees that 
no foreign authority had the power to force them to leave 
Britain, and that any cases where improper pressure was 
being placed on them to do so should be reported to the 
police. 
Consultations with organized labour 
To prevent ill-feeling, particularly with the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) which had a great deal of influence 
over its National Executive Committee,13 the Labour 
Government negotiated the terms of employment of 
Europeans under the labour schemes with trades unions as 
well as with employers. Both the British Employers 
C f d r tl·on and the TUC and later the individual on e e a , 
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unions concerned, were consulted. The Government had 
initially hoped the conditions agreed with reference to 
the employment of Poles could be extended to include EVWs 
but the TUC insisted on new negotiations. However, there 
was little opposition amongst the TUC leadership to the 
general usage of volunteer labour from the DP camps. It 
was agreed that rates of pay for the EVWs should be the 
same as those applying to Bri tish workers to prevent a 
foreign workforce undercutting domestic labour, and they 
were to be employed only where British labour was 
unavailable. This had also been the procedure during the 
war regarding the employment of enemy prisoners of war 
held in Britain. Promotion prospects for EVWs were 
severely restricted. In addition, male EVWs employed in 
jobs usually taken by women were to receive the same, 
higher, rates of pay that British men would receive in 
similar employment. The EVWs also received rationed 
goods equivalent to those allowed British citizens doing 
the same type of employment. Where necessary the EVWs 
would also be issued with some second-hand clothing. 
The views of the trades unions are difficult to gauge. 
Although ready to make agreements on a national level 
with regard to the employment of EVWs, there were often 
objections expressed on a local level to the use of 
foreign labour. Stadulis, in a study of contemporary 
trades union periodicals, found only news notes on the 
-- Page 75 
progress of negotiations between the Ministry of Labour 
and union representatives in the journals of both the 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, two unions which held the most openly 
hostile views on the admission of foreign labour to 
Britain. The hostility of local NUM branches meant that 
the recruitment of EVWs into the coalmining industry had 
to be suspended in July 1948. The textile unions did not 
provide their own journals. The most outspoken journal 
on the subject was the 'The Land Worker' of the National 
Union of Agricultural Workers. 14 The agricultural unions 
particularly objected to the use of gang labour 
administered by the county agricultural executives, as 
these served to undermine the improvements to conditions 
and wages being sought by regular agricultural workers. 
The county agricultural executives finally capitulated to 
this view, which gained ministerial support, and began to 
move away from the use of gang labour in autumn 1949. 
Those workers made unemployed involved a high proportion 
of EVWs. 
However, despite the negotiations with the trades unions, 
resentment from sections of the British population 
towards the foreign workers did appear, particularly when 
it was fel t tha t they were taking the jobs of Bri tish 
citizens. In March 1952 Cyril Osborne spoke in the House 
of Commons that 
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"there is already fear of redundancy in 
many industries, and that there will be a 
great deal of resentment if our own 
people find themselves out of work while 
foreigners keep their jobs."lS 
However, the Government was satisfied that such a 
situation would not occur because of a clause in the 
foreign workers scheme which stated that foreign labour 
was to be used only when British labour was unavailable. 
In most industries in which foreign workers had been 
recruited there was also an agreement with the 
appropriate union that foreign workers would be the first 
to go in the event of redundancies. It was the 
responsibility of the parties involved to decide if such 
clauses were to be adhered to. In many cases they were 
not put into operation. For example, when depression hit 
the textile industry in 19S1 the unions did not oppose 
the employers' policy of putting both British and foreign 
workers on short time so that redundancies of any kind 
could be avoided. EVWs who were made redundant were 
covered by the National Insurance Act and were therefore 
entitled to use the social services; they also received 
help from the local employment exchanges to find new 
employment. 
These feelings of job insecurity were expressed against 
the introduction of foreign labour but were often based 
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on the experiences of Bri tish labour before the Second 
World War rather than on previous contact with the 
incoming national groups. 
In strong union areas hostility was also expressed at the 
EVWs' reluctance to become involved in union matters. 
The TUC were unapproving of EVW attempts to set up their 
own national groups within the unions, although the 
Transport and General Workers' Union did actually 
encourage the formation of such groups within the London 
area. British workers were also hostile to the EVWs' 
reluctance to become involved in trades disputes. 
However, the EVWs had good reason not to become involved 
as, if the strike was unofficial, they risked 
deportation. Vocal left-wing elements of the trades 
union movement were also disapproving of the EVWs' 
antagonism towards the Sovie t Union. However, despi te 
this, in places where foreign labour was introduced 
hostility towards the EVWs was sometimes reduced as they 
became known as individuals to their British fellow 
workers rather than as the threatened mass of cheap 
foreign labour. 
Employment - restrictions on choice 
More choice was afforded to the volunteer workers, as 
civilians, than had been the case with prisoners of war 
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when being allocated employment. However, jobs did have 
to be approved by the Ministry of Labour and the 
industries defined as 'essential' to economic 
reconstruction had first calIon this source of labour. 
Jobs available to the EVWs were often of a similar type 
to those done by the prisoners of war whom they replaced 
as the prisoners were repatriated. Employers wishing to 
employ foreign labour had to make their application to 
the local Ministry of Labour office which would allocate 
a worker to them if Bri tish labour proved unavailable. 
EVWs were asked by the Ministry of Labour to stay in the 
industry in which they were placed for a period of at 
least 12 months. 
The actual contract of employment was not shown to the 
refugee until arrival in Britain. In the DP camps on the 
Continent a leaflet was distributed to all prospective 
EVWs which stated that recruits would be paid the same 
wages and be employed under the same conditions as 
British workers. Recruits to the scheme were then 
required to sign an undertaking in which they declared 
their willingness to accept employment found for them by 
the Government. The contract of employment signed by the 
refugee upon the commencement of employment in Bri tain 
was a separate document. In this contract it was 
stipulated that deductions would be made from the wages 
of the refugee to cover social insurance contributions 
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and similar taxes. These contributions entitled the 
refugees to use all of the social security benefits 
available to Bri tish ci tizens should they be required. 
Briefly, these benefits comprised accident, sickness, 
unemployment, maternity and widow's benefits, guardian's 
allowances, retirement pensions and death grants. 
Special arrangements were made to enable refugee workers 
who had not been resident in Bri tain for a sufficient 
period to still be eligible for sickness and unemployment 
benefits. This gave the EVWs greater security than was 
the case in many of the other countries which had been 
willing to accept them. 
Changes in employment within the undermanned industries 
were allowed but moving from an undermanned essential 
industry to other employment was not looked upon 
favourably and was permitted only in exceptional 
circumstances, for example by moving away from heavy 
manual labour due to persistent ill health. However, 
when viewed in the context of similar restrictions on 
British citizens employed in agriculture and coalmining, 
which were introduced in 1947, the reluctance to permit 
changes in occupation amongst EVWs seem less draconian. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that employment 
restrictions were more rigorously enforced against EVWs 
than against the British population. 16 
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Those EVWs who changed employment without first seeking 
the permission of the local Ministry of Labour offices 
could be prosecuted under the Aliens Order, 1920. 
However, this was resorted to only in particularly 
serious cases. On a more threatening note to the 
refugees, they also risked deportation. However this was 
unlikely if they had transferred into another of the 
undermanned industries. Again, as with prosecutions, 
there was a certain amount of reluctance to deport EVWs 
who had committed only minor offences against employment 
restrictions, and deportation was usually resorted to 
only in the case of recalcitrant EVWs who persistently 
ignored the rules governing their occupational mobility. 
In the course of events, only 602 of the 91,000 arrivals 
were deported; 125 up to the end of 1948, 163 during 
1949, and 314 in 1950. No deportations were made after 
the end of the probationary period of EVWs. There were 
also 3,828 who returned voluntarily although amongst 
these were a number of bad conduct cases who would 
otherwise have been deported. 17 
Restrictions on the type of employment available to an 
EVW were maintained for the first three years of 
residence in Britain, with the exception of EVWs married 
to British subjects from whom restrictions were lifted in 
October 1948. The extension of employment restrictions 
beyond the initial twelve months was much misunderstood 
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by the EVWs, many 
restrictions could 
indefinite period of 
of whom, not realising 
in fact be maintained for 
time, had held the belief 
that 
an 
that 
restrictions were in operation for the first year only. 
In particular, it was a source of disquiet amongst those 
displaced persons whose background had not been one of 
manual labour and were expecting the opportunity to 
return to something approximate to their 
after completing a twelve month period 
industrial or agricultural employment. 
former status 
of unskilled 
The one year 
clause had in fact been a safety measure for the British 
authorities to enable the deportation of any workers not 
found satisfactory after that initial period. It also 
appeased those opponents of the scheme who had expressed 
concern about the large influx of refugees into Britain 
who, in their view, may prove difficult to integrate into 
British society. 
The Control of Engagement Orders affecting British 
workers were removed in March 1950 and this, along with 
external pressure from the International Refugee 
Organization and the Economic and Social Council of the 
United Nations, paved the way for employment restrictions 
to be gradually removed from EVWs throughout 1951 and 
1952. By January 1953, with the employment restrictions 
removed, EVWs were reclassified as foreign workers 
recruited under various employment schemes rather than 
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being referred under the all-embracing title of 'European 
Volunteer Workers'. However, despite the freedom of 
choice of employment now available to former EVWs, 
existing industrial agreements reached with the trades 
unions regarding the use of foreign workers were to 
remain in force throughout the 1950s, which continued to 
affect the promotion prospects of former EVWs, including 
moves from unskilled to skilled work, and discriminated 
against them when redundancies became necessary. Some 
restrictions were also maintained on older professional 
EVWs returning to their former occupations. For example, 
dentists had to undertake a one-year course at London 
University before being allowed to practise in Britain. 
Doctors also had to requalify to British standards. 
However, language and financial difficulties sometimes 
prevented them from doing so. Other professions, for 
example lawyers and ex-Army officers, were often unable 
to achieve their former status and remained in manual or 
semi-skilled employment. 
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Statistics - the numbers involved 
The number of foreign workers recruited on official 
schemes were18 : 
1947 
1948 
1949 
37,594 
40,225 
8,661 
1950 
1951 
4,728 
2,613 
The bulk of these workers were from displaced persons' 
camps and comprised mainly BaIts and Ukrainians. Figures 
given by Paul Foot are 30,000 Ukrainians, 14,000 Poles, 
12,000 Latvians and 10,000 Yugoslavs. He does not give 
an estimate of either Estonians or Lithuanians who also 
arrived in considerable numbers .19 After May 1949 the 
arrivals were restricted to women volunteers. The 
principal industries and occupations in which these 
foreign workers were employed were agriculture, 
coalmining, textiles, brickmaking, domestic service 
(mainly in hospitals and institutions) and nursing. 
However, as restrictions on types of employment available 
to EVWs were lifted there was a marked shift away from 
some of these jobs into ones with better pay and better 
conditions. Agriculture suffered particularly badly from 
shifts in employment. 
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The breakdown into male and female employment can be seen 
in the following comparisons of the numbers of first 
placings of EVWs at 9 September 1950. 20 Of the 33,158 
women recruited 27 per cent had entered the cotton 
industry, 22 per cent were domestics in hospitals and 
similar institutions, 15 per cent had found other 
domestic employment, 15 per cent were in the woollen 
industry, and 7 per cent had found employment in nursing. 
Only 65 women had found employment in agriculture, 
compared to 29,554, or 52 per cent, of the men. Other 
major sources of male EVW employment were coalmining (19 
per cent), non-hospital domestics (6 per cent), brick and 
allied industries (5 per cent), and the iron and steel 
industries (3 per cent). Four per cent of men were also 
involved in various aspects of the textiles industry 
(excluding hosiery). In addition to these figures, 919 
women and 1,458 men were employed by the National Service 
Hostels Corporation in maintaining the EVW camps and 
hostels. However, some occupa tions fared bet ter than 
others at retaining EVW employees after the removal of 
employment restrictions. Domestic employment lost many 
of its female EVWs, some of whom gave up working after 
having children. Many EVWs employed in agriculture left 
at the earliest opportunity, due to better wages and 
working conditions in other industries, and to move to 
more densely populated areas in order to escape the 
isolation they suffered in rural life. 
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Coalmining also 
lost a high percentage of EVWs first placed in the 
industry, a primary cause being the hostili ty of the 
local NUM branches to their introduction. On 2 July 1949 
there had been 6,966 EVWs on the colliery books, but by 
the corresponding date in 1955 this number had fallen to 
3,998 former EVWs. 21 
The EVWs were generally viewed by employers as very 
satisfactory employees who were hardworking and 
conscientious. This was mainly due to the refugees' 
attitude towards work which was basically to earn as much 
money as possible in order to obtain some degree of 
financial security after the deprivations suffered by 
them during the Second World War. Overtime was 
particularly attractive to them for this reason. In some 
cases this led to dislike by their English colleagues who 
thought them too eager and a threat to working conditions 
which had been won for them by the trades unions. These 
feelings of hostility grew worse when threatened with 
unemployment. Many employers were reluctant to allow 
EVWs to leave to take jobs elsewhere, but there was 
Ii t tIe they could do if other employers were offering 
better conditions and wages. Other EVWs sought 
employment elsewhere in order to move nearer to relatives 
employed in other parts of the country. The employers 
were often disgruntled that the Ministry of Labour 
allowed such changes in employment of workers who had 
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been trained and, in some cases provided with 
accommodation, by their first employers but the 
Ministry's officials felt there was little they could do 
to stop such changes in employment without being accused 
of treating the EVWs as slave labour. 22 
Accommodation 
The biggest restriction, however, in allowing the 
displaced persons into Britain was the availability of 
suitable accommodation. Accommodation was in short 
supply for the domestic population and the housing of 
refugees could not be seen to be taking priority. Arthur 
Horner, general secretary of the National Union of 
Mineworkers, actually put forward the view in February 
1947 that the building of new houses for foreign workers 
"while the miners continued to live in slums" as an 
objection to the use of foreign labour in the pi ts. 23 
There were also problems in finding accommodation for the 
Poles whose resettlement in Britain had already been 
agreed and provision for these Poles took precedence over 
any further influx of refugees. On arrival the EVWs were 
accommodated in transit camps near the port of arrival 
before being transferred to one of nine holding camps 
situated in various parts of the country which were 
staffed largely by the refugees themselves and could 
accommodate approximately 10,000 people. 24 It was 
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reported in Parliament on 28 June 1948 that £46,000 
capital costs had already been incurred by the Ministry 
of Works in providing the transit and holding hostels for 
EVWs. 25 
After employment had been found for the EVWs they were 
then moved on to available hostels or private lodgings 
nearer to their place of work which had been found for 
them by the Ministry of Labour officials. In 1951 there 
were still 118 workers' hostels open in Britain, housing 
not just EVWs but also members of the Polish Resettlement 
Corps and approximately 17,000 British workers. 26 
Officials tried, wherever possible, to house married 
couples in the same hostel and arrange for them to find 
work in the same district in order to prevent later 
requests to change employment on account of family 
separation. Once in employment a charge, ini tially 30 
shillings for men, and 25 shillings for women, was made 
on the EVWs for food and accommodation. Although EVWs in 
employment were liable to income tax, hostel charges were 
exempted from assessment for income tax. Hostel 
accommodation was meant as a temporary measure only since 
space was limited and hostel life did little to integrate 
the refugees into the larger British community. 
The hostels and holding camps were lacking in comfort, 
since the sites were intended as only temporary 
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residences. Complaints about the conditions within the 
hostels were forthcoming from both the EVWs themselves 
and from representatives of visiting organizations such 
as the Women's Voluntary Service and the International 
Refugee Organization. Complaints were also made by some 
EVWs about the behaviour of the hostel managers and their 
treatment of the refugees. There were also conflicts 
between hostel residents of differing nationalities. 
Some improvements were made 
remained on transferring 
to condi tions but priori ty 
the EVWs to private 
accommodation as soon as possible. 
The EVWs were thus restricted to employment in areas 
where such accommodation was available. To combat this 
restriction some of the larger employers provided hostel 
accommodation of their own. Farmers were also encouraged 
to provide accommodation for any EVW labour they wished 
to use, and by applying to the Board of Trade they could 
receive dockets for furniture and linen it was necessary 
to provide for the EVWs. However, landlords were not 
always altruistic in their motives and a minority 
provided sub-standard accommodation and exploited their 
foreign tenants who were unaccustomed to British money or 
ways. These welfare concerns were often deal t wi th in 
the immediate period after their arrival by the Ministry 
of Labour's welfare organization, the National Hostels 
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Corpora tion, wi th valuable help being given by various 
voluntary bodies. 
There were three separate hostels set up for the 
accommodation of dependants of the EVWs who were unable 
to find private lodgings. In most of these hostels 
dependants were forced to live separately from the EVW. 
When families were separated the search to find private 
accommodation became more pressing. The first of the 
family hostels to close was in May 1950, the second 
following in the autumn of 1952. However, 150 dependants 
were still being housed in the remaining hostel as late 
as 1956. 27 In December 1949 the Refugees' Housing 
Society was established to raise funds for providing a 
home for the elderly parents of EVWs who would otherwise 
have been unable to come to Britain. This home was 
opened in Wandsworth on 20 March 1951. The associa tion 
was founded by Harold Ingham and it received aid from the 
Guide International Service and the Bri tish Red Cross 
Society as well as donations from other sources. The 
first ten residents of the home were of Estonian, 
Latvian, Polish and Ukrainian nationality. Relatives of 
the residents made a contribution towards maintenance. 
However, the association also appealed for charitable 
donations. There was also the opening of a hostel for 
former displaced persons in Britain sponsored by the 
British Council for Aid to Refugees in June 1951. It 
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offered accommodation for 59 people, with priority being 
given to the elderly. The need for such accommoda tion 
was illustrated by the oversubscription for places in the 
home which were made by 1,500 relatives of displaced 
persons. 28 
The EVWs moved into private accommodation as soon as any 
became available. Families often pooled their resources 
to enable them to purchase properties and as a result 
this accommodation was often as overcrowded as the 
hostels. It also resulted in a number of European 
Volunteer Workers becoming landlords to other displaced 
persons. During the 1950s some former EVWs moved into 
council properties, but proportionately fewer than 
compared to the population as a whole. This was due to 
both the attitudes of the EVWs who had a strong desire to 
own their own homes and were prepared to make many 
sacrifices to do so, and also to the lack of priori ty 
assigned to them on council housing waiting lists. By 
the middle of 1950 approximately 50 per cent of EVWs had 
found accommodation other than that provided by the 
hostels,29 by 1956 it has been estimated that little more 
than 3,000 EVWs and their dependants remained in 
hostels. 30 
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The Distressed Relatives Scheme 
In addition to the labour schemes it is also necessary to 
consider the Distressed Relatives Scheme. This was in 
effect forced upon the British Government by the lack of 
volunteers for EVW schemes who were wi thout dependants. 
This scheme made it possible for families to be reunited, 
be it with spouse, children or elderly parents in need of 
care. Maintenance and accommodation was to be provided 
by the person already resident in Bri tain. Briefly, 
those allowed in when the scheme was announced in 
Parliament in November 1945 were : wives, husbands unable 
to support their wives abroad, children under the age of 
21 and one daughter over 21 if, otherwise she would be 
left on her own, as well as females under 21 and males 
under 18 with no relatives abroad but one in Britain 
prepared to take them in, and finally elderly parents 
unable to care for themselves. Those admitted into the 
country who were capable of working, particularly the 
young people, came under the condition that they should 
be allowed to take only that employment approved by the 
Ministry of Labour. Guarantees of maintenance were 
required before any visa was granted and such guarantees 
were checked for their validi ty. Married EVW couples 
were also required, from July 1947 onwards, to sign an 
undertaking agreeing to live separately if work could not 
be found for them both in the same geographical area. 
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However, this did not prevent subsequent difficulties 
when requests were made to transfer employment to a 
location nearer to that of a spouse, and in cases where 
EVWs already in Britain became insistent on joining their 
partners they were allowed to do so without disciplinary 
measures being taken. 
Transport arrangements were the responsibility of those 
involved rather than the Government. 31 The costs were to 
be met by the host already in Britain and the 
arrangements were to be organized through the Central 
Office for Refugees, and the transport itself was 
organized by the Bri tish Red Cross which was also to 
organize reception in Britain. Owing to the limi ted 
transport facilities there was often a considerable wait 
for distressed relatives coming to Britain. To limit the 
numbers entering Britain and to ease transport 
difficulties people without dependants were preferred for 
the Westward Ho! scheme. The backlog of transportation 
for dependants, in addi tion to the problems faced in 
finding suitable accommodation, was responsible for the 
re-introduction of restricting the EVW schemes to those 
without dependants in July 1947. 
By 30 May 1946924 people had arrived in Britain under 
the terms of the Distressed Relatives Scheme and it was 
known that there were many more on the Continent waiting 
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for transport. 32 By 18 November 1946 the number of 
people who had arrived in Bri tain as a resul t of the 
Distressed Relatives scheme had increased to 2,525. 33 In 
May 1951 this total had risen to 3,707 dependants of 
EVWs. 34 Figures given in Parliament breakdown the 
number of dependants of European Volunteer Workers 
allowed into Britain into 268 men, 1,696 women and 1,860 
children. 35 The number admi tted to Bri tain qualifying 
under criteria outlined in the Distressed Relatives 
Scheme had risen to 6,500 by October 1956 and, in 
addition, a further 2,500 had been admitted who had not 
actually qualified under the terms of the scheme. The 
Distressed Relatives Scheme remained in operation but in 
cases of extreme hardship some people who fell outside 
the terms of the scheme were allowed into Britain. 36 
Healthcare provisions 
The health of the European Volunteer Workers was an 
important issue since sick EVWs would be unable to 
undertake the employment for which they had been brought 
to Britain. Whilst in hostels provided by the National 
Service Hostels Corporation they were administered by 
doctors appointed by the Corporation. These doctors were 
also responsible for supervising the arrangement for 
general camp hygiene. The greatest problems with the 
refugees' health were their susceptibility to 
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tuberculosis and mental disorders as a resul t of their 
wartime experiences and the realities of camp and hostel 
life. To help ease the boredom of camp life, something 
which the EVWs experienced over a prolonged period, 
recreational facilities, for example sports and concerts, 
were arranged. 
Initially, a distinction was made between those who were 
ill or pregnant before they arrived in Britain and those 
who became so afterwards. Those who were ill or pregnant 
before arrival were returned to Germany (except pregnant 
EVWs with husbands already in Britain), those who became 
so after arrival had provision made for them. They were 
cared for and maintained by the authorities during 
periods of sickness or unemployment until they qualified 
for benefit under the newly created National Health and 
Unemployment Insurance Schemes. The Government was 
reluctant to deport many sick EVWs for fear of the bad 
publicity which would ensue but by mid-March 1948 79 EVWs 
had been returned to Germany on grounds of ill health. 
After this time it was decided tha t all tuberculosis 
cases should be returned to Germany due to the 
availability of the appropriate medical facilities there 
and the shortage of such facilities in Britain, and that 
those with serious psychological problems should also be 
returned as it would in their interests to be treated in 
a country where language difficulties were less of a 
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problem. 
refugees 
It has been estimated that one per cent of the 
required hospitalization after mental 
breakdowns, a figure which compares to just 0.34 per cent 
of the British population as a whole. 37 Mental 
breakdowns were most common amongst EVWs who entered 
domestic or agricultural work in which they found 
themselves 
nationality. 
removed from refugees of their own 
All other illnesses, and also pregnancies, 
were in future to be treated in Britain. Later, as more 
facilities became available, it was decided that 
tuberculosis and psychiatric cases should also be treated 
in Britain. 
Whenever EVWs were returned on medical grounds protests 
were forthcoming from both the refugees' own welfare 
groups in Britain and also from the International Refugee 
Organization. It was argued that such returns unsettled 
other EVWs in Britain who feared for their own security 
as future residents of Britain should anything happen to 
prevent them from working. The International Refugee 
Organization also expressed concern about the reception 
of sick EVWs in Germany following their return. At best 
the reception which could be hoped for was one of 
indifference, and at worst one of hostility, and either 
way it would be a distressing experience for these sick 
and disturbed individuals. It was these reactions to the 
policy of returning sick EVWs combined with international 
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calls for countries to accept more of the 'hard core' 
Displaced Persons who had been unable to find 
resettlement elsewhere due to illness, disability or 
social and political reasons, which led the British 
Government to abandon its early policy and agree to treat 
all sick EVWs in Bri tain. Ini tially EVWs wi th 
tuberculosis were treated in hospitals which had been set 
up for the Polish armed forces during the war. This was 
followed by the establishment of a tuberculosis hospital 
specifically for EVWs. 
Although female EVWs were no longer to face deportation 
should they become pregnant their treatment by the 
British authorities still left something to be desired. 
No plans were made to provide married quarters in the 
industrial hostels and the situation arose where female 
EVWs on becoming unemployed after reaching the advanced 
stages of pregnancy were made to leave the hostels. The 
MP Ivor Thomas was concerned that these women, thrown out 
of the industrial hostels and often unable to find 
lodgings locally, suffered unnecessary hardship. 
However, the view of the Government remained unchanged; 
industrial hostels were designed to accommodate 
transferred industrial workers and were unsuitable for 
mothers with young children. 38 In such cases the Women's 
Voluntary Service often involved itself trying to make 
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alternative arrangements for unmarried mothers amongst 
the EVWs. 
Food rations allocated to all EVWs were the same as those 
for British workers in similar jobs. This did not, 
however, prevent accusations from some people, including 
a number of Members of Parliament, for example Albert 
Stubbs, Major Legge-Bourke and Captain Crookshank in the 
Commons and Lord Willoughby de Eresby in the Lords, that 
EVWs rations were in fact higher than those of British 
workers. This was consistently refuted by the Government 
but some refused to be reassured. 
Language teaching and educational provision 
It was also important that the EVWs, only 10 per cent of 
whom had any knowledge of English on arrival,9 mastered 
sufficient English to be able to work efficiently and 
classes were arranged for them with the assistance of the 
local education authorities and various voluntary 
organizations. The provision of textbooks and other 
teaching materials in the holding hostels was the 
responsibility of the local education authorities but the 
costs to them were reimbursed by the Ministry of Labour. 
Attendance of English classes for refugees other than 
those allocated to the pits tended to be voluntary, and 
were not always undertaken by the EVWs who, being in 
-- Page 98 --
full-time employment, often preferred to use their free 
hours for more leisurely pursui ts. In November 1947 a 
responsibility on the part of the refugee to learn 
sufficient English was added to the explanatory leaflet 
outlining the conditions of entry. However, this was not 
enforced after the EVW had been placed in employment. 
EVWs des tined for work in the collierie s were given a 
compulsory ten-week language course for safety reasons, 
knowledge of mining terms being taught in addi tion to 
basic general English language. Under the direction of 
Mr. B. L. Vulliamy, the director of studies to the 
National Coal Board, 160 intellectuals from amongst the 
Poles and other foreign volunteers were trained on a 4-5 
week course as English teachers and were subsequently 
used to teach the Poles and EVWs intended for work in the 
collieries. 40 After completion of the English language 
course, a further three weeks were spent training the 
EVWs in British mining techniques at a Coalmining 
Training Centre. Whilst undertaking English language and 
voca tional training the EVWs were given an addi tional 
allowance by the NCB to supplement that of the Ministry 
of Labour so that they would remain in the industry. 
In some factories the communication problem was partly 
eased by putting EVWs into the same section to work 
together and, if possible, placing them under the 
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supervision of someone who spoke some common language 
with them, for example a refugee from Central or Eastern 
Europe who had been resident in Britain for a number of 
years. In later years, after the removal of employment 
restrictions, a number of refugees found their promotion 
prospects hampered by their lack of ability in the 
English language. 
Other educational opportunities for the EVWs were 
limited. They had come to Britain as foreign labour on 
two year contracts and any educational activities 
undertaken by them were by necessity carried out in their 
spare time. After their two year contracts were at an 
end a return to full-time education remained unlikely due 
to their individual financial situations. Throughout 
1949 the International Student Service contacted students 
amongs t the EVWs to provide them wi th informa tion on 
evening and correspondence courses and to put them in 
touch with British students. The International Student 
Service reported that although most EVWs desired to 
complete their studies the physically strenuous 
occupations in which they were employed and the 
overcrowded living conditions of hostel life made study 
difficult. 41 From December 1949 EVWs under 30 years of 
age were permitted to undertake a full-time educational 
course of at least two-years duration after completing at 
least 18 months of full-time employment. Forty-four 
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applications were received in the next 18 months, the 
majori ty of which were successful. 42 However, despi te 
few applications being made by former displaced persons 
for study places, such applications were not always given 
sympathetic consideration. For example, the students at 
Liverpool University rejected the admission of a 
Displaced Person in 1949, stating the British 
Universities should be for the British. 43 However, 
schemes to offer places to the displaced persons, which 
involved an annual levy of one shilling per student, were 
accepted at Oxford, Manchester and Cardiff. 44 
Problems wi th language also combined to create another 
form of hostility amongst British workers who disliked 
their foreign colleagues talking to each other in their 
own language. Such feelings can also be witnessed 
against later arrivals to Britain, for example the Asian 
community. Hostili ty in some Bri tish colleagues also 
resulted from the EVWs' failure to participate in the 
general working community, for example by not attending 
works outings. The EVWs' desire to save as much as their 
earnings as possible sometimes led to accusations of 
meanness by those he who did not understand the 
circumstances which had led them to behave in this way. 
Some efforts were made to educa te EVWs on the Bri tish 
'way of life'. A general booklet was published in eight 
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languages by the Central Office of Information which gave 
information about life in Britain, and this was 
distributed free to all EVWs. A number of other booklets 
were also published. The booklets had such titles as To 
Help You Settle in Britain and Contemporary Life in 
Britain. These booklets tended to be of a pragmatic 
nature, outlining information on basics such as British 
money, weights and measures, rationing and social 
security. Some EVWs had some practical information, for 
example how to cash a postal order, included in their 
English language teaching. The services of the Ministry 
of Labour's Welfare Officers were also made available to 
foreign workers in need of advice and assistance. In 
addition, two bodies were formed to provide further help 
for refugees settling in Britain. These were the Central 
Co-ordinating Committee of Refugee Welfare Organizations, 
formed in 1948, and the British Council for Aid to 
Refugees, formed in 1950. Public libraries did what they 
could for the EVWs by providing books in East European 
languages where there were local East European exile 
communities. 
Preparing an easy reception 
The Churches in Britain were very co-operative in the 
arrangements they made for the reception of the refugees 
and their relatives. The British Council of Churches 
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established a Foreign Workers' Commi ttee, and the 
Catholic Church also had an EVW committee. In addition 
to co-operating over general aid and welfare arrangements 
they also co-operated with the national communities when 
they took moves to establish networks of their own 
priests. The Foreign Workers' Committee was instrumental 
in negotiating the release from their employment 
contracts of EVW priests in order for them to undertake 
religious duties. Initially Orthodox priests serving the 
EVWs were given a maintenance and travel allowance by the 
British Council of Churches but this ended in 1952. 
However, by this time the refugees were already making 
provisions for themselves and contributed towards the 
costs of having their own priests. The Churches in 
Britain provided the EVWs with contacts as well as with 
meeting rooms, and in some cases offered the use of the 
churches for religious services. The Roman Catholic 
Church was particularly helpful to both the Ukrainian and 
Polish Catholic communities in this matter. 
Other voluntary bodies also aided with the reception of 
the EVWs. For example, the Young Men's Christian 
Association and the Young Women's Christian Association 
welcomed foreign members. However, their success was 
limited as the refugees often did not accept such 
invi ta tions to jOin. The Women's Voluntary Service was 
also active in aiding the reception of the EVWs. In 
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addition to the provision of social activities, including 
arrangements for EVWs to visi t Bri tish homes, the WVS 
placed particular emphasis on the welfare requirements of 
the EVWs. Some International Clubs were also established 
but these tended to encourage the involvement of the 
refugees at the expense of British members and thus lost 
their effectiveness in encouraging integration into the 
wider community. 
After the winding down of the International Refugee 
Organization in Britain in 1950, a co-ordinating body, 
the Bri tish Council for Aid to Refugees, was formed to 
oversee the activities of the voluntary agencies. It was 
governed by representatives of twenty of these agencies 
and worked closely with the Home Office and the Ministry 
of Labour. The aim was to aid the resettlement process 
for all refugees finding residence in Bri tain. It was 
also responsible for distributing some funds to refugee 
national bodies, a task in which it was occasionally 
criticised by the refugees who did not always agree with 
the spending priorities of the Council. 
The refugees also established their own national 
organizations, which were often vociferous in calling for 
an improvement in the treatment and rights of their 
members, but these organizations had little influence on 
British officialdom. The national groups also often 
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established contributary welfare funds which supplemented 
the sickness and accident benefits paid to needy 
compatriots. The organizations were strengthened to an 
extent by working together through the Central Co-
ordinating Committee of Refugee Welfare Organizations 
which was formed in April 1948, but overall their 
position was a weak one as they had very little 
bargaining power. Also, the setting up of national 
groups and associations by the refugees sometimes 
hampered their integration into the British community as 
they preferred instead to socialise wi th their fellow 
exiles. Such tendencies are in fact natural but their 
effect should still be noted. Adjustment was also 
retarded in some cases by the hope that in the not too 
distant future after their initial arrival in Britain the 
political situation in Europe would change in such a way 
as to make a return home possible. As this hope faded 
and stronger ties with Britain emerged, for example 
through intermarriage or children growing up in Britain, 
more effort was made to adjust to permanent residency. 
It was not only the EVWs who needed to be educated about 
the British. It was decided early on in the scheme that 
the terms 'Displaced Person' and 'DP' had become 
derogatory and should be replaced by the neutral 
'European Volunteer Worker' or 'EVW'. Newspapers of the 
time carried numerous articles about the EVWs, many of 
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which portrayed them in a positive and sympathetic light. 
However, it was often the articles portraying EVWs in a 
negative way which received the most publicity. In 
October 1947 it was also decided by the Government to 
establish a 'Publicity Committee to educate public 
opinion on foreign workers'. This committee aimed, by 
the production in 1948 of a document enti tIed Workers 
From Abroad, to project a positive image of both Poles 
and EVWs and to dispel hostili ty to their presence 
Britain. 45 The National Coal Board also published 
in 
a 
pamphlet entitled European Labour in British Coalmining 
which was produced to increase the understanding of NCB 
Labour and Welfare officials who were likely to come into 
contact with the foreign recruits. 
Later arrivals - hardcore DPs 
Despite a number of initiatives from many countries to 
accept the post-war refugees there were some displaced 
persons who were not thought attractive migrants and were 
therefore forced to remain in the camps. These were 
mainly the sick and aged. After the winding up of the 
International Refugee Organization in 1950 there was a 
renewed effort to resettle as many people as possible 
from the displaced persons camps on mainland Europe. In 
May 1950 Britain agreed to accept 2,000 of these refugees 
for whom accommodation and maintenance could be provided 
-- Page 106 --
by relatives, friends, other private individuals or 
voluntary organizations. These individuals and 
organiza tions were required in turn to take continued 
responsibility for the refugees admitted on their behalf. 
The British Council for Aid to Refugees was particularly 
active in the operation this scheme. By October 1953 the 
2,000 places had not been filled and it was decided to 
admi t into Bri tain up to 700 people from the displaced 
persons camps for whom continuing guarantees of 
maintenance and accommodation were forthcoming whether 
from charitable organizations or private individuals. In 
August 1954 40 such refugees were admi t ted to Bri tain 
after a fundraising effort by the British Council for Aid 
to Refugees and the provision by them of a new hostel for 
their accommodation. However, in June 1959 there were 
still an estimated 30,000 refugees from the Second World 
War living in camps across Europe, the vast majority of 
them being either old or sick. 46 
Re-emigration of EVWs 
It has been estimated that by the mid-1950s at least one 
half of the EVW recruited labour had re-emigrated to the 
United States or other Commonwealth countries. 47 
However, other estimates h I r than th1" s .4 8 are muc owe 
Some of this re-emigration was caused by fears over job 
security when the shortage of labour no longer existed. 
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For example, there were a large number of applica tions 
for emigration when the textile industry took a downturn 
in 1951. However, by 1952 when the threat of 
unemployment had gone so too did the desire to emigrate 
leave many of the previous year's applicants. 49 Few EVWs 
returned to their own countries. By 11 November 1948 
only 1, 000 of the numbers recrui ted and transported to 
Britain had returned the Continent. 
returned on compassionate grounds. 50 
Naturalization 
Of these, most had 
For those refugees who were allowed to settle permanently 
in Britain, and chose not to re-emigrate elsewhere, the 
prospect of naturalization was opened up to them after 
the statutory period of five years' residence. 
Naturalization meant that the refugees would be able to 
vote in British elections and find foreign travel easier. 
Although naturalization was perceived by some refugees as 
an act of disloyalty to their origins, visiting their 
homeland was fraught with danger if not protected by the 
rights which would be afforded to them as British 
nationals. It was necessary for the applicant to obtain 
declarations of support from four British subjects by 
birth who were also householders and knew the applicant 
well. These sponsors were then interviewed. The 
applicant also had to place notices of the application in 
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the British press. A fee was also payable by the 
applicant which, for those former refugees with little 
disposable income, could be prohi bi t i ve. The Home 
Secretary also consulted police and security service 
files on the applicant. If, within five years of being 
naturalized, a person was found guilty of a criminal 
offence and sentenced to at least 12 months in prison 
then this person could be deprived of his or her British 
citizenship. However, such action was not common. 
During December 1970 questions were asked in the House of 
Commons about the position of East European refugees in 
Britain as affected by proposed changes to the 
legislation governing naturalization. Bradford MP, John 
Wilkinson asked tha t special considera tion be given to 
them on account of their contribution to the Bri tish 
economy, whilst Paul Rose also called for their cases to 
be looked upon sympathetically as many of them were "in a 
state of uncertainty and disquiet". The Minister of 
State for the Home Office, Richard Sharples, replying on 
behalf of the Government believed that there was no need 
to make special provisions and any foreign national 
living in the United Kingdom for five years satisfied the 
qualifications for naturalization. This clearly covered 
East European refugees who had arrived in Britain in the 
immediate post-war years. 51 
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Restrictions on non-naturalized residents 
For those who chose to keep their original nationality 
rather than applying to become British citizens some 
restrictions over their behaviour remained. 
Travel abroad was more difficult for those who did not 
seek naturalization, particularly for those who wished to 
visit their former countries of residence. Although it 
might have been possible for them to obtain permission to 
visit countries in the Communist Eastern bloc, the 
British authorities refused to guarantee their safety 
once there. 
A further restriction on non-naturalized aliens was that 
they were unable to anglicise or otherwise change their 
names unless they had received prior permission from the 
Home Secretary. In January 1947, the then Home Secretary 
James Chuter Ede stated that he would not grant 
permission unless both person and name were considered 
suitable by him. 52 
Residents of Britain still classified as foreign 
nationals also remained ineligible to vote in British 
elections, regardless of the length of the period of 
continued residence in Bri tain. In July 1971 Trevor 
Skeet asked the Government if it would consider amending 
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the Representation of the People Act, 1949, to give the 
right to vote in local government elections to aliens who 
had been resident in Britain for a continuous period of 
15 years and "have consistently paid their taxes over the 
period".53 This suggestion was rejected by the 
Government. 
The message underlying official policy towards foreign 
nationals resident in Britain seems very much to have 
been one of an advocacy of the benefits of naturalization 
for long-term settlers rather than the retention of their 
own nationality. 
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7. THE RESPONSES IN BRITAIN TO THE POLISH ARRIVALS OF THE 
19408 
The arrival of Poles in Britain during the Second World 
War 
Amongst the first Poles to arrive in Britain as a result 
of the Second World War were the officials of the Polish 
Government and throughout the course of the war, the 
Polish Government-in-exile in London had not only been a 
symbol of Poland's resistance to Nazism but had also 
represented to many Poles the continuity of their country 
as a political state. However, Anthony Eden, the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for most of the 
Second World War, and the staff at the Foreign Office had 
become increasingly weary of exiled East European 
politicians. In 1940 when the Polish forces arrived in 
Britain, Winston Churchill, then British Prime Minister, 
had sent a letter of welcome in which he praised the 
Poles for their "deeds of endurance and valour" for which 
their nation was "so justly renowned"l. By 1944 
Churchill still had praise for the Polish forces but not 
for their political leaders. 
It was not until after the German occupation of France in 
June 1940 that large numbers of Poles arrived in Britain. 
The initial number of Polish forces arriving in Britain 
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in 1940 was 10,000 but it quickly became tens of 
thousands. The Polish Army in exile based in Bri tain, 
became a recrui ting centre for exiled Poles throughout 
the world. Polish troops in the Wes t numbered over 
110,000 and at the end of the Second World War these were 
gradually transferred 
officially demobilised. 2 
to Br it ain where they were 
Large numbers of these Polish 
forces, and many members of the government-in-exile, 
chose to remain in the West, a significant proportion 
settling in Britain. 
This chapter is concerned with the reactions in Britain 
to the Poles who arrived both as soldiers and civilians 
to settle in Britain in the years immediately after the 
end of the Second World War. Official and unofficial 
attitudes towards the Poles in the spheres of employment, 
accommodation, education, welfare and as members of the 
wider community will come under consideration. 
The Polish Resettlement Act, 1947 
Initially the British Government sought to encourage as 
many Poles as possible to return to Poland or, rather 
than settle in Britain, to emigrate elsewhere. Although 
it was recognised tha t there was a short-term labour 
shortage in Bri tain, it was feared tha t Polish exiles 
would represent permanent rather temporary additions to 
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the popula t ion. However, it soon became apparent tha t 
large numbers of Poles were unwilling to return to a 
Poland under the leadership of a Communist Government 
and, after the unsettled and migratory nature of their 
wartime experiences, large numbers were also reluctant to 
re-emigrate after being stationed in Britain or 
demobilized there. 
In March 1947 the Polish Resettlement Act was introduced. 
The Act covered all Poles who had arrived in Britain as a 
result of the Second World War, whether as part of the 
forces or as civilians. The spirit of this Act prevented 
discrimination against the settlement of Poles in Britain 
on grounds of age, sex, health, or marital status. It 
also outlined provisions for Poles regarding 
resettlement, emigration, accommodation, health, welfare, 
employment and education. During its passage through 
Parliament the Polish Resettlement Bill had gained 
popular support but had been vehemently opposed by the 
two Communist Party MPs, Philip Piratin and William 
Gallacher. 
The Polish Resettlement Corps (PRC) was also established 
to facili tate the orderly release of the Polish forces 
primarily into the British workforce, but also into 
Bri tish society as a whole. The PRC 'vas deal t wi th 
administratively as part of the British army but it was 
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not a military organization. However, it did provide a 
temporary stumbling block to Anglo-Polish relations as 
the Polish Government threatened that enrolment into the 
PRC could result in a loss of Polish citizenship as under 
Polish law this was the consequence of membership of a 
foreign military organization. This threa t was aimed 
chiefly at officers who enrolled in the PRC, rather than 
the rank and file who it was still hoped could be 
persuaded to return to Poland. However, by the end of 
1948 only 8,700 PRC members had been repatriated. 3 The 
wives and children in Poland of officers who lost their 
own Polish citizenship retained their own citizenship but 
facili ties were made available for them to leave the 
country if they wished. The Polish Government also 
expressed concern that Polish officers hostile to the new 
Polish state would hold influential positions within the 
Corps. 
Members of the PRC were paid an allowance by the British 
Government, the extent of the allowance being dependent 
on both rank and family status. 
PRC members were liable to British taxation. They were 
also subject to British military discipline. This 
resolved the si tua tion whereby the Polish forces under 
British command had ceased legally to be under the 
discipline of the exiled Polish military forces without 
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being under British military jurisdiction, a situation 
which had occurred as a result of the statement of the 
Polish Government in Warsaw that the exiled Polish forces 
could no longer be considered to be part of the forces of 
the new Polish state. Members of the PRC were given 
instruction in the English language and were also 
provided with practical information on life in Britain. 
The Government also created the Central Polish 
Resettlement Office in April 1947 which was to provide 
information and advice on a number of subjects, in 
particular emigration and legal problems relating to 
previous life in Poland, for example, marriage and 
property concerns. 
The arrival of dependants of the Polish forces in Britain 
After the decision had been made to allow members of the 
Polish Armed Forces to settle in Britain, one obvious 
consequence was that the wives and families of these men 
should also be allowed into the country. Polish families 
who did not qualify for entry to Britain were those where 
the head of the family had not served under Bri tish 
command. This included the relatives of men killed in 
Poland in 1939 and 1940, and those men who had died in 
capti vi ty in the Soviet Union prior to 1941. 
the British Government stated that it did 
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However, 
"fully recognise the desirability of 
re-uniting Polish families, whether here 
or in Poland or elsewhere overseas, and 
[was] making constant efforts to this 
end. ,,4 
From the end of the Second World War in Europe to January 
1949 approximately 30,000 relatives of Polish servicemen 
eventually settled in Britain,S arriving in Britain not 
just from Europe but also from India and East Africa 
where they had accompanied the Polish forces during the 
course of the Second World War. Later arrivals amounted 
to approximately 2,600 dependants. 6 
European Volunteer Workers 
Ini tially, due to the primary concern that the PRe be 
absorbed into the Bri tish economy and fearing a 
saturation point of Polish refugees in Britain had been 
reached, Poles were not encouraged as EVWs but, as it 
became clear tha t enough workers from other countries 
would not be recruited under the scheme, there was a 
shift in policy which led to the entry into Britain of 
Polish EVWs. Female Polish workers were encouraged in 
their choice of Britain as a resettlement destination by 
the presence of the PRe which represented potential 
Polish husbands in Britain. In addition to the PRe and 
their families, a further 9,094 Polish men and 4,538 
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Polish women entered Bri tain as part of the European 
Volunteer Workers scheme, bringing with them 99 
dependants. There were also a total of 12,893 Polish-
Ukrainians who entered Britain as part of this scheme. 7 
The numbers involved in Polish resettlement in Britain 
Calculating the extent of the Polish resettlement in 
Britain after the Second World War is complicated by the 
various ways in which it is possible to define the number 
of Poles resident in Bri tain. Census figures include 
Poles who arrived in Britain before the Second World War 
whilst omitting those of Polish descent born in the 
British Isles. However, the Polish community when 
assessing its own numbers tends to include those of 
Polish descent whilst omitting a large proportion of pre-
war refugees, many of whom were Jewish and have involved 
themselves in the Jewish rather than Polish community. 
Census figures will also include large numbers of 
Ukrainians who claimed pre-1939 Polish nationality in 
order to avoid post-war repatriation to the Soviet Union 
but are not ethnic Poles and have their own Ukrainian 
communi ty organiza tions. In assessing the numbers of 
Poles in Bri tain it is important to be aware of such 
anomalies. 
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According to the Census of 1931 there was a Polish 
community in England and Wales numbering 43,604, with an 
estimated 10.3 per cent of them Christian Poles, the 
remainder Jewish. 8 At the end of the Second World War 
over 150,000 Poles se t tIed permanently in England and 
Wales and a further 7-8,000 in Scotland, the majority of 
whom were Roman Ca tholic. Patterson, using both Home 
Office 1951 census figures for aliens and naturalisation 
and informa tion contained in Polish communi ty sources, 
estimates that there were between 130-135,000 Poles 
living in Britain in 1960. 9 These figures include Poles 
who had taken Bri tish ci tizenship and people of Polish 
descent (estimated at 16-18,000). It excludes most 
Polish Jews and Ukrainians and the small number of Poles 
who had cut themselves off from the Polish communi ty. 
The 1961 Census actually gave the number of Polish-born 
residents of the United Kingdom as 136,502, in 1971 the 
number had fallen to 108,000, reflecting the age 
structure of the Polish exiles in Britain and the small 
number of later addi tions. In Bri tain in 1971 of all 
Polish nationals resident in Britain 17.9 per cent were 
aged 65 and over. 10 
Not all the Poles who arrived in Britain after the end of 
the Second World War remained in the country. Some 
eventually chose repatriation, whilst others decided to 
emigra te elsewhere. Many Poles fel t betrayed by the 
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Western Allies over the agreements made at Yalta with the 
Sovie t Union concerning the future of Poland. Those 
Poles who chose not to remain in Britain emigrated to 
countries other than their homeland. In the first five 
years after the end of the Second World War approximately 
10,000 Poles emigrated from Britain to other countries. 11 
An estimated 11 per cent of the Poles arriving in Britain 
after the end of the Second World War eventually 
emigrated elsewhere .12 The total of Polish emigrants 
from Britain amounted to more than 33,000 between 1946 
and 1950. 13 Both repatriation and emigration schemes 
were aided by the British Government. Financial aid to 
emigrate was provided for under Section 7 of the Polish 
Resettlement Act 1947. Members of the PRC and their 
families were provided with free transport if they chose 
to be repatriated or emigration elsewhere. Poles in 
Britain applying for emigration before 31 December 1950 
were aided in making emigration arrangements, both 
financial and otherwise, by the British Government 
sponsored Polish Emigration Scheme. Between 1 December 
1949 and 30 November 1950 1,138 Poles, including 639 men, 
324 women and 175 children received assistance to 
emigrate, with an average cost of £65 per head. The most 
popular destinations were the United States, Canada, and 
Australia, in that order. 14 Assistance from the British 
Government was available to those Poles who had obtained 
visas up to the end of September 1951, after which date 
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the offer was withdrawn. In addition, small numbers of 
aged Poles with no family in Britain did return to Poland 
during the 1960s in order to die in their homeland. lS 
There was also a small number of deporta tions. Poles 
were not deported to their own country and as a result 
the deportation orders were often not enforced as it was 
difficult to find another country to accept them. 
The acquisition of British citizenship 
For those Poles who remained in Bri tain the issue of 
naturalization was likely to arise. Naturalization was 
certainly thought of by the Bri tish authori ties as a 
desirable first stage in the process of assimilation. 
Already by February 1945 the question of naturalization 
for Poles in Britain, particularly those with British 
wives, was being raised in Parliament. However, at this 
time Herbert Morrison, Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs and Minister of Home Security, maintained that 
there were a number of different na tionali ties serving 
the Allied cause in Britain and he did not see why the 
Poles should be singled out for preferential treatment. 16 
John McGovern responded to this by saying tha t Bri tain 
had a "special obligation" to the Poles and 
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"in view of the gross betrayal of Poland 
at the present moment, should not these 
people get special treatment ?" 17 
There were also attempts in February 1947 to attach a 
clause to the Polish Resettlement Bill which would have 
allowed the Poles who had served in Polish uni ts under 
British command during the Second World War to have their 
period of service included as part of the compulsory 
five year residence requirement, as was the case wi th 
foreign nationals who had served in British units. 
However, this move was defeated in Parliament. The Poles 
did not receive any special treatment as regards 
naturalization but, in common with other foreign 
nationals, after five years' continuous residence in 
Bri tain they were allowed to apply to become Bri tish 
citizens. This residential requirement meant that it was 
some time after the Second World War that the bulk of 
Poles in Britain could apply for naturalization. Various 
schemes involving group naturalization of Poles were 
proposed. However, these never received enough official 
support to be put into operation. One reason for this 
reluctance was the belief that it might encourage 
permanent settlement in Britain when emigration and 
repatriation were still being encouraged. It was also 
feared that special treatment for one group would 
encourage other groups to seek similar treatment. During 
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1946 1,008 Poles applied for naturalization, 933 in 1947 
and 2,053 in the first ten months of 1948. 18 Up to 31 
March 1951 7,978 Poles passing through the Polish 
Resettlement Corps had applied for naturalization, 4,850 
of whom were granted certificates .19 Between 1946 and 
1961 33,431 Poles resident in Britain were naturalized. 20 
Initially naturalization was perceived by the Polish 
community as an act of disloyalty to Poland but, as it 
became clear that the establishment of an independent 
Poland was going to take some time, a number of Poles 
eventually decided to take Bri tish na tiona1i ty. This 
became particularly true after Polish families had 
established themselves in Britain and succeeding 
generations were more British than Polish and therefore 
unlikely to return even if it were possible. It was also 
true of the many Pole s who married Bri tish women. The 
advantages of British citizenship would give the Poles 
greater job security and job prospects, in that they 
would cease to be treated as foreigners in the event of 
redundancies or promotion opportunities. In the cases of 
those waiting for public housing British citizenship 
meant that they were not kept at the back of the waiting 
list. It also made a return journey to Poland possible, 
refugee travel papers being invalid for foreign travel to 
the country of birth. There was an increasing 
recognition within the Polish community that members 
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might have practical reasons for adopting British 
citizenship without changing their loyalties to Poland, 
and consequently as time progressed less heed was taken 
of the Polish Government-in-Exile I s demands tha t Poles 
should contact them for permission to apply for British 
citizenship. However, even as naturalized British 
citizens it was not unknown for Poles returning to Poland 
to face arrest and imprisonment. 21 
The naturalization of Poles did not really gather 
momentum until the 1960s when the permanency of 
settlement was coming to be recognised by even those 
Poles who were most optimistic about an eventual return 
to their homeland. In 1967 2,368 Poles, only 330 of whom 
were women, were 
numbers declined 
granted British 
thereafter. 22 
citizenship. The 
The naturalization 
process involved obtaining the signatures of four British 
citizens who were householders, had known the applicant 
for a t least four years and were prepared to vouch for 
the good character of the applicant. This requirement 
was a further reason why those Poles who had integrated 
more into the British community were the most common 
types of applicants from amongst the Polish community. 
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Employment 
The first major impact of the Poles on the British public 
was in the field of employment. During the Second World 
War this was dicta ted by mili tary requirements. After 
1945 the situation became more complex as Poles competed 
with the indigenous workforce, and Polish displaced 
persons augmented the Polish forces already being 
demobilized in Bri tain and seeking civilian employment. 
The attitudes of the Government and Labour Exchange 
officials, employers and trades unions all played a vital 
role in forming the occupational structure of Poles who 
resettled in Britain. Our first major theme in this 
section is to discuss the activities of the Polish 
Resettlement Corps. 
The Polish Resettlement Corps 
In 1946 the Polish authorities in Warsaw ceased to 
recognize as Polish those Polish military units still 
based in the West and it was subsequently decided by the 
British Cabinet Polish Forces Committee that these units 
should be disbanded as speedily as possible, with 
demobilization of the men taking place in Britain. The 
Polish Resettlement Corps (PRC) was then established by 
the British 
the Poles 
Government 
into the 
to facilitate the absorption of 
British community, and more 
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importantly from the Government's point of view, into the 
workforce. The Poles' potential use as a workforce in a 
post-war Britain in dire need of extra labour sources was 
one of the principal factors behind the decision of the 
British Government to allow such large numbers to settle 
permanently in Britain. In recognition of their value as 
a potential workforce vocational training was made 
available to PRe member s, al though their enrolment in 
such training was not to be at the expense of British ex-
servicemen who also wished to enrol in vocational 
training centres. The employment of Polish ex-servicemen 
was given a higher priority then the employment of 
displaced persons and former prisoners-of-war, al though 
the first priority remained the employment of British ex-
servicemen. 
Enrolment into the PRe began on 11 September 1946 and, 
whilst enrolment was voluntary, until May 1947, those 
Poles who refused to join were threatened by the British 
Government with deportation to Germany. Simultaneously, 
those who did enrol in the PRe were threatened with the 
loss of their nationality by the Polish Government. 
Poles classed as invalids in need of long-term treatment 
were not accepted into the PRe, and were not penalised 
for their lack of membership. By the end of 1949 
114 000 Poles had enrolled in the PRe, 91,400 of whom had , 
decided to stay in Britain. 23 Polish women who had 
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served in the Forces were also eligible to join the PRe, 
approximately 5,000 of them passing through in total. 24 
Initially the period of service in the PRe was two years, 
with relegation to the reserve once employment had been 
secured. This period was reduced to one year for members 
enrolling after March 1948. There was also a separate 
branch of the PRe for those who had served in the Polish 
Air Force, approximately 12, 000 Poles passing through 
this organization. 25 
The initial rates of enrolment were not matched by the 
time taken for Poles to be successfully found employment. 
By 25 November only 342 of the 25,171 enrolled PRe 
members had been found work. 26 However, this situation 
improved greatly during the course of 1947. On finding 
employment members of the PRe were placed on reserve 
until their two year enrolment period was completed; they 
were then discharged. 
Those who refused both repatriation or enrolment into the 
PRe risked the possibility of deportation to Germany, the 
view being taken by the British Government that "these 
Poles cannot remain on British benevolence 
indefinitely".27 A small number of deportations did 
actually take place, with 105 Polish recalcitrants 
returned to Germany, all of these deportations occurring 
before 16 June 1947. 28 The recalcitrants who were not 
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deported crea ted an image of being , spi vs " an image 
which reflected badly against the whole Polish community 
in Britain. After the cessation of deportation, in April 
1948 the Government introduced measures whereby 
'persistent refusers', that is men who had refused four 
or more reasonable offers of employment, could be 
compulsorily discharged from the PRC, after which it was 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour to find 
employment for them. Members of the PRC who persistently 
refused offers of work were reported to an Anglo-Polish 
tribunal and, if the refusals were considered as 
unreasonable by the tribunal, the Pole was then 
discharged from the Corps and lost the benefits of its 
membership, including the right to draw military rates of 
pay. Up to 25 January 1949 only four compulsory 
discharges had been necessary, the other men reported to 
the tribunal having wi thdrawn their objections to the 
employment offered to them. After discharge the Poles 
was then liable to be directed to employment under the 
same terms as Bri tish subjects. 29 Approximately 8, 000 
Poles were discharged from the Polish Forces without 
joining the PRC. 30 
Some sections of the Press and public complained that 
there were Poles in the PRC who consistently refused 
offers of employment and preferred instead to live in 
idleness at the expense of the British taxpayer. 
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There 
was criticism of the high level of payment of members of 
the PRC compared to their potential earnings as 
civilians. In particular, concern was expressed that 
members of the PRC were in receipt of higher rates of 
mili tary pay than Bri tish men of equivalent rank and 
obtained better treatment and benefits than British ex-
servicemen. This complaint was heard wi th increasing 
frequency from the last months of 1948 onwards, when the 
PRC contained a high proportion of officers amongst its 
ranks. Such accusations were always vigorously denied by 
the British Government. In fact, rates of pay in the 
Polish Resettlement Corps were between two-thirds and 
three-quarters of the pay of a British soldier of 
equivalent rank. 
However, the general image of large numbers of idle Poles 
content to live at the British taxpayers' expense was a 
misrepresentation of the vast majority of the Polish 
Resettlement Corps. In September 1947 there were only 16 
men who refused offers of employment, in October the 
number was just ten. 31 One possible reason for these 
accusations might have been misunderstandings arising 
from the nature of the PRC which itself had to employ a 
considerable number of Poles in its administration; this 
was particularly true of Polish officers and is one 
reason why there was a high proportion of higher ranks 
remaining in the later stages of the PRC. 
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By 22 June 1948 67,000 members of the PRC had been placed 
in employment. A large number of the members who 
remained unemployed were either elderly and/or 
disabled. 32 Approximately 1,300 members of the PRC were 
registered as disabled, 4.7 per cent of the total, and 
approximately 10 per cent of members were over 50 years 
of age. 33 However, every effort continued to be made to 
place these people in suitable employment. 
After 12 March 1948 the period of service for those 
enrolling into the PRC was reduced to one year. There 
was no further enrolment into the Corps during 1949. 
Towards the end of 1948 discontent was growing amongst 
sections of the Bri tish communi ty over the number of 
Poles still in the PRC, who had not found civilian 
employment. On 25 November 1948 there were 14,965 
remaining members of the PRC, 650 of whom were women. 34 
A number of calls were made for the winding up of the 
Resettlement Corps. This was done on 30 September 1949, 
although members of the PRC whose term of service had not 
expired on that date were allowed to receive ex-gratia 
payments equivalent to their PRC pay until either finding 
employment, emigrating or being repatriated, or until the 
expiry of their term of service, whichever was the 
sooner. Ini tially 2,049 Poles were in receipt of these 
payments, this number having been reduced to 240 by 4 
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April 1950. 35 Of those Poles remaining in the PRC at the 
time of its disbandment, a number were war disabled and 
had restricted employment opportunities. Figures given 
in August 1949 stated that 350 were totally unfit, 250 
were working in Remploy and sheltered industries, whilst 
1,500 were partially handicapped but available for normal 
work. 36 The ex-gratia payments ended in July 1950 and 
all those Poles who had been members of the PRC who had 
been capable and available for work had been absorbed 
into the working population or, if unable to support 
themselves, were being maintained by the National 
Assistance Board at the same rate as British subjects. 
Total Government expendi ture on the Corps between 1945 
and 1950 was £122,320,000. 37 
Final figures for the PRC showed tha t 80,000 Poles had 
been repatriated without joining the PRC, whilst 8,000 
were repatriated after joining. Nearly 10,000 had 
emigrated. The Ministry of Labour had placed nearly 
68,000 in British industry, 10,000 had been discharged 
without being placed and 3,000 had died. In addition, 
there were 2,000 members of the PRC whose contracts had 
not expired and who continued to be paid ex-gratia 
payments. 38 
For Poles who had been members of the Air Force ra ther 
than the Army, the Polish Air Force Association helped to 
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find them civilian employment if they chose to remain in 
Bri tain. It also provided help for those wishing to 
emigrate. 
The general attitude of the trades unions towards Polish 
employment in Britain 
In the establishment of the PRC, the Government had 
sought and gained the acceptance of the General Council 
of the Trades Union Congress (TUC). The TUC General 
Council, at a special meeting held in May 1946, agreed to 
the employment of Poles in Britain, provided that certain 
conditions were met. These were close consul ta tion 
with the individual unions directly involved; Poles would 
be employed only when and where British labour was 
unavailable; any training given to the Poles would not be 
better than that provided for British ex-servicemen; 
Poles' wages should be comparable with those of British 
workers in similar employment thus ensuring tha t Poles 
were not to be used as a source of cheap labour pricing 
British workers out of the labour market. With some of 
the individual unions , for example the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) , there was a further agreement that in 
the case of redundancies Poles would be the first to lose 
their jobs. The decision of the General Council to 
approve the use of Polish labour was the subject of 
heated debate at the 1946 TUC Congress, one of the main 
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objections was the accusation from some sections that the 
Poles were fascist sympathisers. However, these 
delegates failed in their attempts to have the decision 
reversed. 
By 25 November 1947 agreements had been reached in 40 
industries concerning 
those industries. 39 
the employment of 
The Iron and 
Poles 
Steel 
within 
Trades 
Confedera tion had agreed to the employment of Poles by 
December 1946. Also by this date the National Union of 
Railwaymen agreed to the temporary employment of 1, 000 
PRC members in London railway depots to deal with 
Christmas parcels. These agreements did not stop certain 
trades unions later taking unilateral action to hinder 
the introduction of Poles into their industries. Such 
restrictions were pursued for example, by the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union and branches of the NUM. 40 Objections 
were also maintained on a smaller scale, for example, the 
Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers was responsible for 
the dismissal of ten Polish carpenters from a building 
site near Portsmouth in October 1947. 41 Hostility to the 
Poles from pro-Soviet groups was most in evidence in 
employment where trades unions provided obstacles to the 
employment of Poles. Those individuals and organizations 
who were hostile to the trades union movement seized on 
such developments to mount economic and political 
criticisms of the trades unions' responses. In 
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Parliament, the industrialist and Conservative MP, Sidney 
Shephard blamed the attitude of the unions for high 
levels of unemployment amongst the Poles at a time when 
there remained vacancies in the undermanned industries. 
However, the Ministry of Labour Parliamentary Secretary, 
Ness Edwards, replied: 
"I think the emphasis should be laid on 
the other side, that is, that Poles 
cannot live in this country without 
contributing something to its economy."42 
Polish enrolment into the trades unions was to be 
encouraged, including in industries where closed shops 
were not in operation. The two largest unions in Britain 
had a very positive attitude towards Polish membership. 
The Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) actively 
recruited Poles from resettlement camps from 1947 
onwards. By 1949 three all-Polish branches were in 
existence, with a combined membership of 6,000. 43 There 
were also Polish members amongst other branches of the 
TGWU. The TGWU offered its Polish members legal advice, 
representation when dealing with local offices of the 
Ministry of Labour and, between 1947-1950 English 
language lessons. In 1943 the General and Municipal 
Workers' Union had established links wi th the Union of 
Polish Workers and Craftsmen in Great Britain which had 
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been founded in 1940 and this co-operation continued 
during the period of resettlement. By January 1951 the 
Union of Polish Worker s and Craft smen in Grea t Bri tain 
had 78 branches with a total of approximately 9,500 
members. 44 
Other professional associations were formed by the Poles 
who felt more comfortable in their own trade associations 
than in British trades unions, for example, the 
Institute of Polish Engineers in Great Britain which in 
January 1953 had 680 members. There was also a Polish 
Farmers' and Agricultural Workers' Union in Great Britain 
which in January 1953 had 2,000 members. 45 Such bodies 
had predecessors such as the Association of Polish 
Lawyers in Great Britain which was formed in August 1940 
by lawyers who had accompanied the Polish Government-in-
exile to Britain after the fall of France to the Nazis. 
The later trades and crafts unions established by the 
Polish community helped some members to find work more 
easily and also helped the Poles to overcome some of 
their distrust for such organizations. However, the 
formation and membership of Polish trades unions and 
associations was generally discouraged by the trades 
union movement and there was also opposi tion in some 
parliamentary circles. It was believed that integration 
into the British community would be achieved more rapidly 
if the Poles identified themselves with fellow British 
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workers rather than accentuating nationality differences 
in the workplace. 
Also of note when considering the attitudes of the trades 
unions to Polish workers, is the policy of the National 
Union of Railwaymen which responded to the positive 
attitude of Polish workers in public transport by 
awarding honorary citizenship status within the union to 
those with long service, thereby protecting them against 
redundancy where foreign workers were the first to go. 
By 27 July 1949 Minister of State Hector McNeil felt able 
to comment in Parliament on the "excellent relations 
which now exist between Polish and British workers 
here. ,,46 In many instances hostility and opposition to 
Polish workers had been overcome after Bri tish workers 
had come into contact with the Poles and began to view 
them more as colleagues than as competitors. 
The position of Polish European Volunteer Workers 
There were Poles not only in the Resettlement Corps but 
also amongst the European Volunteer Workers who came to 
Bri tain to allevia te manpower shortages. The idea of 
using liberated Poles to provide badly needed manpower in 
Britain was floated in Parliament on 8 May 1945 when 
Thelma Cazalet Keir proposed that their labour be used on 
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the land or in the rebuilding programme rather than that 
of German and Italian prisoners-of-war. The Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Sir John Anderson, replied on behalf of 
the Government that the Poles were being cared for and, 
where possible, being provided wi th employment by the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, and that in 
addition other opportunities for using the skills of 
these people were being inves tiga ted. 4 7 As has 
previously been noted, there was subsequently a change in 
policy which resulted in the recruitment of Poles as part 
of the EVW scheme. 48 
The occupational structure of the Poles in Britain after 
the Second World War 
The majority of Poles settling in Britain initially 
entered the British economy at a low level as unskilled 
workers regardless of their previous education and 
occupation in Poland. The Poles were generally directed 
to sectors of the labour markets which were found 
unattractive by the indigenous population on account of 
poor wage ra tes, lack of job securi ty or the need for 
heavy physical labour. Such employment included 
agricultural work, mining, brickmaking, domestic work, 
the hotel and catering trades, textiles, the construction 
industry and the iron and steel industry. The Poles were 
obliged to stay in these types of employment for several 
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years until employment restrictions eased, any hostility 
of the local population and unions had reduced 
significantly and until their English language skills had 
developed sufficiently to enable them to be able to take 
better jobs. For many professionally qualified Poles age 
restrictions prevented them from ever reaching their 
former professional status after finding exile in 
Britain. 
As far as members of the Polish Resettlement Corps were 
concerned, the principal industries into which they were 
absorbed between 1947-50 were49 : 
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A. 
B. 
Manual Workers 
Agriculture 
Building 
Brick-making 
Coal-mining 
Civil engineering 
Domestic service 
Food manufacturing 
Hotels, catering 
Iron and steel 
General engineering 
Textiles 
Miscellaneous 
TOTAL 
Non-manual workers 
Local Government 
National Government 
Service 
Professional Services 
Students 
Miscellaneous non-
manual, including 
business on own 
account 
TOTAL 
8,200 
9,000 
3,100 
7,300 
3,000 
1,300 
1,500 
6,200 
2,500 
3,500 
6,400 
14,000 
66,000 
1,000 
1,000 
2,000 
2,000 
8,000 
14,000 
The above figures reflect the priorities given to Polish 
employment in various industries by the British 
Government. However, members of the PRC, unlike European 
Volunteer Workers, were not subject to any direction of 
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labour other than that which applied to British workers. 
Restrictions on the employment of Poles ceased when the 
Control of Engagement Order was removed from the British 
population. 
Changes in employment arranged after leaving the PRe are 
not included in the above figures. For example, in 1951 
there were reported to be 1,800 Poles employed by British 
Railways.50 
Agricultural employment 
The Bri tish Government was particularly keen to place 
Polish workers in agriculture. In 1939 training was 
already in progress for the Jewish refugees who had fled 
to Britain from Poland, and then, later in the war, there 
was extensive use of prisoner of war labour in 
agriculture. After the war had ended this source of 
labour gradually diminished as prisoners and refugees 
were repatriated or emigrated elsewhere, and the Poles, 
once their long-term reset tlement in Bri tain had been 
accepted, provided an obvious replacement source. 
However, there were only 6,300 former farmers and 
landowners and 2,500 agricultural workers of all kinds 
amongst the members of the Polish Resettlement Corps.51 
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There were also some objections raised by the Na tional 
Union of Agricultural Workers (NUAvl). They argued that 
the hours and wages structure of agricultural employment 
compared badly with urban employment, and thereby acted 
as a deterrent to the recruitment of British workers, and 
that these should be reformed. It also complained about 
the lack of accommodation for rural workers. 
Negotiations proceeded between the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the NUAW but an agreement on the terms of 
Polish agricultural employment could not be reached with 
the result that in September 1946 the Government put the 
Poles to work on gathering the harvest without total 
union approval. 
Initially many Poles in agricultural employment were used 
in gang labour but they were dispersed when possible; the 
Government was itself against the general principle of 
using Polish gang labour, on account of its intention to 
remove them from any quasi-mili tary forms of control. 
For their part, the Poles also had financial reasons for 
moving away from gang labour; gang labourers received 
only their PRe pay, whilst farmers paid the full rate of 
pay to the Government. 
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Polish employment in coalmining 
Coalmining was another industry targeted by the 
Government for the use of Polish labour. lni tia1ly in 
February 1946 a number of Polish miners were used in 
British pits in an attempt to prevent factories from 
having to reduce working hours due to a lack of fuel. 
However, it was recognized that union approval and co-
operation for the permanent employment of Poles in the 
industry was 
introduction 
a 
of 
necessary requirement; 
Poles into the pits 
any unapproved 
would almost 
certainly result in industrial action, a development 
which the Government was not prepared to risk. 
At this time the National Union of Mineworkers was 
negotiating with the Government for the implementation of 
the "Miners' Charter" which called for the introduction 
of a five-day week plus improved ameni tie s and working 
conditions, and the NUM insisted that these proposals be 
accepted as a condition of tolerating Polish labour in 
the pits. The NUM commanded much sympathy for its 
anxiety that the employment of Poles should not adversely 
affect conditions for British miners, but simultaneously 
it was felt that they should not use the situation to 
obtain concessions for themselves or to embarrass the 
Government. Concern was also expressed that if the 
labour shortage was not resolved by the use of foreign 
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labour there would be a resul tant coal shortage which 
would affect other industries and therefore the pace of 
economic recovery.52 
The NUM Executive after talks with Tue officials 
eventually agreed in January 1947 tha t Poles would be 
allowed to work in the pits provided that the affected 
local miners' branch agreed, the Poles joined the NUM, 
and were the first to go should any redundancies be 
necessary. When this decision was made only 170 Poles 
were immediately available for underground work, with a 
further 226 available shortly; the Poles' greatest 
contribution towards resolving the fuel crisis of January 
and February 1947 was in working on the roads and 
railways rather than in the pits. 
Will Lawther, the President of the NUM, told a press 
conference that the reason so few Poles were suitable for 
mining was because of language difficul ties and there 
were few skilled miners amongst them. This was not 
strictly true. The opposition was such, however, that by 
the end of July 1947 there were 2,288 Poles employed in 
the mining industry but 1,000 others who had been 
sufficiently trained and had accommodation waiting for 
them were still unable to enter the industry because of 
opposition from local miners' lodges at the pits in which 
they had been allocated employment. 53 At this time 301 
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branches of the NUM had rejected proposals to place 
Polish miners in local pits. 54 This was despite attempts 
by the NEC to persuade local lodges to accept the men and 
an overall labour shortage in the mines of 100,000 men. 
In August 1947 the NEC tried to resolve the matter by 
recommending that an official should be appointed to each 
area for three months to deal with the placement of Poles 
in the industry. Proposal s tha t the Pole s should be 
allowed to work in pits without British employees were 
rejected by both Government and Union. However, the NEC 
initiatives were largely ineffective in eradicating 
local-based opPosition, which continued to receive 
widespread publicity in the national Press. 
Sections of the community hostile to the Poles frequently 
made the accusation that the Poles remaining in Britain 
were fascist sympathisers. This was taken one stage 
further by some of NUM branch leaders who claimed that 
their union was actively screening Poles before allowing 
them into the industry. This was denied by the 
Government. 55 Opponents of the NUM used the branch 
objections to claim proof that the union was dominated by 
Communists. This was also denied by the Government; the 
Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Labour, Ness 
Edwards, himself once a miner, stated that the objections 
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were the result of "local misunderstandings not political 
discrimination".56 
Meanwhile, the National Coal Board, which had been 
assigned control of the recently nationalized coalmining 
industry, placed recruitment advertisements in the Polish 
language press in the hope that employment difficulties 
would be overcome. 
The resul t of the tensions between the National Coal 
Board and the National Union of Mineworkers was to 
restrict the number of Poles entering into coalmining and 
to create a reluctance by Poles to enter into an industry 
in which they felt unwelcome. However, the Poles who did 
become miners were gradually accepted by their Bri tish 
colleagues despi te a resis tance towards foreign labour 
which remained ingrained in the NUM and was to be 
demonstrated once again when the use of Hungarian refugee 
labour in the pits was proposed in 1956. 
Polish employment in the textile industry 
The textile industry was also identified as a priority in 
the economic recovery of post-Second World War Britain, 
since it was a rich source of foreign currency through 
its export trade. The textile industries were 
particularly receptive to the use of Polish women workers 
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as most of the jobs available were traditionally thought 
of as suitable for women rather than men. In February 
1947 it was estimated that there were approximately 
50,000 jobs available in the British textile industry.57 
The conditions of Polish employment set out by the 
various textile trades unions were those typical of 
unions in other industries: Polish labour was to be paid 
the same wages as Bri tish workers, Poles were to be 
employed only when Bri tish labour was unavailable, and 
Polish workers were to be the first to be dismissed in 
the event of redundancies. It was recognized that the 
chief difficulty in the employment of Poles in the 
textile industry was in securing sufficient accommodation 
in the areas where jobs were available. As a result, 
workers were placed in the textile industry at a slower 
rate than employers would have liked and many employers 
were obliged to arrange accommodation before being 
provided with foreign workers. 
Other employment 
Ini tially a number of Poles were also employed by the 
Government. The Interim Treasury Commi ttee for Polish 
Questions recruited a number of Poles who had previously 
worked in some capacity for the Polish Government-in-
EXile. After its establishment the Polish Resettlement 
Corps, in addition to finding its members work, also 
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became a major employer of Poles. Poles who worked for 
the PRC were used for both adminis tra ti ve and domes tic 
work in the camps and hostels. However, these were not 
permanent jobs and as the majority of Poles settled into 
civilian life in Britain and the PRC wound up its 
activities, 
employment. 
its employees had to seek alternative 
Early agreements were reached with the gas industry and 
in building and civil engineering regarding the 
employment of ex-members of the Polish forces. Agreement 
was also reached with the Iron and Steel Confederation, 
which was reported in December 1946 to be advocating the 
employment of Poles in its industries, in contrast to the 
National Union of Mineworkers which at that time was 
refusing to accept Polish labour in the pits. 58 However, 
the National Council of the Amalgamated Union of Foundry 
Workers opposed Polish labour, pressing the Government to 
repatriate them, whilst at the same time arguing in 
favour of the importation of Italian labour to help break 
down the bottleneck in production. 
Less important in numerical terms than those Poles in 
agriculture, coalmining and the textile industries, were 
those who had entered the engineering and shipbuilding 
industries. Nevertheless, a great deal of publicity was 
generated by the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers 
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(AUEW) when in July 1947 it decided that Polish labour 
should be wi thdrawn from the indus try. At tha t time 
there were 4,500 Pole s employed in this line of work, 
fewer than 2, 000 of whom were AUEW members. The AUEW 
objected to the Poles' employment on the grounds that no 
prior consul ta tion wi th the union had taken place and 
tha t Bri tish labour was in fact available for the work 
which was on offer. However, those Bri tish men 
supposedly available lived in different areas from their 
potential areas of employment and were unwilling to move 
to take these jobs. The decision to suspend Poles from 
the union was influenced by the strength of Communist 
Party support at all levels of the AUEW, the Communist 
Party view being that Poles should be repatriated as they 
were most needed in the reconstruction of Poland and that 
there was no reason for them to stay in exile. The AUEW 
stated that those Poles who had already joined the union 
would be entitled to a full refund of their union 
subscription fees. The Ministry of Labour, aware of the 
need for increased production in the engineering 
industry, particularly of mining machinery and electrical 
plant, tried to negotiate a settlement with the AUEW but 
this proved impossible. In consequence the Ministry 
decided that, if requested by the employer, Poles should 
continue to be placed in the industry without union 
approval. After 1949 the AUEW relaxed its opposition to 
the Poles who in the meantime had been taking employment 
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in the industry and joining relevant trades unions other 
than the AUEW. 
At the same time as the AUEW dispute, in Augus t 1947 
there was the sacking of ten Polish carpenters in 
Portsmouth as a resul t of local trade union action by 
members of the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers. This 
incident was reported in the Daily Mirror, which 
commented on the pettiness of the action in light of the 
housing shortage, the building contractor's agent having 
calculated that one prospective tenant each week would be 
deprived of a house. F. Wolstencroft, the general 
secretary of the society, was quoted as saying that the 
union executive had decided that they would not allow 
Poles to become members of the union and that their 
members were not to work with non-unionists. The union 
justified its actions by stating that British ex-
servicemen had been allowed into the union, and that if 
Poles were also accepted there was the possibility of too 
many carpenters existing in the future. 59 
The AUEW was joined by another member of the 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, the 
Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers in its opposition to 
Poles entering the industry. The executive of the AUFW 
objected on the grounds of protecting the jobs and 
conditions of British workers. Political objections, 
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referring to the Poles as reactionary were also raised. 
However, amongst the rank and file membership of the AUFW 
there was much less opposition to the Poles. 60 This is 
an interesting reversal of attitudes towards Polish 
labour expressed by the Na tional Union of Mineworkers, 
where opposition came from the branch membership with the 
union executive being in favour of their employment. 
In some industries limits were set on the number of Poles 
to be employed in anyone firm. For example, the 
National Union of Blast Furnacemen agreed to the 
employment of Poles in the iron smelting industry on the 
condition that the total number of Poles in anyone firm 
should not exceed 5 per cent of the total workforce, and 
that Poles employed in any plant should not exceed 10 per 
cent of the total workforce. 61 
After the relaxation of employment restrictions on 
foreign workers and the releasing of the Poles from the 
contracts of employment they had undertaken as part of 
either the PRe or EVW schemes, many Poles began to move 
to lighter, more skilled employment when the opportunity 
arose. 
An immediate return to former professions was not 
possible for a large proportion of the professionally-
trained Poles. They would have found it necessary to 
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requalify according to British standards. The Government 
also established a number of courses for both the 
professional classes and ex-professional army officers to 
enable them to retrain for other skills. By February 
1949 8,369 Polish ex-officers had enrolled in these 
schemes. 62 However, the resettlement into civilian life 
of the ex-professional officers proved problematic; many 
were over 50 years old and found it difficult to adapt to 
change, also many were unwilling to lose status and 
position, they hoped for administrative and executive 
posts which were not available to them. For some of the 
older Poles requalifying and retraining was not an option 
as they had neither the time nor sufficient fluency in 
the English language to retrain and they were therefore 
forced to remain at a lower level in the British economy 
than tha t to which they had been accus tomed in Poland. 
The fate of these men was described as a "tragedy" by The 
Times. 63 In December 1948 it was estimated that 71 per 
cent of the Poles in Bri tain, excluding those who had 
arrived as European Volunteer Workers, were employed on 
work of a lower grade to that which they were qualified 
for. 64 However, although many of the older Poles never 
regained their previous occupational status they often 
encouraged their children to be successful academically 
and thus on entering employment achieve a return to the 
higher economic level which had been held by their 
parents before leaving Poland. 
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Resuming their previous occupations appears to have been 
easier for doctors, dentists and engineers than for those 
in the legal profession. Polish doctors were able to 
register for practice in Britain without having to sit 
British examinations, whilst provisions were made at the 
Brighton technical college for Polish pharmacists to 
undertake a course familiarizing them with differences in 
the practice of pharmacy in Britain and Poland. By 1958 
there were approximately 600 Polish doctors registered, 
80 dentists and up to 2, 000 engineers and technicians 
whilst there were only 36 Poles in the legal profession, 
mainly based in London. 65 
For young architects the situation of having to requalify 
had been eased by the opening in 1942 of the Polish 
Architectural School in Liverpool. The situation for 
Polish academics was fair; by 1960 there were 
approximately 50 Poles on the academic staff at British 
universities and other institutes of higher education. 66 
Refresher courses lasting nine months in educational 
methods and the English language were available for 
Polish teachers. 
It was not uncommon for Poles who had mastered the 
language but still had no occupational qualifications to 
set up their own small businesses. The Union of Polish 
Merchants and Industrialists in Britain annual directory 
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for 1960 listed 2,500 Polish businesses, 75 per cent of 
which were based in London. However, by 1976 this figure 
had been reduced as their owners died, retired or been 
forced to close the business, although those which had 
continued to function had often become larger and more 
prosperous establishments. 67 One type of business often 
set up by Poles in areas of Polish and East European 
settlement were Polish food stores. The exis tence of 
such shops helped the exiled communities to maintain some 
of the cultural aspects of their daily life. 
The employment of Polish women 
The principal occupations of Polish women were in 
domestic service, hospitals and textiles. Their entrance 
into domestic and hospital work was despite the fact that 
official sources had ini tially regarded Polish peasant 
women to be below the standards of cleanliness required 
for such work and to have a tendency to 'drift into 
undesirable ways of life,.68 Once the women had started 
their work these views proved to be unfounded prejudices. 
Patterson estimates that by 1961 only about 40 per cent 
of Polish women in Britain remained in employment,69 the 
other 60 per cent choosing not to work because their 
husbands had sufficient income to support the whole 
family. 
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General conclusions on employment 
Attitudes towards the employment of Poles in Britain 
after the Second World War were generally dependent on 
whether consideration was being made from the side of the 
employers or the employees. 
sought a resolution to 
The Government and employers 
the labour shortage which 
threatened Britain's export drive and reconstruction 
programme. To them the Poles represented an important 
addition to the potential workforce. However, employees 
were more concerned with safeguarding their own position 
and feared the use of foreign labour as a means of 
undercutting wages and conditions. In light of the 
recent economic experiences of the 1930s these fears 
appeared particularly relevant and, at a time when trades 
unions had significant influence in a number of 
industries, played an important part in the placing of 
Poles in employment and the reception given to them by 
their British colleagues. 
The Geographical distribution of Poles in Britain 
When the Polish 
majority of them 
forces first arrived in Britain the 
were stationed in Scotland to build 
defences and guard maritime approaches. A number of 
these Poles settled in Scotland after the war and were 
joined by their families in the 1940s. In 1951 there 
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were 9,250 Polish residents in Scotland, although not all 
of them were exiles who had remained in Britain after the 
Second World War. By 1976 this figure had dwindled to 
4,000. 70 However, the bulk of Poles stationed in 
Scotland during the war moved south to settle in England 
after 1945 where jobs were more plentiful. Within 
England there was also a shift in the areas of settlement 
as most of the Poles who had been sent to work in 
agricul ture left the countryside to find work in the 
towns once the employment restrictions had been removed. 
Not surprisingly the towns which seemed most attractive 
to the Poles were ones where there was already a local 
Polish community in existence. Approximately 30-35,000 
Poles settled in London, 4-5,000 each in Birmingham and 
Manchester, 3,000 in Bradford and between 1,500-3,000 
each in Wolverhampton, Leeds, Nottingham, Sheffield, 
Coventry, Leicester and Slough. 71 Out of necessity the 
Poles initially tended to buy cheap houses in the central 
areas of these cities but would move to the suburbs when 
it became financially possible to do so. 
Polish camps and hostels 
After the Second World War had ended Polish Resettlement 
Corps camps and European Volunteer Worker hostels were 
established to provide accommodation for Polish and 
European arrivals to Britain. These were widely 
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scattered across England. Initially there were ex-army 
camps situated in rural areas but later camps were 
established where Polish labour was in most demand. In 
1947, as more hostels were made available to Poles, the 
National Assistance Board and the National Service 
Hostels Corporation assumed responsibility for their 
administration, a task which had previously been carried 
out by the War Office. These hostels were not intended 
to provide permanent accommodation for the refugees, 
indeed in some cases they were nothing more than Nissen 
huts previously used as temporary accommodation for 
forces stationed in Britain, but were meant as a means of 
delaying competition with the indigenous population. 
However, even camp accommodation could be envied by 
desperate British families seeking homes. In August 1946 
a deserted army camp in Buckinghamshire was taken over by 
British ex-servicemen and their families after hearing it 
was to be used by the wives of Polish soldiers. The 30 
local families who moved into the camp stated that they 
would refuse to vacate the camp until housing was found 
for them. 
As a consequence of their not being intended for long-
term residence, conditions at the hostels were sometimes 
of a poor standard and there was a great deal of 
overcrowding. Conditions were often better in industrial 
hostels also inhabited by British residents. In 1947 the 
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nominal area of space assigned to each man in the hostels 
was increased from 45 to 66 square feet. 72 The camps and 
hostels were also often poorly furnished and difficult to 
heat. At one camp at Fairfield near Prestwick in 
Scotland 380 Polish servicemen and their wives awaiting 
repatriation found conditions in their camp to be of such 
a poor standard, combined with the delay in their return 
to Poland, that in February 1947 they felt it necessary 
to stage a hunger strike. 
Discipline in the camps and hostels was not always easily 
maintained and there were a number of examples of the 
behaviour of the Poles causing friction wi th the local 
popula tion, for example there was a case in Cai thness 
when Poles from a nearby camp were found gUilty of the 
theft of goods worth £100 from a local store. 73 Cases of 
disorder within the camps were also common. One attempt 
to encourage more discipline was the formation of 
Residents' Councils and Committees within the camps, 
encouraging the Poles to take more responsibili ty for 
their lives and behaviour. 
The hostels also provided refugees with the opportunity 
to ease gradually into British life. After discharge 
from the PRC, Poles and their families were allowed to 
remain in the hostels until suitable private 
accommodation was available but they had to make a 
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contribution towards their board and lodgings in the 
hostel. If they desired they were allowed to cater for 
themselves and were issued with ration books. 
Although some did continue to live in the hostels for 
several years after they had gained employment, the 
majority of Poles began to look for private 
accommodation. During the 1950s the hostels were 
gradually emptied and closed down throughout the country; 
on 13 December 1949 there were 27 hostels housing 14,164 
civilian Poles in Bri tain administered by the National 
Assistance Board. 74 Figures for the end of 1950 estimate 
that 9,500 Poles living in National Assistance Board 
hostels were feeding themselves, whilst 4,750 continued 
to live communally. It was further estimated that among 
the residents were 4,000 children, 2, 000 of whom were 
under five years of age. 75 By 31 January 1957 this 
figure had been reduced to 15 hostels accommodating just 
under 6,000 poles 76 and by 1959 only three Polish hostels 
remained. After 1959 the closure of Polish hostels 
continued until just one remained at Ilford Park in 
Devon. In some areas, as a temporary measure, Polish 
family hostels were converted into "housing estates" but 
these too were eventually dismantled to encourage 
integra tion wi th the wider communi ty. In some areas 
local authori ties were asked to take over Polish camps 
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and hostels where there was accommodation space available 
which could be used by local people. 
Ilford Park 
As mentioned above, not all Poles left the hostels and 
near Newton Abbot in Devon the last Polish settlement in 
the country still remains. Ilford Park was originally 
used as an American hospital during the war but in 1947 
was taken over as one of the camps used to accommoda te 
the re1a ti ves of Polish soldiers provided for in the 
Polish Resettlement Act. Most people left the camp to 
start a new life in Britain but some Poles, widows, 
orphans, invalids, and others who were simply unable to 
cope wi th life in a strange country, refused to leave. 
For those who had been most seriously disturbed by their 
experiences during the Second World War it was possible 
to feel less of a stranger inside the camp than outside 
it. 
The 38-acre camp originally housed 600 refugees and in 
1990 128 people still lived there. The average age of 
the inhabitants of the camp in 1990 was 82, some of whom 
had lived there since 12 July 1948, others arrived after 
their own homes were closed. 77 Many of the residents 
chose to enter the home after their health began to fail 
and had no family in Britain to care for them. In 1987 
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there were only three married couples in residence at 
Ilford Park. 78 There is a waiting list of elderly Poles 
who wish to become residents of the camp. Most of the 
residents prefer to live at Ilford Park rather than 
return to Poland because they originated from parts of 
Eastern Poland which were incorporated into other 
territories in 1945. 
Unlike early camp life, all residents now have their own 
room. Some of the residents never learned English and 
others are finding their grasp of the language 
deteriorating. The camp contains a library of hundreds 
of Polish books and receives copies of the daily Polish 
language newspaper printed in London. The camp also 
contains a hut which is used as a Roman Catholic church. 
Many of the people resident at Ilford Park Polish Home 
still live very much in the past, having never become 
members of the wider community in Britain and even within 
the camp many residents participate little in community 
life and prefer to remain alone in their rooms. Perhaps 
the most visible reminder of the way in which many cannot 
come to terms with their past experiences is the way in 
which some still take bread from the tables at meal times 
and hoard it in their rooms, unable to forge t seeing 
their compatriots starve to death during the war. 
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In 1987 the Department of Social Securi ty undertook a 
review of Ilford Park, owing to a decline in the number 
of residents and the deterioration of the buildings. 
Assurances were made that nothing would be done to the 
camp without consultation and nobody would be forced to 
leave the premises. In 1990 the Department planned, 
subject to Treasury approval, to sell some of the land at 
the site and demolish the old buildings but promised to 
build a new home for those pensioners who wanted to 
continue to be part of a Polish community. 
Private accommodation 
For the vast majority of Poles who did seek accommodation 
outside the hostels, the first stage for many was to find 
private lodgings. Rented accommodation of this sort was 
expensive and after the turmoil of the war many Poles had 
a strong desire to own their own homes again, many of 
them eventually becoming homeowners and some even became 
small-scale landlords. In many cases lodgers, often 
fellow Poles, were taken in by houseowners as a 
necessity to make the repayments on the house. The 
Polish Yearbook for 1958-9 estimated that there were at 
least 6,000 Poles owning their own homes, a figure which 
Patterson believed to have increased threefold by the 
mid-1970s. 79 As more Poles were able to buy their own 
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houses the number of families in multiple occupation 
gradually declined. There was some resentment by 
sections of the British community at the success of Poles 
at becoming homeowners but these people were usually 
unaware of the financial sacrifices made by Poles in 
other matters so that they could afford to buy their 
homes. 
The residential areas chosen by Poles were often 
influenced by the proximi ty to Polish facili ties, for 
example the church or a social club, and convenience for 
travelling to work. As a result Poles were often to be 
found in one or two particular areas of the town or city 
in which they had settled. However, the Poles remained 
residentially mobile moving to better areas and more 
expensive housing whenever possible. 
The role of religion in the Polish community 
The Church played an important role in maintaining the 
identity of the Polish community in Britain. Many cities 
had their own Polish Ca tholic parishes. In 1941 there 
was already a Polish Church in London. In 1952 there 
were 113 Polish Roman Catholic priests practising in 
Britain. 80 By 1984 there were still 73 Polish parishes 
in England and Wales. 81 The Church provided a meeting 
place for Poles and Mass continued to be celebrated in 
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the Polish form and so provided an outle t to express 
feelings of 'Polishness'. The English Roman Catholic 
churches allowed the Poles to use their buildings at 
times inconvenient for the British congregation, for 
example Sunday lunchtime. Religious organizations could 
also provide practical help for Poles in Bri tain, for 
example the Ca tholic Council for Polish Welfare, which 
was formed in July 1946 for the welfare of Poles both in 
Britain and in Poland. 
The Roman Catholicism of the Poles was unpopular in the 
staunchly Protestant areas of Scotland where prejudices 
against 'Papists' were often still in existence. This 
kind of reaction was much less common in England, and in 
December 1942 the Roman Catholic hierarchy in England and 
Wales appointed a special day of suffering and prayer for 
the suffering of the Polish nation. In 1944 the Anglo-
Polish Catholic Association was created which was similar 
in character to the Anglo-Polish Society but with the 
added religious element. In common with the Anglo-Polish 
Society the influence of the Anglo-Polish Catholic 
Associa tion began to decline as the na ture of Polish 
settlement in Bri tain became long-term and Poles 
concentrated on establishing themselves economically. 
/' / Also, within the emigre community an emphasis was placed 
on a strong sense of nationalism which it was felt was 
necessary to avoid disintegration. As a consequence the 
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Poles were keen to avoid duo-national organizations which 
hinted at assimilation. 
For administrative purposes the Polish priests, having 
been attached to the Polish forces, were able to 
undertake membership of the Polish Resettlement Corps. 
As members of the PRC they were guaranteed an income for 
two years. After this period they relied on 
parishioners' contributions and, in some cases, had to 
undertake manual employment in order to support 
themselves. 
In the 1931 Census there were 44,462 people resident in 
Britain whose place of birth was Poland,82 the majority 
of these being Jewish refugees. The number of Polish 
Jews in Bri tain would have been added to, a1 though not 
greatly, by the arrival of refugees during and after the 
Second World War. 
In addition to Polish Catholics and Jews there were also 
a number of Lutherans and Orthodox. In 1952 there were 
an estimated 2,200 Polish Lutherans in Britain, of whom 
1,500 had been contacted by the four Polish Lutheran 
pastors active in the country.83 The Polish Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in Exile remained basically independent 
but in 1955 sought association with the Lutheran World 
Federation and from 1 January 1960 became more closely 
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involved with the Lutheran Church of England. There were 
also an estimated 10,000 Orthodox Poles in Britain, the 
majority of whom had been contacted by their twelve 
active priests. 84 
The only statistics relating to the religious composition 
of the Polish communi ty in Bri tain are those from 1948 
which only represent members of the PRC. However, these 
figures do appear to reflect the religious composition of 
those Poles who remained active within the Polish 
community, rather than transferring their allegiance to 
the Ukrainian or Jewish communities in Britain. In the 
PRC in 1948 86 per cent of the 102,200 members were Roman 
Catholic, over 4 per cent Orthodox, over 4 per cent 
Protestant, under 4 per cent Greek Catholic, nearly 2 per 
cent Jewish. 85 Compared to the pre-war population in 
Poland Roman Catholics were over represented, and Greek 
Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish under-represented. 
Polish community organizations in Britain after the 
Second World War 
To maintain ties of nationality the Poles who settled in 
Britain formed a number of associations, for example 
groups were formed for Polish ex-servicemen, Polish women 
etc. Many Polish associations affiliated to the 
Federation of Poles in Great Britain. The larges t of 
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these associations, the Associa tion of Polish Ex-
Combatants (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Kombatantow, 
abbrevia ted to SPK) was formed in 1946 ini tially being 
organized whilst the majority of Poles were still 
resident in the resettlement camps. In July 1949 this 
associa tion had 9,300 members, which by July 1953 had 
increased to 14,600 members, both male and female, in 197 
local branches. 86 The associa tion offered its members 
'consular' services, financial and legal assistance, help 
in finding accommodation and employment, a library 
containing items in both English and Polish, and social 
opportunities at over 100 of its clubs throughout 
Britain. 
For some Poles these organizations were particularly 
important, providing both practical support systems and a 
sense of security and community. For example, some Poles 
were bonded by their shared experience as Soviet 
prisoners of war, ei ther as poli tical prisoners or as 
civilian detainees, and some further still by their 
isolation as members of the Polish Second Corps (or 
'Anders Army') during the war in Palestine and Italy. 
When the Anders Army had arrived in Britain in mid-1946 
the majority of its members could not speak English and 
knew very Ii t tIe about Bri tish people and their way of 
life. Like many other Poles they were also politically 
embittered towards the USSR. 
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The organiza tions were also important for many of the 
older Poles who had been unable to requalify in order to 
take up their former professions in Britain. These men 
often compensated for their loss of status due to 
economic circumstances by becoming leading figures within 
the Polish exile community, being amongst its most active 
members. 
The Poles who had fought in the Second World War were 
highly organised in setting up their national 
associations and some felt embarrassed by the Poles who 
arrived as European Volunteer Workers. The EVWs had come 
to terms less with being uprooted and as a result were 
often a more volatile grouping than Poles who had been 
stationed in Britain or been part of other Western 
fighting forces during the war. However, this was only a 
temporary situation as the EVWs eventually settled down 
to life in Britain and in the provinces became part of 
the new Polish community. 
Polish newspapers 
Soon after their arrival in Bri tain during the Second 
World War, the Poles had established numerous newspapers 
and journals, published in the Polish language, which 
were designed to maintain a sense of national identity 
during the temporary exile enforced upon them by the 
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circumstances of the war. During the Second World War 
the Polish newspapers and periodicals were supported by 
public funds but when these were withdrawn in 1945 the 
number of publications declined. 87 After 1945 the 
newspapers became less military in character and were 
aimed a t a more general market. They also provided an 
important service for Poles seeking the whereabouts of 
relatives with whom they had lost contact through the 
course of the Second World War. The majority of articles 
continued to be in Polish, although during the 1950s 
Polish recipes were often printed in English when 
requested by Polish men who had married British women. 88 
Political activity of Poles in Britain 
In addition to religion, community association and the 
Polish language, an interest in the political situation 
in Poland remained of vital importance to Poles in exile. 
During their period as members of the PRe Poles were 
subject to British military law which forbade them from 
undertaking any activity which could be deemed as 
'political' . However, the organizations soon took on a 
quasi-political character and maintained an interest in 
political and religious events and the general situation 
in Poland. Such interest was generated not just through 
their Polish nationality but also in many cases by the 
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existence of family remaining in Poland. Numerous 
demonstrations and protests against the Soviet Union were 
organized. 
The political aspect of the existence of a large Polish 
community in Britain hostile to the Communist domination 
of Eastern Europe remained of some concern to the 
authorities in Poland who viewed the exiles as an 
embarrassment. The Polish secret services made a number 
of attempts to contact the Polish exiles and try to 
persuade them to return home; a returning exile could be 
used for propaganda purposes. In some cases personal 
contact was made but it was more common for the refugees 
to receive pamphlets and appeals which portrayed life in 
Poland as good and that there was no reason for any Pole 
to be exiled elsewhere. In June 1951 thirteen of these 
secret service agents were identified in Britain and 
deportation orders were served on them. Poles were 
instructed to inform the police if any such approaches 
were made towards them. 89 
The issue of responsibility for the Katyn massacre did 
not disappear. 90 In April 1956 the Federation of Poles 
in Great Britain organized a screening of a Polish film 
about Ka tyn which was wi thdrawn by the Bri tish Council 
only hours before it was due to be shown on the grounds 
that it had never allowed political films to be shown in 
-- Page 169 --
its cinema. In September 1979 the British Government 
allowed a band from the British Armed Forces to attend a 
ceremony for the third anniversary of the unveiling of 
the Katyn Memorial in Hounslow. This was the first time 
that there was to be any official participation from the 
British authorities. However, the Foreign Office pointed 
out that this did not imply that the British Government 
attributed the massacre to the Soviet forces. 
Following the death of Polish exile leader General 
Sikorski in July 1943 the British Government stated that 
after the Second World War his body would be returned to 
Poland for reburial. He was then buried in the Royal Air 
Force cemetery at Newark in Nottinghamshire, as were 
other prominent Polish exiles. The burial was meant to 
be temporary but after the Communist takeover of Poland 
it was decided to be against Sikorski's wishes that he be 
returned to an undemocratic Poland. To exiled Poles 
throughout the world this was symbolic of Poland's 
continued loss of freedom under the terms of the post-
Second World War settlement. However, in March 1981 it 
was made public tha t the Bri tish Government were 
considering moves from the Polish Government for the 
return of Sikorski's remains to Poland. The Polish 
community in Britain objected on the grounds that Poland 
was still under Communist domination and the remains 
should not be returned until Poland was a free country. 
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In this they obtained much support, for example from a 
number of MPs, intellectuals and the Press. The 
Government finally refused the request in June 1981, on 
the advice of the Foreign Office and after intense 
lobbying against the removal of the remains. To have 
returned the remains to Poland would not only have 
offended many Polish exiles throughout the world but 
would have also presented the Polish Government wi th a 
propaganda coup at a time of internal troubles. The 
remains were eventually returned, amidst great publicity, 
on 14 September 1993 at the request of the democratic 
Polish Government. The service in Britain was attended 
by 1,500 Polish ex-servicemen resident in Britain, 
demonstrating the strength of feeling which still existed 
over this issue. There were no serious objections to the 
reburial at this time, although some Poles did express 
the sentiment that it would have been better if Sikorski 
had remained with his men who remained, dead and alive, 
in Britain. There also remained some suspicion that the 
reburial was being used for propaganda purposes in the 
build-up to a Polish election which eventually saw the 
return to power of the former Communists. 
Healthcare provisions 
The general healthcare of the Poles, like other residents 
of Grea t Bri tain, was provided for after 1946 by the 
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Na tional Heal th Service. However, some aspects of the 
health of refugee groups in Britain required further 
attention. 
In common with the other groups of post-Second World War 
refugees settling in Britain there was a significant 
proportion whose wartime experiences had left both 
physical and psychological marks. In addi tion to those 
disabled by the war, the long years of deprivation had 
left some Poles, particularly amongst the former 
displaced persons used as forced labour by the Germans, 
in poor health; for example, there was concern about the 
incidence of tuberculosis amongst EVWs. Invalid homes 
and training centres were established for Polish ex-
servicemen. A maternity horne was established at Rugby 
for pregnant Poles. 
Other Poles had been left psychologically disturbed, and 
some resorted to suicide or alcoholism. Poles and other 
Eas t European refugees wi th psychological problems and 
resident in the South of England were referred to the 
Mabledon Unit which came under the Dartford district 
health authority. However, East Europeans throughout 
Britain became eligible for referral as the unit achieved 
recognition for its specialized care for such groups, who 
had proved difficul t to ca ter for locally because of 
language difficulties. 
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The Association of Friends of Polish Patients also 
assisted in maintaining Poles with psychiatric problems. 
It began sending Christmas presents to Poles in 
psychiatric hospitals in 1954, arranged a number of 
visits to them throughout the year and provided them with 
pocket money to make small purchases. In 1958 this 
organization estimated that there were 1,500 Poles 
undergoing psychiatric treatment in England and Wales. 
In 1958 the Associa tion decided to increase its 
activities to raise funds to equip a hostel to act as a 
halfway house for Poles discharged from hospital but 
still in need of a communal environment. 
English language acquisition 
The acquisi tion of the English language was vi tal in 
reducing the isolation of the Polish community in Britain 
and in facilitating its integration within the 
population. 
During the Second World War there had been a number of 
initiatives to teach English to the Poles stationed in 
Britain. In July 1940 the Lord Provost of Glasgow 
appointed 100 instructors of English for the large 
numbers of Poles stationed in Scotland. The cost of 
these instructors was met by the British Council. The 
Polish Na t ional Council in London had also recommended 
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that special courses in English culture and history 
should be made available to Poles. It has been estimated 
that 40 per cent of the Polish Resettlement Corps had 
some knowledge of English, whilst only 10 per cent of 
EVWs (of all nationalities) had. 9l In order to 
facilitate successful integration, the acquisition of the 
English language became a priori ty once permanent 
resettlement in Bri tain had become a likely option for 
large numbers of Poles. The long term use of 
interpreters was impractical. 
The British authorities provided English language lessons 
for one hour per day for those Poles in the PRC who were 
awaiting employment, and this teaching was often 
supplemented by the Poles who found teachers amongst 
their own ranks. The teaching methods used in these 
English classes were not always those most suited to the 
task. In some cases there was an imbalance between 
teaching English through the use of English Ii tera ture 
and the actual basics required by the poles. 92 In many 
cases, although trained teachers, the English instructors 
were not actually trained to teach English as a foreign 
language, there being a shortage of people trained in 
this at the time. Poles intended for work in the mines 
were provided with English language tuition by the 
National Coal Board. In coalmining the acquisi tion of 
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sufficient language skills were thought to be 
particularly necessary for reasons of safety. 
However, on settling in Britain the Poles had been placed 
in employment as quickly as possible and opportuni ties 
for instruction in the English language were restricted 
to what was thought the minimum necessary to make an 
efficient workforce. The types of employment in which 
they were placed, for example working with heavy, noisy 
machinery, also discouraged much conversation at work. 
Where Poles had married another member of the Polish 
community, Polish also continued to be the language used 
in the home. Resistance to English classes was 
heightened by the initial hopes held by most Poles that a 
return to Poland would be possible wi thin a few years. 
Learning English was also difficult for elderly Poles and 
those who had received little education in Poland. 
For those Poles who did continue to learn English in 
their own time there were a number of correspondence 
courses available and lessons were broadcast by the BBC 
with an accompanying booklet English by Radio. 
For Poles resident in accommodation provided by the 
National Assistance Board English language classes were 
organized by the Committee for the Education of Poles in 
Great Britain. Recreational classes and activities were 
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also organized in the hostels along with talks from 
various organizations about the British 'way of life'. 
Also on the theme of the English way of life, the British 
Government produced a booklet entitled To Help You Settle 
in Britain which aimed to give some description of this. 
There were also numerous articles in the Polish press 
which aimed to familiarize Poles wi th Bri tish ways and 
customs. 
Those Poles who were adept at learning English found that 
it could be of great value in increasing their employment 
opportunities. Many who learnt English particularly well 
moved to semi-skilled white collar jobs once the 
employment restrictions had been lifted. Others found 
tha t a sound grasp of the language enabled them to be 
promoted to more responsible jobs in the firms in which 
they worked. Some Poles also took this further by using 
anglicized versions of their names whilst in the 
workplace to make pronunciation easier for their English 
colleagues. This was particularly true of the young 
Poles who generally found the transition to English life 
much easier. 
In the special schools set up for the education of Polish 
children in Britain where it was unfeasible for them to 
attend British schools there was a shift after 1947 
towards teaching in the English language rather than in 
-- Page 176 --
Polish as it became necessary to equip the children for 
adul t life in ei ther Bri tain or other English-speaking 
countries to which emigration was still possible. The 
curriculum was also altered to more closely resemble that 
followed in Bri tish schools. Consequently, the Polish 
teachers in 
examinations 
these 
such 
schools 
as the 
were encouraged to si t 
Cambridge Certificate 
for 
of 
Proficiency in English or to submi t to inspection in 
order to appraise their abili ty to teach subjects in 
English. Once this had been proved there was an addition 
to their salary. 
It was also attempted to teach pre-school Polish children 
sufficient English. Initially full-time nursery schools 
were open to children aged between two and five years 
whose mothers were in employment. However, in November 
1950 the Committee for the Education of Poles in Great 
Britain decided that part-time nursery schools should be 
made available for children of these ages living in 
Polish communities regardless of whether the mother was 
in employment. Local residents were encouraged by the 
Women's Voluntary Service and Women's Institutes to go 
and talk to these children in English. 
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Education provision for Polish schoolchildren in Britain 
In Scotland Polish secondary schools for both boys and 
girls were opened before the end of the Second World War. 
The schools for Polish children in which lessons were 
given in Polish were closed when it became apparent that 
many Poles were facing long-term settlement in Britain. 
In 1949, before the closures, there had been 50 nursery 
and primary schools wi th 2,300 pupils and 7 secondary 
schools with 2,000 pupils in Britain where Polish 
children were taught in their own language. 93 It was 
believed by the Government that the children of Poles 
would benefit more from the early integration with the 
British community which could be attained by attending 
British schools. The last two primary schools for Polish 
children in National Assistance Board hostels, which were 
situated in Gloucestershire and Leicestershire, were 
closed by the Minis try of Educa t ion in September 1962. 
The pupils of these schools were transferred to local 
British schools. 
Children of Polish parents became most apparent in 
British schools during the late 1950s and 1960s. Before 
this the children had tended to be those born outside 
Britain and accompanying their parents when they settled 
in Britain. During the late 1950s/early 1960s there were 
more children starting school who had been born after 
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their parents had settled in Britain. The Poles were 
most evident in the Roman Catholic schools since the 
majori ty of the Polish communi ty were members of the 
Roman Catholic Church. 
In some of the towns and cities where there were large 
Polish communities the Poles themselves established 
voluntary Polish Saturday schools to which parents could 
send their children to learn about their language, 
culture and history. 
Facilities for higher education 
Facilities for the higher education of Poles in certain 
subjects were also established. In 1941 the Polish 
School of Medicine at 
founded and this was 
the University of Edinburgh was 
followed by courses for Polish 
veterinary students. There was also a Polish Faculty of 
Law a t Oxford Uni versi ty in 1944, archi tecture courses 
for Polish students in Liverpool, and in London courses 
were made available a t the Board of Technical Studies 
which had close links with London University. The Polish 
government-in-exile encouraged members of the Polish 
forces to study and was generous in granting extended 
leave from military service to do so. However, after it 
became apparent that Polish resettlement in Britain was 
to take on a more permanent character support from public 
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funds for the Facul ty of Law a t Oxford was removed in 
October 1946. The Polish Faculty of Medicine at 
Edinburgh University was obliged to continue under its 
own auspices after the end of the Second World War as 
Edinburgh University withdrew its hospitality under 
pressure to find accommodation for its own students. The 
Polish School of Medicine, as it was renamed, continued 
until March 1949 enabling those student already enrolled 
to finish their courses. During the eight years of 
medical courses being on offer to Polish students in 
Edinburgh 227 students qualified as doctors. 94 
Educational opportunities remained open for Poles 
enrolling in the PRC. Poles in Bri tish educa tion who 
decided not to join the Polish Resettlement Corps ceased 
to be eligible for special educational facilities, 
including English language courses. This was done on the 
assumption that Poles not joining the PRC had chosen not 
to be resettled either in Britain or elsewhere and that 
such courses, particularly those in the English language, 
were made available with resettlement in mind. 
In December 1946 the number of Polish students in higher 
education in Britain had been reduced from 4,000 to 
2,800, of whom 1,200 were based in London, including 650 
a t the Polish Uni versi ty College which had been 
established during 1946 with faculties of architecture, 
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economics and engineering. The number of students at the 
Polish University College was not to exceed 1,350. 
Indeed, after its peak of 1,100 students in its first 
year,95 numbers at 
gradually declined. 
1950, the college 
the Polish Uni versi ty College 
No new students were accepted after 
closing in 1953. Students in 
architecture and engineering who had not completed their 
degree courses were transferred at this date to 
polytechnics in London. At the same time as figures 
were set concerning the numbers attending the Polish 
University college, the number of Poles attending 
undergraduate courses at British universities was limited 
to 2,000. A number of Polish institutions which provided 
technical education also existed. 
The Treasury paid for the fees and maintenance of 
students eligible as a consequence of PRC membership and 
either one year's service under British military command 
or having completed one year's service in an industry of 
national importance as a civilian. Phil Piratin, 
Communist Member for Mile End, deplored the idea tha t 
these Polish students were taking places which could 
otherwise be alloca ted to Bri tish ex-servicemen. The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dal ton, informed him 
that this was a mistaken idea and that the Poles were not 
preventing any British ex-servicemen from entering higher 
education, that many of these Polish students had fought 
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bravely for the Allies during the Second World War and 
that he was "astonished to find racial prejudice in this 
matter".96 However, the concern that the British public 
might be resentful if large numbers of Poles were seen to 
be taking places at British universities at the expense 
of British students, was one reason for the limitations 
introduced to the numbers of Polish students at the 
Polish University College. The numbers were to be 
gradually reduced as the Poles 
themselves at British institutions. 
found places for 
Under the terms of 
the 1947 Polish Resettlement Act responsibility for 
Polish education in Britain was transferred to the 
Ministry of Education from the Polish Government-in-
Exile. 
The Polish insti tutions were only temporary and closed 
during the 1950s as Poles entering higher education 
increasingly did so via the British higher education 
system. 
Technical education 
In addition to attending their own educational 
institutions the Poles were entitled to attend British 
institutions which had places available. However, in 
November 1945 the Ministry of Education informed the 
technical colleges that no further admissions should be 
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made to members of the Polish Forces wishing to attend 
day classes. The reasons given for this decision were 
that responsibility for providing educational facilities 
for the forces res ted wi th the service to which they 
belonged, and also tha t resources for day classes at 
technical colleges were now in full use providing for the 
normal training needs of industry and special training 
for demobilized British personnel. 
The government aided the further education of young Poles 
between 1947-1960 by making grants available for those 
interested in higher or technical education. By November 
1948 approximately 27,000 Polish students were in receipt 
of maintenance allowances from British Government 
money.97 Members of the Polish Reset tlement Corps were 
eligible for a Vocational Training Scheme place if their 
training would not prevent the training of a Bri tish 
subject and if the industry concerned had agreed to the 
absorption of Polish workers. In 1948 the offer was made 
to officers in the PRC of six months' leave with pay in 
order to attend a training course which would lead to 
resettlement in civilian life. Arrangements for joining 
such courses were the responsibility of the individuals 
involved. By 15 June 1948 there were 357 Polish officers 
who had taken advantage of this offer. 98 
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The organization of the education of Poles in Great 
Britain 
On 1 April 1947 the Committee for the Education of Poles 
in Great Britain was established to aid in the 
educational arrangements for Poles. This committee 
included both British and Polish members, the majority of 
whom had direct links with education. One of the 
responsibilities of this Committee was to select Polish 
students to receive maintenance awards from the 
authorities. The principal objectives of the Committee 
were to ensure the provision of English language teaching 
for all Poles prepared to attend classes and, in the long 
term, to wind down the Polish educational institutions 
and encourage enrolment in British educational 
establishments. Between March 1947 and the end of 
September 1954 the committee incurred a total expenditure 
of £9,058,315 which had been used for the purposes of 
educating Poles in Britain. 99 The period of operation of 
the Committee for the Education of Poles in Great Britain 
ended on 30 September 1954. After this time 
responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of 
Education, which immediately established an Advisory 
Committee, including amongst its members nearly all those 
who had served on the Committee for the Education of 
Poles in Great Britain, to advise on Polish educational 
matters in Britain. The educational establishments which 
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had been under the control of the Committee were 
transferred to local education authority control, with 
Government 
This was 
reimbursement 
to continue 
of any necessary expendi ture. 
until the schools became 
unnecessary. 
In addition to maintaining strong ties to the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Poles further kept alive their 
historical and cultural heritage by establishing the 
General Sikorski Historical Institute and the Polish 
Library in London. The Polish Library itself stocked 
books of interest to Poles in Britain, whether in the 
Polish or English language. Initially it was maintained 
with the help of an annual grant of £11,000 from the 
Department of Educa tion and Science. Between 1954 and 
the end of March 1967 Government funding to Polish 
cultural centres in the United Kingdom amounted to 
£200,000. 100 
However, a decision to withdraw this funding was reached 
by the British Government in 1966, a time when 
maintaining the cuI tural identi ties of exiled minori ty 
groups in Britain seems to have lost importance in 
parliamentary circles. This decision was not made 
wi thout much opposi tion. Many Conserva ti ve members of 
the House of Lords raised objections, as did a number of 
academics. Of particular concern was the possibility of 
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the Library having to close down and its books being 
dispersed throughout the country, with the threat of 
reduced access to both students and Polish readers to the 
collection. It was generally fel t to be desirable to 
keep the collection together. A typical description of 
the Government decision to withdraw funding given by its 
opponents was that of C. Lewy of Trinity College 
Cambridge who described it as "a most unenlightened and 
deplorable action" .101 There were many calls for the 
decision to be reversed. The Polish community deplored 
the possibility that the library should be lost, since it 
was an intellectual centre for Polish emigres throughout 
the world. 
Birmingham University offered to house the research 
collection of the Polish Library but this was rejected by 
the Polish Library which preferred to maintain the entire 
library under its own control. The communi ty fel t the 
library to be its own property as many of the books had 
been donated by Polish exiles. The unity of the 
collection was maintained however under the arrangements 
by which the Library was handed over to the Polish Social 
and Cultural Association on 1 August 1967. The 
University of London School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies agreed to make an annual grant to the Association 
towards the salaries of the library staff in return for a 
representative on the governing body of the library.102 
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In 1969 the Polish Cultural Fund applied for Government 
aid in purchasing a property for a cuI tural centre but 
its appeal was turned down by the Government. 
The public libraries throughout Bri tain also s tacked a 
small selection of books in Polish, and in building up 
this collection they were aided in their choices by the 
Committee for the Education of Poles in Great Britain and 
the Polish Library. 
The effect of British attitudes towards the Soviet Union 
on relationships with the Polish exile community 
Even during the Second World War attitudes towards Poles 
were not always favourable. After the Soviet Union 
entered the war on the side of the Allies against Nazi 
Germany, the Soviets' irreconcilable differences with the 
Poles meant that some, although not all, sections of the 
British public cooled in their attitudes towards the 
Poles. Certain sections of the press were particularly 
guilty of this; it was evident in the Communist newspaper 
the Daily Worker, and also in the newspapers under the 
control of the pro-Soviet Max Beaverbrook. Clashes 
between the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Soviet 
Union over post-war frontiers and also on responsibility 
for the Katyn massacre initially worked against the Poles 
in the eyes of a British public which saw the Soviets as 
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allies in the struggle against Nazism. Such antipathy 
towards the Poles was directed most frequently at the 
exiled government. Holders of such views often remained 
sympathetic to the suffering of the ordinary Polish 
people and continued to recognize the bravery of the 
Polish armed forces. 
These difficul ties did not remain indefini tely as when 
news of the persecution and terror in Poland during the 
Stalinist era reached Britain understanding and sympathy 
was seen to return in most sections of the public and the 
press. Nevertheless, some hostili ty towards the Poles 
did remain amongst Russophiles in Britain. In the House 
of Commons on 4 February 1946 Leslie Solley, a Labour MP, 
claimed "that the British public is disturbed" by anti-
Soviet intrigues and propaganda engaged in by General 
Anders and officers of the Polish Second Corps, and he 
demanded to know what action was going to be taken to put 
an end to it. 103 The only reply he received was that the 
situation was receiving active consideration. Other 
organizations went further and vociferously objected to 
the resettlement in Britain of Poles who refused 
repatriation. One such example of this was the West Ham 
Trades Council which forwarded to the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs a resolution passed by its members in 
protest of the Polish resettlement. A Gallup opinion 
poll taken in June 1946 showed that 56 per cent of the 
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British public disapproved of the decision of the British 
Government to allow Poles to resettle in Britain, 30 per 
cent approved, whilst 14 per cent did not express an 
opinion. 104 
Non-repatriable Poles 
The boundaries of Poland and the degree of Polish 
independence were significant issues which had emerged in 
post-war discussions between the victorious Allied 
powers. In addition, there was also the sensitive matter 
of the possible future resettlement of non-repa triable 
Poles. Of particular concern to this thesis were the 
attitudes towards their resettlement in Britain. 
There were divisions on what policy should be adopted by 
the Bri tish Government towards any non-repatriables at 
the end of the Second World War. One particularly 
vociferous proponent of the acceptance of a fair 
proportion of Poles for settlement in Britain was the 
member for the English Uni versi ties, Miss Eleanor 
Rathbone. Despite calls for a pledge to accept a limited 
number of refugees in Bri tain after the war, no such 
pledge was forthcoming from the British Government for a 
number of years. Indeed, even in 1946, when the forcible 
repatriation of Poles had been rejected, the Government 
would not commit itself to accepting unlimited numbers of 
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poles, stating that some might be forced to settle 
elsewhere. 
However, calls for the right of Poles to residency in 
Britain were strengthened when it became clear that the 
post-war Polish frontiers would not be the same as those 
of 1939 and that many Poles would find their homes had 
been placed under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union. 
Although many members of Parliament agreed that Soviet 
claims to Polish terri tory should be complied wi th, it 
was still strongly felt that Bri tain had moral 
obligations to the Poles which needed to be maintained. 
After the adoption of the Curzon line had been agreed 
upon by the three powers at the Yalta conference 
Churchill indicated tha t government policy towards the 
long-term acceptance of refugees was changing, telling 
Parliament that, for those Poles who were unhappy about 
returning home, Britain 
"must be regarded as their final security. 
If everything else fails, here are open 
1 f h B · . hE· ,,105 the porta sot e rltls mplre. 
The official line taken by the British Government towards 
the Poles remained that stated by the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, on 20 August 1945, 
that Poles were urged 
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"to go back to their country and assume 
their responsibilities in building the 
new Poland. They will render a far 
greater service there than they can do 
from outside."106 
After the Yalta conference it was made clear by the 
British Government that no Poles would be repatriated 
against their will but that hopefully the conditions 
would be created within Poland which would encourage as 
many of them as possible to return. These conditions did 
not occur and in fact as time passed condi tions made 
repatriation even less of an attractive option for many 
Poles. For example, many Polish units which had served 
under Western command were dubbed as 'fascists' by the 
Polish Provisional Government, which made members of 
these units even more fearful of persecution upon return 
to Poland. 
The threat of Soviet dominance over the future Poland 
initiated the reluctance by some Poles towards their 
eventual repatriation, some for ideological reasons 
others because they also had a realistic fear for their 
lives if they returned. This was particularly true of 
the Polish Second Corps who had experienced deportation 
to the Soviet Union in the first two years of the Second 
World War, and also of the professional officer class of 
the old Polish army who feared punishment as 
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reactionaries. The attitudes of the officers in turn 
affected the attitudes of the rank and file towards 
repatriation. Although many Poles hoped one day to 
return to Poland they refused to do so whilst the country 
was under Soviet domination, particularly as the 
guarantees of safety given by the Polish Government were 
unconvincing. In such circumstances they decided in the 
meantime to remain in Britain. 
There were a number of allegations made in the Press and 
elsewhere against the Polish officers and Government-in-
exile put ting pressure on the Polish forces to refuse 
repatriation. Indeed after the initial return of some 
Poles immedia tely after the war there was very Ii t tIe 
further repatriation. 
By January 1946 only 17.2 per cent of the Polish army 
under Western military command had opted for 
repatriation, and of those Poles who had served in the 
Bri tish Royal Air Force a pal try 0.5 per cent chose to 
return to Poland. 107 Transportation difficulties meant 
that many Poles had to wait for long periods of time to 
be repatriated and this gave many of them an opportunity 
to delay their decision or to change their decision to be 
repatriated. 
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On 20 March 1946 all members of the Polish Armed Forces 
received a document, in Polish, outlining the conditions 
which would apply to them should they return to Poland. 
The document was issued by the Polish Provisional 
Government as a result of consultations between it and 
the British Government. The statement made by the Polish 
Provisional Government as contained in the document 
informed the Poles that no punitive measures or reprisals 
would be carried out against them unless they had served 
in the German Army, committed acts of High Treason or 
been guilty of common crimes. Those members who chose to 
be demobilized in Poland would be entitled to all 
pensions and benefits accorded to all other Polish 
soldiers. Polish citizens who had lived east of the 
Curzon line in 1939 and whose place of birth would now be 
located in the Soviet Union were guaranteed Polish 
citizenship. 
The statement of the Polish Provisional Government was 
accompanied by a letter from Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, which outlined British 
policy, stating that the conditions set out by the Polish 
Provisional Government were considered to be satisfactory 
and that the Poles should now decide whether they wished 
to be repatriated or resettled. Bevin informed the Poles 
that in the view of the British Government it was in the 
best interests of Poland for them to return and "make 
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their contribution to the restoration of the prosperity 
of liberated Poland". No promise was made that any 
resettlement would necessarily take place in Britain. 
The Poles were also informed that their military units 
would be disbanded as soon as possible .108 During his 
statement in the House of Commons regarding this document 
Bevin told the House that he did not want to dwell too 
much on what Britain would do for those choosing 
resettlement as he did not in any way want to discourage 
repatriation. The British Government continually 
reasserted that Poles should, when they felt it possible 
to do so, return to Poland and help in the reconstruction 
of that country. 
Despi te continued efforts by the Polish Government to 
persuade the exiles to return, there were few 
repatriations after the initial returnees. The Polish 
Government was particularly keen to persuade leaders of 
the Polish community in Britain to return as such 
repatriations provided propaganda opportunities. During 
the mid-1950s there was an attempt by the Polish 
authori ties to persuade exiles to return but this was 
generally unsuccessful. In September 1955, however, they 
were successful in securing the return of Hugon Hanke, a 
Minister of the Polish Government-in-exile, who had 
become disillusioned with emigre politics. Hanke urged 
other Polish exiles to follow his example. However, 
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although the return of Hanke shocked and dismayed other 
Polish emigre leaders he was relatively unknown amongst 
the wider Polish community in Britain. Hanke was one of 
very few successes in a campaign by the Polish Government 
at that time attempting to persuade notable Polish 
emigres to return by promising they would not be punished 
and would get jobs corresponding to the previous position 
held by them in Polish society. These attempts to 
persuade Poles to re turn resul ted in September 1955 in 
the deportation from Britain of Josef Malicki, secretary-
general of the Polish Social and Cultural Association, a 
body sponsored by the Polish Government, for his 
involvement in the campaign. 
The Poles as former allies 
After the end of the Second World War most people in 
Britain were sympathetic to the Poles who were seen as an 
unjustly abandoned ally. There were numerous expressions 
of outrage, including those by several Members of 
Parliament, when it was announced that no Poles would be 
present at the Allied Victory Parade in London on 8 June 
1945. However, the Poles' absence was more a resul t of 
political considerations than a failure to recognize the 
bravery and effort of the Polish forces. The Bri tish 
Government had invited the newly recognized Polish 
Government in Warsaw to send representatives from the 
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Polish forces to attend as the official representatives 
of the Polish forces and, after initially agreeing to 
attend, the Polish authorities in Warsaw decided not to 
send a military contingent. Twenty-five of the Poles who 
had flown wi th the Bri tish forces were also invi ted to 
attend as part of the Royal Air Force contingent but 
refused to do so in protest a t the lack of recogni tion 
given to Polish ex-servicemen who had served under 
Western command and refused repatriation to Poland under 
the Communist regime. 
Even this sympathy for former allies had a limit though. 
On 29 August 1949 the Committee for the Commemoration of 
the Invasion of Poland 1939, chaired by General Anders, 
held a press conference at which it was revealed that the 
London Transport Executive had refused to display a 
poster prepared by the Committee on the grounds that it 
was too controversial. The poster read: 
"September, 1939. - Poland risked all for 
liberty - yours as well as hers. 
September, 1949. You have your 
liberty, but don't forget poland's.,,109 
There was also an article enti tIed 'How to trea tour 
Poles' published in the Daily Mirror in August 1946 
wri t ten by Leslie B. Thomas, who had come into contact 
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with the Polish forces in Italy and the Middle East 
during the Second World War. The article warned that the 
Poles of the Second Corps were not like those Poles who 
had already had contact with Britain and that they were 
"flannellers" who would use hardluck stories to their 
advantage. He also stressed their lack of English, 
illiteracy and acceptance of whatever was told to them by 
their Polish officers. The picture painted by Thomas of 
the character of this body of men was far from 
flattering. IIO 
Accusations of fascist sympathies 
Throughout Bri tain there were allega tions tha t some of 
the Poles had been fascists. This arose from confusion 
concerning those Poles who, having found themselves in 
territory under German control, had been forced to either 
work or fight for the Germans. A number of the Poles who 
had been in the forces under Bri tish command had been 
enrolled after their capture as members of the Wehrmacht, 
and it was also known that amongst the Polish displaced 
persons entering Britain as EVWs a large proportion had 
been used as forced labour within the Reich. An 
estimated 39,000 of the Polish forces in Britain had in 
some way served the Germans during the Second World War, 
18,000 of these then went on to fight for the Allies, the 
remainder not having had the opportunity to fight due to 
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the end of the war. 111 Allegations were made by anti-
Polish agitators in Britain that large numbers of these 
Poles had not been forced into co-opera tion wi th the 
Germans but had done so willingly. However, on behalf of 
the Government, Frederick Bellenger, Secretary of Sta te 
for War, attempted to reassure Parliament that this was 
not the case, that they had been conscripted compulsorily 
and had taken the firs t opportuni ty to desert to the 
Allies "often at considerable risk to themselves".112 
Reassurance was also given that those who had served the 
Germans during the war underwent careful security 
screening. 113 This did not put an end to all the 
accusations of fascists and war criminals having arrived 
in Britain along with the Poles in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. For example, there was the case of 
Wladyslaw Dering who had arrived in Bri tain wi th the 
Polish army in 1946 and was wanted by the Polish 
Government for aiding biological experiments on Jews 
1941-1944. After considering the evidence presented to 
them the British Government, after initially intending to 
comply with the extradition request, decided against 
deporting him.1l4 
The Communist Party of Great Britain capitalized on 
suspicions that there were fascists amongst the Poles in 
Bri tain by seeking publici ty for such allega t ions. In 
1946 it published a leaflet entitled No British Jobs for 
-- Page 198 --
Fascist Poles in which it claimed that at least one-third 
of the Poles in Britain had fought for the Germans, 
whilst the remainder were all fascists reluctant to 
return to Poland now that it had a 'democratic' 
government. It also described the Polish Government-in-
exile in London as "opposed to the democratic reform of 
Poland". The leaflet then went on to cite opposition to 
Poles which had been expressed during the TUC meeting at 
which the use of Polish labour in Britain had been 
discussed. Following on from the accusations levelled at 
the Poles the leaflet then quoted Hansard in which it was 
estimated that the Poles in Britain would cost the 
British taxpayers £33,000,000 during 1946. It ended with 
the demand for the Poles to be returned to Poland, 
claiming that there was no reason for them to take 
British jobs when the "democratically elected Polish 
Government has repeatedly offered to take these men back 
and to provide them with work". 
In 1950 the Immigration Service was ordered to undertake 
security screening of former members of the Polish Second 
Corps and their dependants who had not previously been 
screened at the port of their arrival in Britain. The 
screening process was then extended to other 
nationalities who had arrived as a result of the Second 
World War. The screening undertaken of these groups in 
1950 took two years to complete. Questions relating to 
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the effectiveness and thoroughness of such post-war 
screening processes have been brought into prominence 
recently in the debate surrounding war criminals. 
Images of Polish criminality 
As the Second World War ended there was a growing image 
in Bri tain, particularly in the press, of criminali ty 
rampaging through the exiled Polish community. 
One incident which caught the imagination of all sections 
of the Press and the general public was the escape from 
prison in Norwich of Stanislaw Zborowski, an armed Polish 
ex-soldier. Zborowski had escaped on 30 May 1946 with 
two other Polish soldiers who were quickly recaptured. 
However, the hunt for Zborowski took much longer and he 
was not recaptured until 22 June 1947. Zborowski also 
staged a second escape in April 1948 but it took only 
four days to capture him on this occasion. The chase for 
this Polish prisoner, who had been sentenced for 9 months 
imprisonment after being found guilty of a £364 robbery 
which involved the theft of 44,000 cigarettes from a 
NAAFI canteen, gained a great deal of publicity but was 
not reported in such a manner which could be seen as 
hostile to the Polish community in general. However, 
this cannot be said of the reporting of all criminal 
cases which involved Poles. For example, on 5 April 1948 
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an article 
Argus wi th 
was 
the 
carried in the 
title 'POLE AS 
Bradford Telegraph and 
PASSPORT "PIMPERNEL'" , 
which related the tale of five men who had been charged 
with providing residents of a displaced persons camp in 
Germany with false passports enabling them to travel 
freely throughout Europe. However, despite the headline, 
only one of the men was Polish, the others were British. 
During April and May 1948 there were a number of criminal 
cases reported involving Poles which could only have 
served to fuel those already hostile to their 
resettlement in Britain. In one ins tance a case was 
reported in which a Pole who admitted to a £2,500 robbery 
but also tried to get his girlfriend imprisoned so that 
she would not be able to see other men while he was in 
jail. 
The image of Poles as black marketeers also gained 
popular credence after the Second World War. For 
example, there was the story of one Pole who left his 
camp wi th nothing and wi thin three months had a bank 
balance of £10,000 from the profits made from the black 
market. 11S As with the British population, members of 
the Polish community did become involved in black market 
activities but the numbers involved tended to be 
exaggerated by both the press and the gossips. 
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To some extent the incidence of criminality amongst the 
Poles can be attributed to the idleness of camp life. It 
also has to be accepted that amongst any large group of 
people there are likely to be a small minority who will 
engage in criminal activity. Many of the criminal cases 
involving the Poles were related to disorder. There were 
also several cases of unauthorized possession of 
firearms, an offence also common amongst the indigenous 
population at this time, which can be related to the easy 
availability of firearms following a period spent in the 
armed forces. 
Problems created by the uneven gender distribution of the 
Poles in Britain 
Longer-lasting hostility towards the Poles was caused by 
the uneven gender distribution of the refugees, with men 
far outnumbering women. The Poles arriving in Bri tain 
during 1941-45 were predominantly men who were members of 
the Polish armed forces. More women and children arrived 
in the years immediately after the Second World War both 
as dependants and, in the case of women, as EVWs. 
December 1951 there were 101,284 men and 34,486 
On 1 
women 
regis tered as Polish na t ionals in Grea t Bri tain. The 
actual gender distribution of Poles in any given locality 
tended to differ according to the type of accommodation 
and employment available. As stated in the 1971 Census 
-- Page 202 --
of the Poles resident in the United Kingdom 73,500 were 
male and 35,300 female. 116 
This did create some hostility towards the Poles by some 
local men who saw them as competition for British women. 
There were a number of marriages between Polish men and 
Bri tish women during the war, including a few thousand 
Scottish-Polish marriages. By the end of the Second 
World War there had been approximately 4,000 Polish-
British marriages, with a similar number of children 
resulting from these marriages. 117 After the war the 
number of these marriages would have significantly 
increased due to the lack of available Polish women for 
the Polish men in Britain. 
Inter-marriage worked both for and against the acceptance 
of Poles into the local community. Although it created 
hostili ty in some sections of the communi ty, it also 
increased their apparent assimilation by many members of 
the local community via family links and increased 
acquisition of English language. 
A further factor in creating hostility towards the Poles 
was when some Polish men became involved with British 
women despite having wives back in Poland. Koczy in his 
review of the Scottish-Polish Society talks of 
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illegitimate children resulting from these relationships 
souring Scottish-Polish relations. 118 
Conclusion 
As time progressed, the Poles were regarded as less of a 
threat, hostility towards them dwindled and there was a 
return to the image of the Poles in Britain in terms of 
their contribution to the Allied war effort. In January 
1968 Portsmouth park committee approved plans for a 
£3,000 memorial to the Polish communi ty in Bri tain. A 
Polish exile communi ty had existed in Portsmouth since 
1834 when more than 200 Polish soldiers had arrived in 
flight from the failed uprising of 1831. Of a more 
controversial nature was the memorial to the victims of 
the Katyn massacre in London. The Soviet Embassy 
objected to this when it was proposed to erect it in 
1976, six years after the fund had been started to pay 
for it. The Embassy lodged its protest with Kensington 
and Chelsea Council which had approved the memorial 
bearing the inscription "Katyn 1940" to be erected in 
Gunnersbury cemetery. The Soviets objected on the 
grounds that the date of 1940 implied that they were 
responsible for the massacre rather than the Germans who 
the Soviets claimed had been the perpetrators in 1941. 
These actions by the Soviet Embassy resulted in Sir 
Frederick Bennett, the Conservative MP for Torbay and 
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chairman of the Katyn Memorial Fund, to table a motion in 
the House of Commons to discuss the "improper conduct" of 
the Soviet Embassy over the issue. However, the official 
Government response was one of appeasement towards all 
parties; whilst it put forward no objections to the 
memorial it also refused an invitation to the unveiling 
ceremony to avoid offending the Soviets. 
Although a generaliza tion, perhaps the best summary of 
British attitudes towards the Poles is that given by 
Patterson : 
"By 1960 the Poles were no longer 
conceived of as potential scabs, fascists 
or Casanovas. Instead they were seen as 
good workers, ratepayers, solid citizens 
and family men.,,119 
As time passed and feelings of competi tion towards the 
Poles lessened, the pervading attitude towards the Poles 
was one of respect for their contribution to the Allied 
cause during the Second World War and subsequent to this, 
a respect for an integrated, although not assimilated, 
Polish exile community in Britain. There also continued 
to be some feeling of responsibility for the fate of 
Poland as part of the post-Second World War settlement. 
This is reflected in a description of the Poles in 
Britain by The Times in 1985 : 
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"The majority of Poles living in Britain 
are still, in the true sense of the word, 
exiles. Whether they found themselves 
here as Stalin imposed Soviet domination 
on Poland in 1944/5, or as General 
Jaruzelski reimposed it by proxy in 1982, 
they are unnaturally banished from their 
native land by the political 
circumstances which we call, in 
shorthand, "Yalta". ,,120 
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8. THE RESPONSES TO UKRAINIANS IN BRITAIN 
The Ukrainians who came to Bri tain a t the end of the 
Second World War could be divided into two groups; those 
who came here voluntarily under the European Volunteer 
Workers' schemes and those who were brought here 
involuntarily by the British Government as prisoners of 
war. However, both groups were settlers here, the 
prisoners having little desire to return to the Soviet 
Union where they feared persecution for their nationalist 
beliefs and for having fought against the Soviet Union or 
performed forced labour under German command. 
British perceptions of the 'Ukrainian problem' 
For most of the Second World War the situation in Ukraine 
had not figured highly in the thoughts of Britain's 
politicians, the 'Ukrainian problem' not really becoming 
an issue until 1945. In January of tha t year Rhys 
Davies, a Labour Member of Parliament, spoke out on the 
subject in favour of Ukrainians being allowed to have 
some input into the discussions on the control of their 
territories once peace had been established. He argued 
tha t 48, 000, 000 people lived in Ukraine, more than the 
popula tion of Grea t Bri tain, and it was wrong for such 
decisions to be made for them. 1 Professor Savory, Member 
for Queen's Uni versi ty, Belfast, put forward a similar 
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argument in February when speaking of the Ukrainian lands 
previously under Polish control, and the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, when asked what 
information he had on the views of Polish Ukrainians on 
their becoming part of the Soviet Union, replied that he 
was aware of the Ukrainian nationalist movement but 
admitted that he had no information as to what their 
actual views on the situation were although he did make 
reference to the inter-war clashes between Poles and 
Ukrainians. 2 
It was only the turn in foreign policy after the end of 
the Second World War which changed the at ti tude of the 
Bri t ish Government towards the Ukrainians. Whilst the 
Soviet Union had remained an ally of Britain the British 
Government were unwilling to offend the Soviets. Further 
to this, it was not prudent to offend the Soviets 
immediately after the cessation of hostilities because 
not only were Soviet citizens facing liberation by the 
British forces but nearly 4,000 British prisoners of war 
were liberated by the Soviets. 3 Whilst the Soviets had 
British citizens under their care the British authorities 
were limited in their actions until their safe 
repatriation had been secured. However, once these 
British men had been returned and the Cold War had begun 
to set in, it became convenient to regard the Ukrainians 
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and BaIts who had so far escaped repatriation as 
oppressed peoples under Russian Communist domination. 
Poli ticians and the public became concerned about the 
number of Soviet ci tizens who had been forcibly 
repa tria ted and thus were now perceived to have been 
political refugees who had been denied asylum in Britain. 
There were questions raised in the House of Commons on 21 
May 1947 regarding the forcible repatriation to the 
Soviet Union of 185 men from the prisoner of war camp at 
Rimini, actions which, according to Labour Member of 
Parliament, Richard Stokes, had resulted in a number of 
attempted suicides. Replying on behalf of the 
Government, Christopher Mayhew, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that there 
had been no a t tempted suicides and, al though three men 
did escape, there were no other incidents. The men who 
had been repatriated were said to have been either Soviet 
citizens serving in the Soviet armed forces or had given 
active assistance to the enemy, categories of men it had 
been agreed to return to the Soviet Union under the terms 
of the Yalta Agreement on Repatriation and that "no 
undertaking has been given which would preclude the 
repatriation of men in . " these categorles . Stokes then 
contended that it was 
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"outrageous to expect to continue to 
carry out a policy laid down at Yalta, 
which clearly adumbrated that there 
should be a fair trial and return of 
these people, when there is now no fair 
trial". 
He also claimed tha t these men were persuaded to enter 
the train transporting them to the Soviet Union by being 
told that they were being taken to Scotland to help the 
miners there. Mayhew said that he would be willing to 
examine any evidence Stokes had to support his claims, 
but that he thought the version of events he himself had 
given was nearer to the truth. 4 Foreign Secretary, 
Ernest Bevin, agreed that the idea of forced 
repatriations to any country was "abhorrent" to Britain 
but that any exploitation of Britain by asylum seekers 
could not be tolerated. When asked by Godfrey Nicholson 
tha tat the very leas t those who faced certain dea th 
after repatriation should not be returned, Bevin replied 
that although there had been some suicides by people who 
could not face repatriation he did not think that Britain 
were actually sending anyone to face certain dea th and 
tha t Bri tain' s duty to return these people was clearly 
defined in the terms of the Yalta Agreement. 5 This 
statement was made on 11 June 1947, only seven days 
before questions were raised in the Commons regarding the 
transporta tion to Bri tain of more than 8, 000 Ukrainian 
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prisoners of war from Rimini. Hector McNeil, Minister of 
State, replying on behalf of the Government, stated that 
there had been demands by the Soviet authorities for the 
return of these men but that the majority of them had 
originated from territories which had been incorporated 
into the Soviet Union after 1 September 1939 so the 
British Government had not felt bound to comply with this 
request. 6 
The transfer to Britain of Ukrainian prisoners of war 
When considering the war records of some of the 
Ukrainians who fought on the side of the Axis powers it 
may at first seem surprising that these men were not 
returned to the Soviet Union but if one looks at 
political developments after the Second World War, when 
the Cold War was already beginning to take shape, the 
motives of the British Government become clearer. It may 
have been the original intention of the Bri tish 
Government to return to the Soviet Union the Ukrainian 
prisoners of war held under British guard in the Italian 
town of Rimini but, when the time came for this to be 
done, the Cold War atmosphere meant the West was 
reluctant to repatriate to the Soviet Union anyone 
unwilling to go. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 
Stalin demanded the return of all prisoners of war of 
Soviet nationality held in Italy and placed increasing 
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pressure on the Italian Government for the return of 
these men. Subsequent to this, the Bri tish Government 
decided to transfer 8,397 Ukrainian prisoners of war from 
Rimini in Italy7 to England in May 1947. At the time the 
British Government justified its actions by stating that 
preliminary screening had shown the majority of these men 
were from the Polish Ukraine, were not Soviet citizens on 
1 September 1939, and therefore the Allies were not 
required to engage in their forcible repatriation to the 
Soviet Union • Further attempts to determine the men's 
nationality were to be made after arrival in Britain. It 
was also claimed that leaving prisoners of war in Italy 
after the ratification of the Italian peace treaty would 
represent a burden on the Italian Government after the 
wi thdrawal of the Allied troops and tha t this was the 
primary reason for the removal of the Ukrainians to 
Britain. 
The labour shortage 
(a) The use of prisoners of war 
During the Second World War and its aftermath there was a 
shortage of available labour in Britain, a factor which 
worked in favour of the refugee groups. If it was not 
for this fact there would have been no European Volunteer 
Worker schemes, the numbers of refugees allowed into 
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Britain would therefore have been on a much smaller 
scale. 
During the course of the war there had been some concern 
about the employment in key industries, for example 
coalmining, of enemy prisoners of war held in Bri tain, 
but wartime concerns did not greatly affect the majority 
of Ukrainians who arrived as prisoners of war since the 
bulk of these men were not transported to Britain until 
after the cessation of hostilities. Indeed the 
Ukrainians who were transported to Bri tain from Rimini 
benefi ted from a marked turn around in policy towards 
them as prisoners of war. When questioned in February 
1946 about the possibility of allowing Italian prisoners 
of war to remain in Britain if they so wished the Home 
Secretary, Chuter Ede, stated that "the general principle 
is that prisoners of war who are brought here temporarily 
for custody should ultimately return to their own 
countries".8 If this was still the case at the time of 
the transportation of Ukrainian prisoners to Britain in 
1948, then it becomes clear that they were already being 
thought of more as displaced refugee volunteer workers 
than prisoners of war awaiting repatriation. This 
supposition is supported by the rapidity with which the 
Ukrainian prisoners of war were reclassified as European 
Volunteer Workers; indeed Daniel Lipson, an independent 
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Member of Parliament, asked if these Ukrainians would be 
employed in Britain. 9 
That they should be used in industry or agriculture was 
an obvious step as there was already concern that holding 
these men as prisoners of war represented a financial 
burden on the British authorities. In July 1948 it was 
stated that 8,397 Ukrainian prisoners of war remained in 
Britain and that they were mainly being employed in 
agriculture. 10 
However, some doubts were expressed at the time about the 
legitimacy of the reclassification of prisoners of war as 
displaced persons or European Volunteer Workers. It had 
been agreed in the IRO constitution, as approved by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1946, 
that prisoners of war could not be reclassified as 
displaced persons. However, none of the Ukrainian 
prisoners of war had been granted European Volunteer 
Worker status at that time although it was stated in 
Parliament on 15 July 1948 that it was hoped that 
selection teams would soon be visiting the 
f 1 f ""1" t t 11 aci itate the granting 0 C1Vl lan s a us. 
camps to 
This had 
to be achieved in a very short space of time as Britain 
had committed itself to ending the presence of all 
prisoners of war in the country by 31 December 1948, the 
Germans and Italians having all been repatriated or 
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allowed to work in Britain under civilian status and the 
Prisoner of War department of the War Office closed down 
in July 1948. 
By 7 December 1948 there were said to be just 566 
Ukrainian prisoners of war being held in Britain, a large 
number of whom were sick and therefore unavailable for 
work other than the administrative work necessary to the 
maintenance of the camp where they were being held. As 
prisoners of war were no longer to be held in Bri tain 
after 1948 those classed as unfi t for work were placed 
under the care of the National Assistance Board on 1 
January 1949. The Secretary of State for War, Emmanuel 
Shinwell, told Parliament in December 1948 that although 
he would like to make a final statement on the future of 
these men he was unfortunately unable to do so as there 
were "difficulties".12 
(b) The use of European Volunteer Workers 
However, the majority of Ukrainians entering Britain 
after the war came over initially not as prisoners of war 
but as European Volunteer Workers (EVWs) recruited from 
the displaced persons' camps on mainland Europe. Early 
recruitment was restricted to women but this was then 
extended to male recruits after it became apparent that 
female labour would not be sufficient to fulfil Britain's 
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manpower requirements. When the first batch of 63 male 
EVWs arrived in Britain on 21 April 1947 approximately 
half of them were Ukrainian. These were followed by much 
larger numbers; 1,440 homeless Ukrainians arrived in 
Britain on 27 May 1947. By 3 June 1947, Ness Edwards, a 
member of the Labour Government, reported to the House of 
Commons tha t approxima tely 10, 000 EVWs had arrived in 
Britain, consisting "almost entirely of BaIts and 
Ukrainians". The placing of the EVWs in employment after 
arrival was reported to be "proceeding satisfactorily", 
with the comment "Indeed we are afraid that it may 
prejudice some of the other foreign workers who are 
already here." Public statements of sa tisfaction were 
not always mirrored by private statements, however, and 
in private discussions in the Ministry of Labour the 
Ukrainians were initially perceived as "essentially 
peasant" and therefore less suited to settling in Britain 
than the preferred Balts. 13 
As outlined above, the bulk of the Ukrainians who settled 
in post-war Britain arrived as European Volunteer Workers 
and as such they were directed into the undermanned 
industries by the Ministry of Labour. Consequently, most 
Ukrainians' first experience of employment in Britain was 
in the textile industries and agriculture. Ukrainian 
prisoners of war were often used as agricultural gang 
labour until their reclassification as EVWs, although 
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even then many continued to work in agricultural 
employment until more attractive employment became 
available. Amongst EVWs of all nationalities there was a 
tendency to leave agricultural employment as quickly as 
possible to find work which offered higher wages and 
better conditions, and often there was a move to urban 
centres in which a 
establishing itself. 
keen to employ large 
Ukrainian community was already 
The National Coal Board was also 
numbers of EVWs but there were 
difficulties with numerous local branches of the National 
Union of Mineworkers. The hostile attitudes of certain 
trades unions were matched by a reluctance amongst the 
Ukrainians and other East European refugees to become 
involved in the unions which they believed to have 
sympathies with the Soviet Union. For example, in 1958 
there was the case of a Ukrainian truck driver for the 
Pressed Steel Company in Swindon who refused to join the 
Amalgama ted Engineering Union, which was known to have 
strong Communist links. The Ukrainian had worked for the 
company for two years. The trouble over union membership 
arose when there were complaints from other workers that 
he and another man of British nationality who had also 
refused to join the union were working too much overtime. 
The Ukrainian had said that he would rather hand in his 
notice than join the union although the British man 
capitulated and joined in order that the dispute could be 
settled. 
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The Ukrainians in Britain - numbers involved 
Official figures on the number of Ukrainians in Britain 
are difficult to find because at the time of their 
arrival Ukraine was not recognized as a separate nation 
and its former inhabi tants were therefore listed under 
figures for the other nationalities which had been in 
control of Ukraine in 1939. In 1980 Kenneth Weetch asked 
the Government if in the following year's Census it would 
be possible for Ukrainians to be classified as 
'Ukrainians' rather than under the heading 'Russian' as 
had been the case with the previous Censuses. The reply 
from Sir George Younger was that all those born outside 
the United Kingdom and Irish Republic would be asked to 
give the current name of the country in which they were 
born, and as such, Ukrainians would be lis ted not as 
Russians or Ukrainians but as having been born in what 
was in 1980 termed the USSR. 14 There was also the 
additional problem of Ukrainians who had given false 
nationalities in order to escape deportation. However 
estimates were made and, in 1951, it was stated in 
Parliament that approximately 23,000 Ukrainians came to 
Britain as European Volunteer Workers, 8,000 as prisoners 
of war and b f th POI1'sh forces .15 5,000 as mem er s 0 e 
Other figures had estimated that, excluding ex-prisoners 
of war, 20,930 Ukrainians arrived in Britain as part of 
the EVW scheme, 16,210 of whom were men, 4,720 women. 16 
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There were also 411 adults, 375 of whom were women, and 
451 children who arrived in Britain as dependants of 
Ukrainian EVWs. No dependants of the ex-prisoners of war 
came to Britain. 17 
Later arrivals 
Very few Ukrainians arrived in Britain after the 
cessation of the foreign labour schemes in the early 
1950s. This was mainly due to lack of opportuni ty for 
Ukrainians wanting to escape to the West but it is 
unclear exactly how many more Ukrainians the British 
authori ties would have been prepared to allow into the 
country if there had been many waiting for permission to 
enter. For example, in December 1958 the Government said 
that it was prepared to grant visas to the fiancees of 
two Ukrainians resident in Slough in order tha t they 
could marry, providing that the applicants could produce 
to the visa officer in Belgrade travel documents bearing 
adequate return facilities to Yugoslavia. The Home 
Office claimed that it was "always ready to further the 
course of true love", but not, it seems, if it meant 
allowing permanent settlement in Britain by the two 
fiancees. 18 
Also in 1958 the British Government offered to admit into 
Britain fifty refugees who had suffered from 
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tuberculosis. However, in June 1959 there were 
complaints from the Worthing Refugee Relief Committee 
that only two individuals had been admitted to Britain 
under these conditions and that they had been waiting for 
seven months for a family of Ukrainians, sponsored by 
them, the father of whom had suffered from tuberculosis, 
to be allowed into the country. The Committee had a flat 
waiting to house the family which had been furnished by 
donations from the public. The father of the family had 
been pronounced free of tuberculosis in 1954 and 
subsequently declared fit for light work. The family had 
been living in refugee camps for fourteen years and the 
Committee asked that the Prime Minister, who had launched 
World Refugee Year on 1 June, should sympathetically 
reconsider their application for admission to Britain. 19 
In 1963 a small number of Soviet ci tizens were given 
permission by the Soviet authorities to join their 
relatives in Britain. However, the numbers concerned 
were very small; fewer than twenty people were allowed to 
leave the Soviet Union for Britain. 
Theore tically there was a further opportuni ty for 
Ukrainians in the Soviet Union to join their relatives in 
Britain and the rest of the world after the signing of 
the Helsinki Agreement in 1975 in which such emigration 
from the Sovie t Union was provided for. However, the 
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Soviet Union remained reluctant for families to be 
reunited and Britain was obliged to raise the matter 
repeatedly with the Soviet authorities in cases relevant 
to the agreements made at Helsinki. 
Concern over the forcible repatriations 
Initially a number of forcible repatriations of Soviet 
citizens had been undertaken, but as anti-Soviet feeling 
grew these ceased to happen. In later years the British 
Government remained secretive about its role in these 
early forcible repatriations of Soviet citizens, 
retaining a number of documents relating to Operation 
Keelhaul rather than releasing them into the Public 
Record Office when their original time limit had expired. 
When questioned in Parliament in 1978 as to the contents 
of the documents which had been retained Dr David Owen 
replied that one of the reports named persons who might 
still be alive in the Soviet Union, whilst the other 
three dealt with "matters of security which it is not our 
practice to reveal".20 Other documents were said to have 
been destroyed in 1968 or 1969. However, one such 
document did become available when the copy held by the 
United States was released into the public domain. The 
release of these documents encouraged renewed interest in 
the repatriations and the Liberal politician Jo Grimond, 
former Director of Personnel of the European Division of 
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the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration 1945-47, asked the Government in March 
1978 whether arrangements would be made to pay 
compensation to the survivors of the people handed over 
to the Soviet authori ties a t the end of the war. The 
answer to this was an emphatic 'no,.21 The release of 
the documents also stimulated media interest; for example 
in February 1978 there was a series of articles in The 
Times regarding the contents of the file made available 
by the United States. 22 In particular, the role of Major 
Denis Hills in shielding a number of Soviet ci tizens, 
including the Ukrainian Division, from repatriation to 
the Sovie t Union received considerable publici ty. The 
release of the document s and the subsequent publici ty 
sparked off much debate concerning the moral position of 
the repatriations. 
Deportations from Britain 
However, not all the Ukrainian prisoners of war brought 
to Britain were allowed to remain in the country. 
Questions were first raised in the House of Commons on 13 
May 1948 regarding the impending deportation to Germany 
of approxima tely 500 Ukrainians. Richard Stokes, who 
raised the question, described these Ukrainians as "unfit 
for work" and asked for the decision to undertake the 
deportations to be reconsidered as they were not German 
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and had nowhere to go in that country. He asked tha t 
they be reclassified as poli tical refugees. The Home 
Secretary, James Chuter Ede, denied that any such 
decision to deport any Ukrainians had been taken. 23 
Questions about deportations persisted, and on 10 June 
Stanley Prescott raised the issue of the impending 
deportation to Germany of sixty Ukrainians who had fallen 
ill whilst in Britain and he requested for such 
proposals to be dropped. In reply Ede referred him to 
the answer of 13 May.24 The argument continued to rage 
throughout June with the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Chuter Ede, forced to deny continually that a 
decision to deport any of the Ukrainians had been taken. 
Frank Beswick asked Ede at what date responsibility for 
the Ukrainians had been transferred to him, but Ede 
required notice of the question before he felt that he 
could reply.25 Some confusion as to who bore the 
responsibility for these men continued amongst members 
for a month until the situation was finally clarified by 
Ede with the statement that whilst they remained 
prisoners of war the War Office was responsible for them 
but any discussion of their being allowed to settle as 
civilians in Britain also concerned the Home Secretary.26 
The rna t ter of deporta tions was raised again in January 
1949 following the deportations to Germany of a number of 
Ukrainians during the previous month. In December 1948 
-- Page 223 --
it had been stated that there were difficulties with some 
of the 566 Ukrainian prisoners of war who remained in 
Britain although it was not stated at the time that 
deportations were imminent. 27 Ede made a statement 
regarding the deporta tions in Parliament on 19 January 
1949. In it he reported that by the end of 1948 there 
were 530 Ukrainians remaining in Britain who were still 
officially prisoners of war, of these 300 had been found 
ei ther unsui table or unwilling to assume European 
Volunteer Worker status, the rest being either ill or 
engaged in hospi tal duties. International obligations 
meant that it was necessary to release all prisoners of 
war from military custody on 31 December 1948 so it had 
been decided to send the 300 men unacceptable for 
civilian work in Britain to Germany for discharge. 
However, in the event only 80 men were deported, 46 of 
whom wished to return; 33 who, because of the records as 
prisoners of war, could not be accepted as EVWs, and one 
man who had refused all offers of employment. A final 
decision about the remainder was deferred to see if it 
would be possible to place them in employment in Britain 
"without detriment to the interests of British 
subjects".28 Quintin Hogg wanted to know why it was felt 
necessary to parade 32 of the men with their hands 
handcuffed behind their backs whilst en route to Germany. 
Michael Stewart gave the reply that a number of them had 
threatened violence to either themselves or their guards 
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and that they would forcibly resist their removal. In 
order to prevent this it was felt necessary to handcuff 
them. 29 Presumably these men were among the 34 mentioned 
above who had not chosen to return but were found 
unsuitable to remain in Britain. 
Reports of the deportations appeared in many of the 
national newspapers. An editorial in the New Statesman 
and Nation used the deportations as an excuse to make 
demands to "clear out the rubbish amongst those who have 
already come" as part of volunteer worker and 
resettlement schemes. The Ukrainians themselves created 
attention for the deportations by writing to national 
newspapers appealing for clemency towards their 
countrymen facing a return to the Continent. Hunger 
strikes were also threatened by the Ukrainians. The 
Archbishop of Canterbury involved himself in the protest 
by wri ting to the Home Secretary expressing his 
opposition to the proposed deportations. The public 
outcry which had followed the announcement of the 
proposed deportations of 300 Ukrainians and the bad 
publicity for the British Government which resulted was a 
determining factor in the actual number of deportations 
being reduced to just 80 men. 
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Re-emigration 
Not all the Ukrainians who arrived in Bri tain in the 
years immediately after the end of the Second World War 
remained in Britain, many re-emigrated to Canada and the 
United States where large Ukrainian exile communities 
already existed. There was also a small incidence of re-
emigration to other countries, for example Australia and 
New Zealand. An estimated 26 per cent of all Ukrainians, 
including 50 per cent of the women, emigrated. Only 17 
per cent of the ex-prisoners of war left Bri tain to 
settle elsewhere. 30 Having been given the chance of 
civilian life in Britain the ex-prisoners of war were 
often the most eager to integrate themselves into the 
life of their new country. 
Naturalization 
The Ukrainians who did choose to settle permanently in 
Britain were allowed to seek naturalization after the 
statutory period of five years' residence. In the case 
of ex-prisoners of war, the period of residence was dated 
from the point a t which civilian s ta tus was attained. 
Naturalization was particularly important for those 
Ukrainians who were considering going abroad for any 
length of time. This was particularly true for those who 
wished to visit Ukraine again, since unless they 
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officially obtained British nationality they remained 
Soviet citizens and travel to that country was therefore 
undertaken at their own risk. 
The dangers of returning to the Soviet Union without the 
protection of British citizenship was illustrated by the 
case of Nickolai Shcharegin a Soviet citizen who had been 
resident in Britain for twenty years and was married to a 
United Kingdom citizen but travelled to the Soviet Union 
on business in October 1968 on a Home Office travel 
document which was clearly marked as invalid for the 
USSR. He was subsequently detained by the Soviet 
authorities after his arrival in that country. The 
Bri tish consul in Moscow immedia tely made inquiries on 
behalf of Shcharegin's wife but it was not until October 
1969 that the consulate was informed that he was to be 
tried for an unnamed offence. Shcharegin received a ten 
year sentence for treason and was not released until 
September 1978. The Soviets claimed that Shcharegin was 
in fact an assumed name and tha t he was not in fact a 
Ukrainian deported to Germany during the Second World war 
but a defector from the Red Army in 1947, one year before 
his arrival in Bri tain. The managing director of the 
company for which Shcharegin worked told the press : 
"It was idiotic that he went to a country 
he had defected from. I have no idea why 
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he did it. But we had no idea of his 
background at the time. If we had known 
I might not have employed him, and I 
certainly would not have considered 
sending him to Moscow. 
a British passport, 
He did not have 
but had travel 
documents issued by the British 
Government. ,,31 
During his imprisonment Shcharegin was visi ted by his 
wife three times until January 1971 after which her 
applica tions to see him were refused. She led a long 
campaign to free him before eventually seeking, and being 
granted, a divorce. Shcharegin initially refused offers 
of Soviet papers after his release, despite threats of 
rearrest, as he intended to apply for British citizenship 
and did not want to forfeit his claims. He arrived back 
in Britain eventually in November 1978, on a Soviet 
passport he had been forced to accept as the only way he 
could leave the Soviet Union. 
However, British citizenship could only provide 
protection to a degree. In August 1977 the Soviet 
authorities arrested a British student, whose father was 
of Ukrainian origin, for distributing anti-Soviet 
propaganda whilst visiting relatives in Ukraine. 
Initially this was denied by the student and there was 
pressure for his release from the National Union of 
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students, his Member of Parliament, the Foreign Office 
and the British Embassy in Moscow. However, he was not 
released until January 1978, after having publicly 
confessed his guilt. 
Provision of accommodation 
On arrival in Britain the Ukrainians, whether arriving as 
prisoners of war or EVWs, were housed temporarily in 
camps. The EVWs, and the ex-prisoners of war who had 
been given EVW status, were then transferred to suitable 
hostel accommoda tion, when it became available, near 
their place of employment. From there the refugees were 
encouraged to find private accommodation, usually 
lodgings. However, some Ukrainians would band together 
with friends and purchase a house for jOint occupation. 
The numbers of Ukrainians in multiple occupation of 
houses tended to decline after the mid-1950s when it 
became possible for more of them to purchase their own 
properties after saving for the necessary deposi t. In 
rural areas house purchase was more difficul t as fewer 
sources of private accommodation were available, and the 
prospect of a prolonged residence in a hostel was a 
further reason for the departure from agricultural 
employment and further migration to the industrial towns 
of many Ukrainians. 
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Religious composition and provision 
The Ukrainians, like other minority groups, had to make 
their own religious provisions. It had been policy that 
chaplains would not be provided for prisoners of war at 
public expense but that the costs would be met from the 
prisoners own welfare funds. Having their own priests in 
Britain meant that it remained possible for Ukrainians to 
marry in traditional Ukrainian style but a light-hearted 
report in the Daily Mirror in December 1947 in its 
description of the wedding of two Ukrainian EVWs pointed 
out tha t the Ukrainian service was the prelude to an 
"ordinary service in a Methodist Church". 32 The 
Ukrainian community was also able to continue to 
celebrate religious festivals according to the Julian 
calendar, with Christmas Day on 7 January, and New Year's 
Day on 14 January. Employers were often respectful of 
these differences and allowed Ukrainian workers to take 
their holidays to coincide with their religious 
festivals. 
The Ukrainian community was also divided by the two 
religions of its members. The western Ukrainians tended 
to be Greek Catholic (Uniate), whilst those from the East 
were Orthodox. These religious di visions continued in 
the guise of two separate national organizations the 
Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (Catholic), 
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and the Federation of Ukrainians in Great Britain 
(Orthodox) • The majority of Ukrainians in Britain came 
from the West and therefore the Catholic organizations 
are the largest. As a result, by 1952 there were 14 
Roman Catholic priests serving the Ukrainian community in 
Britain. 33 It has been estimated that approximately 65 
per cent of Ukrainians in Britain were Catholic and 35 
per cent Orthodox. 34 This situation is reversed in 
Ukraine itself however, where the most popular religion 
is Orthodoxy. 
In the years after resettlement, as the Ukrainian 
communi ties in the ci ties became organized, the larger 
communities were often able to buy premises to be used as 
Ukrainian churches, clubs and community centres. Until 
the purchase of their own churches the Uniate Ukrainians 
borrowed local Roman Catholic churches, whilst the 
Orthodox Ukrainians borrowed local Anglican churches. 
The retention of Ukrainian church services provided the 
refugees in Britain with an opportunity for them to 
express their own cuI tural identi ty, and to maintain 
links with other members of the Ukrainian community. 
Ukrainian community associations 
The Ukrainians who came to Bri tain were conscious of 
their Ukrainian nationality whether they originated from 
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Soviet or Polish Ukraine. As a result, the Polish 
Ukrainians arriving in Britain after the Second World War 
tended to disassocia te themselves from other Poles and 
join the new Ukrainian communi ties being formed in the 
localities. 
The Ukrainian communi ty arriving in Bri tain after the 
Second World War had to establish its own associa tions 
without help from previous Ukrainian settlers. Prior to 
1945 the previous Ukrainian settlement had numbered only 
100 people who arrived in 1920 following the Soviet 
defeat of the Ukrainian Republic. 35 
The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain was formed 
in January 1946 and took on a role in Ukrainian education 
through Saturday schools for children and grants for 
Ukrainian students, welfare charities and social 
activities. The Associa tion also provided free legal 
advice for its members. In carrying out these functions 
the Association aimed to work in close co-operation with 
the appropriate British authorities. The welfare 
services of the Association were paid for by voluntary 
contributions from members and were made available to all 
Ukrainians in Britain whether fee-paying members of the 
Association or not. Ukrainians who were not disabled but 
refused to accept employment in Bri tain were excluded 
from any welfare provisions. The welfare services of the 
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Associa tion of Ukrainians in Grea t Bri tain were deemed 
worthy of being placed on record by the National 
Assis tance Board in its Report for the year ending 31 
December 1949. 36 The Association quickly established 
itself, encouraging branches to be formed wherever there 
were twelve or more members of the Ukrainian community in 
the locality, and groups to be formed where the Ukrainian 
community numbered fewer than twelve. By 1 January 1951 
the Association had 201 branches and 84 groups. Figures 
for 31 December 1953 showed the Association to have 
18,720 active members. 37 As Ukrainians began to drift 
out of agriculture and into the industrial towns the 
number of branches and groups declined but individual 
membership increased. 
In 1948 the Federation of Ukrainians in Great Britain was 
formed which had particular interests in welfare and 
youth projects. For female Ukrainians there was the 
Association of Ukrainian Women, which by 1954 had sixteen 
branches. 38 During the 1980s this organization was 
active in the campaign for the release of Ukrainian 
prisoners of conscience. There were also various other 
associations, including an Association of Ukrainian 
Former Combatants in Great Britain formed in September 
1949 which had 2,833 members in 89 branches in 1954. 39 
Numerous choirs and dance troupes also existed, the most 
famous of these being the Orlyk dance troupe based in 
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Manchester. many 
employers allowed workers involved in these organizations 
Again, as with religious festivals, 
to take holidays enabling them to participate in 
festivals and competitions. Expressions of national and 
cultural identity remained important to the organized 
community. In 1954 an exhibition of sculptures by 
Gregory Kruk was organized in London by the Association 
of Ukrainians in Grea t Bri tain, wi th the accompanying 
statement that "its purpose is the material, cultural, 
moral and spiritual welfare of the 30,000 Ukrainians in 
this country". 
When the children of the Ukrainians were old enough they 
were also involved in communi ty life by being sent to 
special Ukrainian 'Saturday schools' established by the 
older Ukrainians to teach the second generation born in 
Britain about their Ukrainian origins. Teachers in these 
schools were first genera tion Ukrainians, some of whom 
had in fact been teachers before their life in exile. 
These teachers formed their own associa tion, the 
Ukrainian Teachers' and Educators' Organization in Great 
Britain. The children were also often members of 
Ukrainian youth organizations, the most important of 
these being the Spilka Ukrainskoi Molodi, usually 
abbreviated to SUM. 
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However, although the majority of Ukrainians in Britain 
involved themselves in the Ukrainian community, a few did 
choose to try and forget their past and submerge 
themselves in the British community. It is difficult to 
assess the experiences of these Ukrainians as they are 
both difficult to trace and prefer not to express 
opinions on matters regarding Ukraine or Ukrainians in 
Britain. 
Throughout the 1950s the Ukrainian exile organizations 
arranged some events which would bring its members into 
contact wi th the Bri tish communi ty, in order to 
facilitate early settlement. For example, the 
Organization of Ukrainian Women organized social events 
to which it encouraged members to bring British friends. 
There were also 23 Ukrainian sports clubs, mainly in 
football, and also a number of chess clubs, which 
organized matches with British teams. In 1953 the Anglo-
Ukrainian Society was founded to increase links between 
the Ukrainian and British communities. 
membership numbered approximately 700. 
In 1959 its 
A number of Ukrainian publications were produced for the 
Ukrainian community in Britain, including a weekly 
newspaper Ukrainska Dumka (Ukrainian Thought). Many of 
these journals and pamphlets were published by Ukrainian 
Publishers Ltd which is based in London. The book 
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publishing department of the Association of Ukrainians in 
Grea t Bri tain also increasingly published books about 
Ukraine in the English language, thus making them 
accessible to the British relatives of those Ukrainians 
who had intermarried, and also to the Bri tish public 
generally. 
Political activity amongst Ukrainians in Britain 
In October 1949 an appeal was issued from Ukraine by the 
Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, and the Ukrainian 
underground military organizations UPA and DUN, to 
Ukrainian exiles stating that Ukrainians abroad were 
expected to continue the fight for independent Ukraine 
and that: 
"Above all, Embattled Ukraine expects 
Ukrainians abroad to represent their 
people and their struggle for liberation 
in a worthy and responsible manner to the 
rest of the world."40 
The Ukrainian communi ty in Bri tain remained fai thful to 
this ideal and, unsurprisingly, the community was 
extremely hostile in its attitude towards the Soviet 
Union. The Ukrainians became a leading force within the 
Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Na tions and the Capti ve Na tions 
organization. Both these umbrella organizations, and the 
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individual national groups involved, made continued 
vociferous protests against the Soviet Union. In Britain 
they gained a great deal of publicity in April 1956 with 
their protests aimed at the visiting Soviet leaders 
Khrushchev and Bulganin. 
A number of national Ukrainian protest groups were also 
established, for example, the Ukrainian Protest Committee 
and the Committee in Defence of Ukrainian and Political 
Prisoners, both of which were based in London. 
Appeals regarding the treatment of Ukraine and its 
ci tizens by the Sovie t Union were frequently circula ted 
to British Members of Parliament and the British press. 
MPs wi th Ukrainians in their consti tuencies were often 
quite receptive to these appeals on behalf of Ukrainian 
prisoners of conscience and involved themselves in the 
Ukrainian lobby in Parliament which was headed by William 
Whitlock, one of the Labour Members for Nottingham. 
Not tingham had long been the centre of many Ukrainian 
demonstrations based in the north of England. However, 
much of the prominent support given to Ukrainians by the 
British came from noticeably right-wing sources, for 
example Major General J. F. C. Fuller, an ardent opponent 
of Communism and known to have connections with British 
fascism during the 1930s. 
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The anti-Soviet activities did not go unnoticed by the 
Soviet Union whose secret services applied mildly 
intimidatory tactics towards the Ukrainians in Britain. 
One popular method was to mail propaganda to the refugees 
from an agency in East Berlin inviting them to return to 
the Soviet Union, and in June 1958 Dr Donald Johnson, a 
Conserva ti ve Member of Parliament, asked the Government 
if it would make diplomatic representations to have such 
activities stopped. Replying on behalf of the Foreign 
Secretary, Commander Allan Noble stated that although the 
Minister was aware of these activities and that they were 
a source of "apprehension and dis tress" to the refugees 
the Government could not intervene unless the law was 
actually being broken and that it was doubtful whether 
any diplomatic representations would be effective in this 
matter. 41 There were also sporadic condemnations of 
./ /' Ukrainian emigres which were issued by the Ukrainian 
Communist Party from within the Soviet Union. 
A source of pride to politically active Ukrainians was 
the election in 1983 of the first Ukrainian as a member 
of the British Parliament. Stefan Terlezki, 
Conservative member for Cardiff West, had been a member 
of Cardiff ci ty council since 1968 and South Glamorgan 
County Council since 1973. He had also been chairman of 
Cardiff Ci ty Football Club. Terlezki was described by 
/ / 
Private Eye as being a 'Russian emigre' He pursued some 
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of his interests as a Ukrainian within Parliament, 
raising issues such as human rights in Ukraine and asking 
the Government what it was doing to establish links 
between Bri tain and Ukraine. A significant number of 
Conservative MPs have expressed sympathy for Ukraine, and 
the Conservative Party Conference in October 1983 
witnessed the launch of an organization called 
Conservative Friends of Free Ukraine. 
Healthcare 
During 1948 there was a great deal of concern shown in 
Parliament regarding the position of Ukrainian ex-
prisoners of war who were found unfi t for transfer to 
European Volunteer Worker status. Of particular concern 
was the idea that these men would be deported to Germany. 
As prisoners of war they were transferred to the military 
hospi tal at Diss in Norfolk when they became ill. In 
July 1948 there were 158 Ukrainian patients resident 
there. 42 When it became necessary to release them from 
military custody on 31 December 1948, this date having 
been set for the removal of all prisoners of war from 
Bri tain, the responsibili ty for the care of the sick 
Ukrainian prisoners of war was to be passed on to the 
civil health authorities. However, some deportations of 
sick Ukrainians had already taken place. For example 
there was the case of one Ukrainian prisoner of war who 
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was deported to Germany after he became blind as the 
result of falling from a farm 10rry.43 
There were also health problems amongst Ukrainian EVWs. 
These were of a similar nature to the other national 
groups entering Britain as EVWs, and involved mainly 
psychological problems resulting from wartime 
experiences, and also the lifestyle of the displaced 
person was of particular concern. Some disturbed EVWs, 
both Ukrainians and other nationalities, resorted to 
alcoholism and, i~ some cases, even suicide. In response 
to the health problems within the Ukrainian community the 
Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain bought a farm 
at Chiddingford in Surrey in September 1949 which it 
converted into 'Sydenhurst', an invalids' and 
convalescents' home, paid for and maintained by voluntary 
contributions from the Association's members. 
English language acquisition 
The language barrier was a problem for a large number of 
the Ukrainians, the majority of whom had little, if any, 
knowledge of the English language before their arrival in 
Bri tain. A further problem was the suspicion of 
interpreters initially used by the authorities. 
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Language lessons were provided for the Ukrainians as EVWs 
but, in common with the other EVW groups, attendance was 
not always good and many acquired only a rudimentary 
knowledge of English. These classes were often organized 
by local authorities in areas of Ukrainian settlement but 
were paid for by the Ministry of Labour. Ukrainians 
entering the coalmining industry benefited from special 
English classes organized by the Na tional Coal Board. 
Approximately 10 per cent of Ukrainians arriving in 
Britain could speak English and these were deliberately 
scattered geographically to act as interpreters in 
localities where there were significant numbers of 
Ukrainians. 
The Ukrainian community itself also provided some English 
language teaching for its members. The Association of 
Ukrainians in Great Britain provided classes at its 
London headquarters and at some of its provincial 
branches. 
The assumption of the authorities was that if intending 
to settle in Britain the Ukrainians would learn English 
and, on the basis of this assumption, did not feel bound 
to provide the Ukrainians with materials in their own 
language. In May 1951 questions were raised in 
Parliament about the feasibility of the BBC making 
foreign radio broadcasts in Ukrainian, possibly with the 
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help of Ukrainians in Bri tain who would also like to 
listen to broadcasts in their own language. Replying for 
the Government Herbert Morrison, the newly appointed 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that most 
of the Ukrainians in Ukraine could speak Russian and so 
were catered for by the Russian broadcasts of the BBC and 
doubts were expressed about 'letting loose' the 
Ukrainians in Britain to broadcast to their fellow 
countrymen still resident in Ukraine. 44 Questions were 
again raised concerning this subject in July 1951 when 
Morrison admitted that representations had been made to 
him from the Ukrainian community in Britain on the matter 
but that it was still thought that the positive effects 
of such broadcasts would be outweighed by the resultant 
cuts which would have to be made to other services. 45 
Educational opportunities 
The question of providing the Ukrainians with some 
knowledge of the British way of life in addition to the 
basic aspects of the language was first raised in 
Parliament by Tom Driberg in July 1948. Chuter Ede 
replied that in addition to the knowledge they would gain 
through contacts made with British workers in the course 
of their employment, some classes were arranged for them 
by the local education authorities, with assistance from 
voluntary organizations. 46 However, as EVWs, there were 
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few opportunities for first generation Ukrainians in 
higher education. 
A small number of Ukrainians did go on to further full 
time study. Some took advantage of the scholarship 
schemes opened to former EVWs by the British Government 
in 1949 and the Associa tion of Ukrainians in Grea t 
Britain also established a Students' Assistance Board, 
which made grants of maintenance and paid university fees 
for undergraduates. However, the number of Ukrainians 
entering full time education were small. In common with 
other groups of former displaced persons their priorities 
were in establishing themselves and their families 
financially. 
The children of the Ukrainians, the majority of them born 
in Britain, started to appear in British schools by the 
late 1950s. Those coming from an all-Ukrainian 
background often spoke very Ii t tIe English before 
starting school, Ukrainian being the language which was 
spoken most frequently in the home. 
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Social attitudes 
(a) Gender distribution and intermarriage 
There was a relatively high degree of intermarriage 
between Ukrainian men and British women. Although 
Ukrainian women were preferred, they were far outnumbered 
by the men who were then obliged to marry women of other 
nationalities. Large numbers therefore married Bri tish 
women, wi th Italian women also being a popular choice. 
However, in many of these mixed marriages the Ukrainian 
customs often continued to be observed, particularly in 
the encouragement of children to be both aware and proud 
of their Ukrainian origins. 
A reluctance towards intermarriage remained wi thin the 
community and some first generation Ukrainians were 
disappointed when their children chose to marry from 
outside the Ukrainian community. 
(b) British perceptions of Ukrainians prior to their 
arrival in Britain 
Those Ukrainians who came to Britain as European 
Volunteer Workers found that attitudes towards them 
tended to be governed by their EVW status rather than by 
their Ukrainian nationality. In August 1946 it was 
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suggested in a letter to The Times that Ukrainians in the 
displaced persons' camps on the Continent, who refused to 
return because of the fear of poli tical or religious 
persecution, could be used as a temporary labour force 
in agriculture and mining in Britain in which there was a 
severe shortage of available British workers. The group 
were said to be "remarkably useful, industrious and well 
behaved" and should not be feared as permanent additions 
to the British population "as they would undoubtedly 
emigrate in due time to the Americas" where they could 
join the Ukrainian communi ties already established 
there. 47 
Attitudes towards the Ukrainians who came to Britain as 
prisoners of war benefited from their relatively late 
arrival in 1947 as by this time many of the restrictions 
pertaining to ex-enemy personnel had been lifted. During 
the Second World War fraternization between British 
civilians and enemy prisoners of war was forbidden, 
restrictions on contact wi th the public being relaxed 
during December 1946, some months before the bulk of the 
Ukrainian prisoners of war arrived in Britain. However, 
some res trictions did remain on their behaviour and in 
November 1947 complaints were sent to the Secre tary of 
State for War by the Parish Council and the Women's 
Institute of Horbling, Lincolnshire, about the behaviour 
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after dark of Ukrainians held at the prisoner of war camp 
there. 
Some confusion about the separa te identi ty of Ukraine 
from Russia and the Soviet Union persisted in some 
quarters. Such misunderstandings were fostered by the 
Soviet Union. For example, when Ukraine was admitted to 
the United Nations at the end of the Second World War it 
was suggested by the British Government that the two 
states should exchange diplomatic representatives, 
however the request was made through the Sovie t 
Government and no reply to the request was subsequently 
received. 
Security screening of Ukrainians entering Britain; its 
aftermath and the war crimes debate 
Although it was known that many of the BaIts and 
Ukrainians who came to Britain after the Second World War 
had fought on the side of the Axis powers during the 
course of hostilities, there was only a minimal concern 
about their acti vi ties during their period of mili tary 
service. European Volunteer Workers had been politically 
screened on entering the displaced persons camps but 
there was little further screening by the British 
authorities of the displaced persons on their 
volunteering for work in Britain. 
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The Government 
justified this at the time by claiming that the screening 
by officials of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration was sufficient. However, 
these interviews were often undertaken without the 
presence of a suitable translator because UNRRA and the 
military authorities lacked sufficient personnel able to 
speak the appropriate East European languages. In such 
cases use was made of displaced persons who tended to 
present translations which were favourable to the case of 
fellow refugees. Soviet officials were sometimes present 
at the interviews but their aim was to enforce the 
repatriation of as many East Europeans as possible and 
therefore were also unlikely to give unbiased 
translations. The Western military authorities also had 
further suspicions that the Soviets were using the 
screenings for intelligence gathering. Effective 
screening was often sacrificed to speed up arrival into 
Britain of the badly needed manpower. In some cases men 
rejected by National Coal Board doctors because tattoos 
which identified them as ex-Waffen SS members would be 
visible in the showers, were allowed to enter into other 
industries where this would not be the case. 48 
When questioned over the level of screening of the 
Ukrainians brought to Bri tain as prisoners of war from 
Rimini Hector McNeil told Parliament in June 1947 that a , 
cross-section of the Division concerned had been screened 
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by the Refugee Screening Commission in February of that 
year, and that no war criminals had been found amongst 
them. Barnett Janner asked McNeil if he was aware that 
"members of this Division were exceptionally brutal, that 
they murdered hundreds of people in cold blood" and asked 
whether the necessary steps would be taken to ensure that 
"none of those who come to this country took part in any 
of these sadistic and vicious incidents". 49 McNeil 
replied wi th the assurance that" extensi ve precautions" 
would be taken to ensure tha t any criminals would be 
treated as such and that he was in "no doubt" that these 
men would undergo further screening processes. The 
screening of the Ukrainian prisoners of war had been 
undertaken in Rimini by the Special Refugee Screening 
Commission under the leadership of Brigadier Fitzroy 
Maclean. Due to the time constraints imposed on them it 
was possible for the commission to screen only a cross 
section of camp residents. Maclean reported to the 
Foreign Office that a number of them had 'murky war 
records' and that others admitted to having volunteered 
for the Waffen SS. SO He thought it likely that the 
proportion of men claiming to originate from Polish 
rather than Soviet Ukraine was much higher than was in 
fact the case but proving this point would be extremely 
difficult. Maclean also stated that the repatriation of 
these men to the Soviet Union would involve a major 
military operation as all the inmates of the camp would 
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participate in active resistance to any such moves. It 
was recommended by the screening commission that the men 
be turned into displaced persons in order to protect them 
from the Soviets and that some place of refuge should be 
found for them. 
In view of the confusion which ensued in the aftermath of 
the Second World War the laxity of the screening process 
of displaced persons entering Britain becomes more 
understandable, particularly if one also considers the 
desperate need for additional labour which was necessary 
for the country's economic reconstruction. It has also 
been alleged that the authorities chose to ignore the war 
records of some East Europeans with the long-term view of 
the possibility of later using them as spies for Britain 
as the onset of the Cold War became increasingly 
apparent. 51 In addi tion to this, the conflict between 
Jews in Palestine and the British occupying forces, 
combined wi th the associa tion of Jews wi th the black 
market in Bri tain, created antisemi tic feeling in some 
circles which in turn resulted in some antipathy towards 
the prosecution of large numbers of perpetrators of war 
crimes against the Jews. At the time of the liberation 
of the Nazi concentration and death camps and the war 
crimes trials at Nuremburg information made available to 
the general public was restricted due to a combination of 
the lack of newsprint available and a squeamish Press 
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reluctant to reveal to its readers the full extent of the 
atrocities. In addition, the scale of the crimes seemed 
incomprehensible to many. It was not until the trial 
of Adolf Eichmann in 1960-61 that popular interest was 
stimulated in the atrocities committed against Jews 
during the Second World War. 
Regarding specific claims of brutality by the Ukrainian 
'Galizien Division', Christopher Mayhew, Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in Parliament that 
the Ukrainians brought to Bri tain as prisoners of war 
were in fact members of the 1st Ukrainian Division of the 
Wehrmach t ra ther than the Galizien Division which had 
ceased to exist after the Battle of Brody in July 1944. 
However, to satisfy those who thought some of the 
Ukrainians may be implicated in war crimes there would be 
further screening of the men in Britain. 52 
The war crimes issue 
However, this was not the end of the war crimes issue 
which was to rise to prominence again in the 1980s and, 
although this thesis concentrates on the 1950s, it is 
important to follow this theme through. 
In March 1979 John Tomlinson gave an assurance to 
Parliament tha t the Government placed no limi t on the 
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initiation of legal proceedings or the imposition of 
penalties with respect to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 53 The calls in Parliament for legislation to 
deal with war criminals continued to gather momentum and 
in November 1986 the All-Party Parliamentary War Crimes 
Group was formed, significantly one of its members being 
Stefan Terlezki who himself came from a Ukrainian 
background. 
At the same time the Press were also voicing increasing 
support for measures to be taken, particularly after the 
release of 17 names by the Simon Wiesenthal Center and 34 
names by the Soviet Union of alleged Nazi war criminals 
living in Britain. In addition to newspaper coverage 
there was some television exposure, including a widely 
publicised programme by Scottish Television. In some 
cases the names of men suspected were revealed in the 
Press. There were calls from the Labour front bench to 
put a stop to these revelations under the rules governing 
sub judice, but the reply came from the Home Secretary 
tha t such newspaper comment could not be prevented. 54 
However, in any such cases the jury would in the end have 
to decide whether the trial had been fair. 
In July 1987 in a statement on the the policy towards war 
crimes, the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd confirmed that 
Britain would consider the extradition of people accused 
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of war crimes abroad, but not to the Soviet Union and 
that previous requests by the Sovie t Union for 
extraditions had been refused in the 1960s and 1970s. It 
was also stated that Britain had received from the Simon 
Wiesenthal Center documentary material in support of 
allegations that people responsible for war crimes were 
living in Bri tain. The ma terial was being examined to 
assess the scope for further action. 55 There were 17 
names on the Simon Wiesenthal list, of which ten were 
still thought to be alive within the United Kingdom, with 
a further 34 names on a list provided by Scottish 
Television, of whom seven were thought to still be living 
within the United Kingdom. 56 However, it would not be 
possible for the men accused in these documents to be 
extradited as all the crimes were committed within 
territory controlled by the Soviet Union after 1945, a 
country with which Britain had no extradition treaty. As 
the law stood there could also be no trial in Britain of 
these men for crimes committed abroad before they became 
either British citizens or long-term residents of 
Britain. 
The decision was taken in February 1988 to review the 
pOSition regarding alleged war criminals and an 
independent inquiry into the matter, costing £500, 000, 
was undertaken by Sir Thomas Hetherington, former 
Director of Public Prosecutions, and William Chalmers, 
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former Crown Agent in Scotland, to assess whether a 
change in the law would be worthwhile to facilitate the 
trial in Britain of alleged war criminals. 57 There was 
much general support for the establishment of the inquiry 
but it was not universal. For example, Ivor Stanbrook, 
Conservative member for Orpington, thought that it was a 
bad decision which he feared would lead to a wi tch-
hunt. 58 In this he was supported by Harry Ewing, Member 
for Falkirk, East, who although expressing sympathy for 
the victims of the atrocities and the relatives, asked 
"what is to be achieved by putting on 
trial people of 80 years of 
and, assuming that they are 
sending them to prison for 
age or more 
found guilty, 
the rest of 
their natural lives? What on earth can 
be achieved by that sort of approach ?,,59 
In contrast to this was an article in The Economist in 
favour of prosecutions which stated that not attempting 
prosecution 
"would mean telling the world Britain has 
forgiven - or, worse, forgotten. Some 
crimes are too foul for human 
forgiveness; some lessons too serious 
b f t ,,60 ever to e orgo ten. 
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The popular view was that justice against Nazi war 
criminals had not been thoroughly carried out at the end 
of the Second World War and that, far from being 
vengeful, justice was overdue. This was tempered by the 
acknowledgment amongs t many who held this opinion tha t 
there were serious problems with the validity of much of 
the evidence, some of which would come from the Soviet 
Union, whose record on human rights made ita doubtful 
source, and other evidence being difficult to disentangle 
due to the length of time since the events in question 
took place. However, the other major countries which 
took Eastern European migrants in the immediate post-war 
years, Australia, Canada and the United States, all had 
powers to prosecute alleged war criminals and like 
Britain did not have a statute of limitations which would 
have meant that too much time had elapsed between the 
crime and the prosecution. 
The Hetherington Report was published in July 1989. The 
report was in two parts, the main report which was 
published contained the analysis and conclusions of the 
inquiry team, the second report which was not intended 
for publication examined in detail individual cases. The 
inquiry recommended tha t the law be changed to enable 
prosecution in Bri tain of people currently resident in 
the country who committed war crimes in German-occupied 
terri tory during the Second World War. In three of the 
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individual cases it had investiga ted the inquiry team 
concluded that there was enough evidence to mount a 
prosecution. Extradition of alleged war criminals to the 
Soviet Union was not recommended. Labour's shadow home 
secretary, Roy Hattersley, called for the legislation to 
be made more general and provide for the prosecution of 
war criminals from any war not just those of the Second 
World War as was the case in other countries which had 
legislated to provide for the prosecution of war 
criminals. This view was also supported by the Social 
and Liberal Democratic Party. However, this was seen by 
the Government to be too problematic: it preferred 
instead to concentrate on the recommendations of the 
Hetherington inquiry into Second World War criminals 
only.61 
Subsequently, legisla t ion was introduced which provided 
for the possible prosecution of suspected war criminals 
from the Second World War. The legislation was passed in 
the Commons by a large majority on a free vote. However, 
there was some opposition to the Bill as it was 
presented, particularly in the House of Lords where many 
Lords expressed reservations regarding the likelihood of 
a fair trial for anyone accused of such crimes. It was 
the practicalities rather than the principle of the Bill 
which came most into question. Those who objected to the 
War Crimes Bill frequently reiterated their repulsion of 
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antisemi tism (indeed a number of those who opposed the 
Bill were in fact Jewish) and the crimes involved but 
found they could not put aside their doubts that a fair 
trial would be difficult to achieve. Problems relating 
to the memory and availabili ty of wi tnesses due to the 
time which had lapsed since the crimes occurred, and also 
the availability of sufficient facilities and time which 
would be made available to the defence, were among the 
concerns which were expressed. The Hetherington-Chalmers 
Report had addressed itself to the possibility of 
conviction ra ther than of fair trial. The Spectator 
described the Bill as "fundamentally misconceived", 
believing that fair trials would be difficult to achieve, 
with comparisons being drawn to the overturning of 
verdicts passed on people convicted of Irish terrorist 
activities, there being a "risk of unsafe verdicts in 
highly charged cases".62 However, The Guardian put 
forward the view tha t the failure of the Bill in the 
House of Lords would result in there being a time limit 
on mass murder when one did not exist in individual cases 
of murder and that this would represent "a shameful 
message to the world which the Commons should not 
hesitate to put into reverse". 63 However, in other 
sources concern was expressed that discrimination was 
being shown to one particular group when the Wes tern 
forces, Soviets, Italians, Japanese, and later war 
criminals such as those in Cambodia, were excluded. 
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Concern was also expressed by some who believed the Bill 
to be introducing retrospective legislation, for which 
there was traditionally little sympathy in British 
Parliaments. The House of Lords remained a stumbling 
block to the passage of the Bill and the Commons found it 
necessary to invoke the Parliament Act of 1949 for the 
legislation to come into force. 
royal assent on 10 May 1991. 64 
The Bill received the 
During the inquiry into the existence of alleged war 
criminals living in Britain there was extensive publicity 
surrounding the issue and the results of the Hetherington 
Report received detailed coverage in the popular Press. 
In addition, as far as the Ukrainian community was 
concerned, on an interna tional level there was also a 
great deal of publicity pertaining to the John Demjanjuk 
trial which was taking place in Israel following his 
deportation from the United States of America which had 
stripped him of his American citizenship. The Ukrainian 
and Baltic communities were distressed by the publicity 
as they believed the allegations concerning a small 
number of individuals reflected badly on the whole 
community. However, it was the rumour and general 
publicity to which they objected and not the prosecution 
of actual war criminals. For example Lord Cocks of 
Hartcliffe stated that Ukrainians in St Helens had made a 
number of representations to their MP that "they were 
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very much in favour of action being taken on the lines 
proposed by the Government. ,,65 There was also some 
concern amongst the Ukrainian community that evidence 
supporting some of the allegations against individuals 
waS mainly supplied by the Soviet Union and therefore 
there was a possibility that it could be propaganda 
rather than evidence. 
Concern that publicity surrounding the war crimes issue 
should not reflect on the Ukrainian and Baltic 
communities as a whole were also expressed by members of 
both Houses of Parliament. Merlyn Rees, chairman of the 
all-party group on war crimes was keen to point out that 
from the Ukrainian and Baltic communities most of the 
people who came to Britain after the war were considered 
to be "first-rate citizens" but that it should not be 
ignored that a small minority amongst them might have 
been guilty of mass murder contravening international 
laws governing conduct in time of war, and these people 
should not be allowed to get away with it. Douglas Hurd 
was also keen to stress that the East European 
communities were well respected and contained many 
thousands of "admirable and loyal citizens".66 A 
conclusion which, after the initial difficulties of being 
regarded as competitors by the indigenous population, 
appears to have entered into general circulation. 
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9. THE RESPONSES IN BRITAIN TO THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEES 
1956-7 
Although Hungarians entered Britain as European Volunteer 
Workers in the years immediately after the Second World 
War, they were small in number and went relatively 
unnoticed amongst the mass of Poles, Ukrainians, BaIts, 
Germans and Italians also arriving at this time. In 
contras t, the refugees following the Hungarian uprising 
of 1956 arrived in a blaze of publicity, and it is on 
this group which this chapter concentrates. 
1956 : The responses of the British Government and the 
arrival of the Hungarians in Britain 
The British Government responded quickly to the Hungarian 
refugee question. On 5 November 1956, the day after 
Soviet tanks had begun to attack Budapest and Imre Nagy 
had been forced to seek refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, 
there was already talk in the House of Commons of 
"offering hospitality to a substantial proportion of the 
10, 000 refugees who have had to flee from the Russian 
tyranny."l This was seen as the best way in which 
Bri tain could help the Hungarians; direct intervention 
was impractical as it would risk a possible war wi th 
Russia. For similar reasons it was also decided that it 
was necessary to keep in contact wi th the Soviets. It 
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waS further decided that, although it disapproved of the 
Kadar Government which took control after the suppression 
of the uprising, it would not be prudent to impose 
sanctions on Hungary as this would only cause more 
suffering to the Hungarian people as a whole. In 1962 
the British Government went further in strengthening its 
links with Hungary by introducing a programme of cultural 
exchanges. 
By 7 November 1956 the Bri t ish Government was already 
investigating the possibility of receiving 2,500 of the 
Hungarian refugees and in this it had the full support of 
the other parliamentary parties. However, this was not a 
rigidly fixed figure and was to be kept under review as 
further information came through from Austria with 
reference to the extent of the problem. This resulted 
in the Government announcement on 23 November that, after 
a request from Austria, it was to waive the original 
limit of 2,500. By 11 December 1956 approximately 11,000 
Hungarians had arrived2 which, with the exception of 
Austria, was the largest number any country had received. 
Such a large number of refugees in so short a space of 
time had not originally been planned for and consequently 
congestion had occurred at the reception centres and it 
was necessary to suspend temporarily the admi t tance of 
more refugees until the accommoda tion problem had been 
resolved. This did not take long and a t the Uni ted 
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Nations General Assembly on 10 January 1957 the United 
Kingdom's representative said that the country was 
prepared to take a further 5,000 Hungarians. 3 Of this 
5,000 the Inter-Governmental Committee for European 
Migration could only afford transportation for 550 of 
them, the rest were brought here by the British 
Government at the cost of £32,000. By March 1957 it was 
being estimated in official quarters that approximately 
19,000 Hungarian refugees had been admitted to Britain. 4 
Emigration and repatriation 
By the end of 1956, having received such a large number 
of refugees, the Government felt it could not accept any 
more until some of those Hungarians only in Britain 
temporarily had departed for the countries in which they 
wished to settle permanently. 5 This referred in 
particular to the 5,000 Hungarians who, in December 1956, 
Canada had promised to take from Britain in the Spring of 
1957. In November 1956 it had originally been planned 
that Western European countries could help the situation 
in Austria, which was finding it difficult to cope with 
the large numbers of Hungarians crossing the border, by 
temporarily taking refugees who hoped to eventually 
settle in non-European countries. It was known that many 
of the refugees wanted to go to Australia, New Zealand, 
and the United States of America. The British Council 
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for Aid to Refugees estimated that approximately one-half 
of the Hungarians tha t came to Bri tain in November and 
December 1956 wished to emigrate elsewhere. 6 However, 
except for Canada, countries continued to restrict their 
intake of refugees to those who carne directly from 
Austria. After Bri tain lifted its suspension on the 
admittance of refugees in January 1957 only those wanting 
to settle permanently in Britain were accepted, and this 
was made clear to the refugees when they were given 
indi vidual int erviews whil s t still in Aus tr ia. By 10 
April 1957 the United Kingdom had received 21,000 
Hungarian refugees, of whom 15,000 intended to settle 
permanently in the country.7 Few refugees were added to 
this total so that by 20 February 1958 21,667 Hungarian 
refugees had arrived in the United Kingdom since 28 
October 1956, of whom 14,710 remained. 8 
Of those who had left Britain the majority had emigrated 
to other Western nations although some had in fact 
returned to Hungary. The Bri tish Council for Aid to 
Refugee s reported tha t even as early as January 1957 a 
few of the refugees were wanting to return. 9 The British 
Government did not prevent those wanting to go back from 
doing so; it was felt that it was the responsibility of 
the Hungarian authori ties to grant permission enabling 
such people to return. By 17 February 1957 only 121 
refugees had returned to Hungary.l0 Reports in The Daily 
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Express and The Daily Herald accused those refugees 
wanting to go back to Hungary as being members of the 
Hungarian secret police. This was refuted by the 
Hungarian Legation in London who said that it was: 
"ridiculous, and at the same time 
slanderous, to classify as 'members of 
the Hungarian secret police' those 
Hungarians who wished to return to their 
families and their homeland as soon as 
possible." 11 
The Hungarian Legation wanted to help those refugees 
wishing to return to Hungary, saying that these people 
were feeling disappointed after having been misled about 
life in the West and had realised "their mistake in 
leaving,,12. In many ways this may have been true as the 
first experience of Hungarians in Britain in 1956 was 
life in the refugee camps, something which did not 
resemble the prosperous Western lifestyle they may have 
heard about whilst in the East. By 20 February 1958 
d 13 . h 1,214 of the refugees had returne to Hungary elt er 
disillusioned with life in Britain or missing family and 
friends back home. This figure had risen to 
approximately 2,000 by 1 June 1961. 14 
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Arrivals from the camps in Yugoslavia 
It is interesting that throughout 1956 and 1957 the 
British Government had a noticeably different attitude 
towards accepting refugees from Austria and towards 
accepting them from Yugoslavia. The Government claimed 
that this was because it had originally been in Austria 
that there was a large-scale arrival of refugees. 
Indeed, there is a good deal of truth in this claim. Up 
to 10 December 1956 Austria had received 126,000 refugees 
whilst up to 7 December only 859 Hungarians had fled to 
Yugoslavia. However, whilst the number of refugees in 
Austria began to decline, only 69,491 remained in the 
country by 19 December, 
continued to increase. 
the number in Yugoslavia 
This situation did not go 
unnoticed and on 21 February 1957 in the House of Commons 
Barnett Janner asked why Britain was not taking refugees 
from Yugoslavia. 15 By 8 April 1957 the number of 
refugees in Yugoslavia had increased to 18,000 and the 
United Nations felt it necessary to issue an appeal for 
countries to take some of these refugees. The Bri tish 
Government responded by stating that it had already made 
a "considerable contribution" to solving the refugee 
problem and was "not normally a country of 
immigration" .16 The language used in this statement is 
clearly less sympathetic in tone than the reply of: 
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"Her Majesty's Government 
programme of the United 
support the 
Nations High 
Commissioner for the resettlement of 
these refugees"17 
which was given when questioned about the Hungarian 
refugees still in Austria in December 1957. Even bearing 
in mind that Austria received nine times more Hungarian 
refugees than Yugoslavia, Britain still took 
proportionally less of its intake from Yugoslavia than it 
did from Austria. On 4 July 1957 Viscount Colville of 
Culross spoke on this subject in the House of Lords, 
pOinting out that although 500 of the refugees in 
Yugoslavia had selected Britain as the country they would 
like to enter, only 50 had been allowed into the country 
to date, and another 50 were expected to arrive 
shortly.18 On 28 December 1957 the Government announced 
tha t a further 200 Hungarians were to be allowed into 
Britain from Yugoslavia to replace the 200 refugees 
leaving Britain for Australia. 19 However, this apparent 
discrimination was not only present in Britain; most 
countries seem to have been more reluctant to take 
refugees from Yugoslavia than from Austria and there was 
also more financial aid given to Austria from the West 
than was given to the Yugoslavs. This was a resul t of 
the political climate of the time; during the Cold War 
Western countries were more willing to provide aid to a 
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fellow Western country, Austria, than a member of the 
Eastern bloc, Yugoslavia. There was also increased 
suspicion by the Western powers that refugees arriving 
from Yugoslavia were more likely to be Communis t spies 
than refugees arriving from camps in Austria. 
Security measures on arrival 
On account of the urgency of the situation and the 
accumulation of large numbers of refugees Britain along 
wi th countries such as Swi tzerland, Sweden and Holland 
waived its usual immigration restrictions when accepting 
the refugees, allowing them to come to Bri tain wi thout 
having had individual interviews. This was a popular 
move at the time but by 13 December 1956 concern was 
already being expressed about the possibili ty of 
Hungarian Communist agents corning into Britain along with 
the refugees. 20 This prompted Major Lloyd-George to 
declare tha t the Government had in fact made securi ty 
arrangements to prevent such a thing from happening. 21 
A small party of 61 Hungarian refugees, including 14 
children, arrived in London on 17 November 1956 with the 
first large party of Hungarian refugees arriving in 
London on the following day. The Bri tish Red Cross, in 
consultation with the International Committee for 
European Migra tion, had made the arrangements for the 
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transportation from Austria of this group. On entry into 
Britain all the refugees had to register themselves with 
the police and give some information about themselves. 
The authorities realised that many of them might be 
reluctant to do this for fear of reprisals on the family 
they had left behind in Hungary and so gave official 
assurances that none of the information imparted by the 
refugees would be passed on to any foreign organization 
or government. 
Security checks on the Hungarians were initially minimal 
and took place at the port of entry; the refugees were 
then issued with an identification document. The lack of 
screening in the early period of arrival resulted in some 
rumours of the possibility of Communist spies arriving in 
Bri tain amongs t the refugees. On 2 December 1956 the 
Sunday Express carried the story "Could there be a spy 
amongst the refugees?". The writer of the article 
expressed sympathy for the refugees and did not wish to 
see them "unduly badgered" by the authorities but at the 
same time felt that the authorities concerned should 
ensure tha t careful screening of the refugees did take 
place. After these security scares it was arranged for a 
team of immigration officials to be sent to the camps in 
Austria to screen the refugees before they were accepted 
for resettlement in Britain. In October 1957 to lay 
remaining fears to rest a further screening of Hungarian 
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refugee s in the Uni ted Kingdom was undertaken by the 
Immigration officers. 
Later arrivals 
Apart from limiting the numbers of refugees allowed into 
the country at certain times, no restrictions were 
actually placed on which individuals to accept until June 
1957. After this point only those refugees who 
qualified under the Distressed Relatives Scheme of 
1945 were to be allowed into Britain. 22 As a consequence 
of the imposition of the Distressed Relatives Scheme 23 
the Hungarians arriving after June 1957 were usually 
dependant relatives of refugees already settled in 
Britain. However, not all relatives could obtain the 
relevant paperwork and one woman attempting to join her 
uncle in Bri tain waded ashore after being dropped by a 
small boat somewhere near Dover. 24 
An incident which aroused public interest was the illegal 
arrival in Britain of eleven Hungarian stowaways from 
Brazil who were given permission by the Home Secretary to 
remain in the country in January 1958. The decision not 
to deport these three families was given only after a 
careful consideration of the possible effects on one of 
the women who was eight months pregnant. One of the men, 
f d ·· commented "We are deeply on hearing 0 this eC1Sl0n, 
--Page 268 --
grateful to the English people and Press who have made 
this case" , to which an edi torial in The Times replied 
that they should indeed feel grateful to Britain "for 
offering them hospi tali ty which we may fairly say they 
would have been unlikely to get anywhere else in the 
world".25 The child was eventually named after the Home 
Secretary, R. A. Butler, and the MP Anthony Greenwood who 
had appealed on behalf of allowing the stowaways to stay 
in Britain. Greenwood was also godfather at the 
Christening. 
Similar stories followed in the 1960s. The most 
prominent Hungarian applicant for Bri tish residence in 
this period being Elizabeth Vigh who had represented 
Hungary at three Olympic games in the javelin and discuss 
events. 26 Not all applications to remain in Britain made 
by Hungarians were granted. During the 1970s stories of 
refugees from Hungary tended to focus on defectors to the 
West in general rather than those applying to remain in 
Britain. This was a reflection of the small numbers 
involved. In August 1974 it was reported that a British 
lorry driver had been found guilty of trying to smuggle a 
Hungarian girl to the West in his lorry and had been 
sentenced to four months' imprisonment. 27 
The numbers arriving in Britain after 1957 were few. In 
1973 only seven Hungarians applied for political asylum 
--Page 269 --
in Britain28 and by the early 1980s applications made to 
the British Government by Hungarians seeking asylum 
appear to have averaged out to approximately 20 per year. 
Decisions on these applications were not always quickly 
received and were not always given Government assent. 29 
The numbers of Hungarians applying for naturalization 
also fell during the 1970s. 30 
Organized reception of the refugees 
The reception of the refugees was made the responsibility 
of the British Council for Aid to Refugees who co-
ordinated their efforts with other voluntary 
organizations and was kept in close contact with relevant 
government departments through the existence of a 
parliamentary Inter-Departmental Working Party. On 9 
November 1956 the British Council for Aid to Refugees was 
awarded a £10,000 government grant to cover 
administrative expenses. 31 When the refugees first began 
to arrive the Council had only five members of staff but 
by January 1957, as the organization tried to cope with 
the large numbers of refugees coming into Britain, this 
had been increased to 140 staff. 32 The British Council 
for Aid to Refugees received further financial assistance 
from the Lord Mayor of London's Fund set up to help the 
Hungarians but by the end of August 1957 the Council had 
exhausted almost all of its funds and the Government 
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decided that from 1 October 1957 responsibility for 
maintaining the refugees should pass from the Council 
to the National Assistance Board. Voluntary 
organizations other than the British Council for Aid to 
Refugees, for example the Red Cross, the St John's 
Ambulance Brigade and the United Nations Association, 
also played an important role in welcoming and 
maintaining the refugees. These organizations received 
much praise from both the British people and the 
Hungarians themselves. 
Popular sympathy 
On their arrival there was much popular sympathy for the 
Hungarians who were seen as heroic freedom fighters. 
This sympathy was fuelled by reports in the Press about 
the si tua tion in Hungary, the heroism of the freedom 
fighters and the plight of the refugees. The tabloid 
newspapers also made extensive use of emotive photographs 
of the refugees, particularly women and children, 
arriving in Austria and later in Britain. 33 The caption 
under one photograph of a Hungarian girl in a reception 
camp in Bri tain read tha t al though now safe in England 
"those tragic eyes in a little girl r s face hold the 
horror of a broken home, a sha t tered town, a murdered 
nation.,,34 Hungarian men featured in the reports and 
photographs tended to be those who had sustained injuries 
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during the fighting. The behaviour of the Press at the 
reception camps in Austria did not however go 
unquestioned. One correspondent to The Times who had 
been a volunteer worker there in December 1956 complained 
about the intrusive behaviour of many members of the 
British Press, and their insensitivity in the quest for 
the best photographs. He went on to ask "Can nothing be 
done by the Press Council to stop this attitude of 
'anything for a good story,?,,35 The deliberate omission 
of a photograph of Hungarian refugees was also used to 
some effec t by the Daily Mirror in December 1956. The 
newspaper had been featuring a series of 'Comedian of the 
Year', 'Face of the Year' etc, and for 'Picture of the 
Year' it had chosen a photograph of twenty Hungarian 
refugees enjoying a party held for them by the newspaper 
at the Hungarian restaurant in London. However, the 
newspaper explained that it could not publish the picture 
because the refugees still had relatives in Hungary and 
did not want to jeopardize their safety by being 
recognized. The report explained that it hoped one day 
to be able to print a photograph of these people being 
reunited with their families. Political cartoonists also 
commented on the si tua tion, for example a drawing by 
Vicky in the Daily Mirror showed an old woman and two 
children accompanied by the quote "'Fascist and 
reactionary elements have 
controlled Budapest Radio.,,36 
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been crushed' Soviet-
Television also played its 
part in heightening public sympathy for the refugees. On 
11 November 1956 the BBC made a live television broadcast 
from a transit camp for Hungarian refugees at 
Traiskirchen in Austria. 
Demonstra tions in support of the Hungarian people were 
organized by university students in Cardiff and Leeds , 
and more than 1,000 London University students protested 
outside the Soviet Embassy, with mounted police having to 
drive back over 100 demonstrators who tried to charge 
police guarding the Embassy. One student demonstrator, 
having been prevented by police from reaching the 
Embassy, attempted to march on the offices of The Daily 
Worker, the newspaper of the Communis t Party of Grea t 
Bri tain, before again finding police blocking the way. 
After a mass demonstration of several thousand students 
and Hungarian exiles in Hyde Park on 11 November 1956, 
200 students marched to the offices of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain in Covent Garden and milk bottles 
were thrown at the offices' windows. 
There was also talk of British university students going 
over to Hungary to participate in the fighting. In 
November 1956 the British Universities Volunteer Force 
began seeking volunteers to fight in Hungary, and called 
on other Western European uni versi ties to do the same 
until a projected force of 20, 000 students were 
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available. A British Universities Committee was formed 
by students from Nottingham University and the London 
School of Economics to discuss the possibility of such a 
student force. This commi ttee discussed its ideas wi th 
the United Kingdom Committee for the Assistance of 
Hungarian Freedom Fighters, the main aim of which was to 
collect money and clothing for the Hungarians. However, 
despite a great deal of support amongst British students 
for the Hungarian rebels there were few who actually went 
so far as volunteering to help in the fighting. For 
example there were only 20 volunteers at Nottingham 
University. 
Many people shared the sentiments expressed by Michael-
Vincent Korda of Magdalen College, Oxford in a letter to 
The Spectator, 23 November 1956, in which he said that by 
not actively supporting the rebels at the time of the 
uprising we had failed the Hungarian people and that we 
must help the refugees. Some were also of the opinion 
that Britain's action in Suez had encouraged the Soviet 
Union in its decision to intervene in Hungary. Indeed, 
it is possible that, with regards to the action in Suez, 
its failure marked the start of a new era in which 
Bri tain began to look more towards its place in Europe 
rather than in the Commonwealth, and that this shift in 
attitudes was beneficial to the Hungarian refugees in 
terms of Britain's response to them. 
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Numerous, more peaceful, expressions of sympathy were 
also made at this time. A delegation of Labour leaders 
visited the Soviet Ambassador in London to express their 
'profound shock and horror' at events in Hungary,37 and 
resolutions of sympathy for the Hungarian people were 
made by several political organizations, one example of 
this being the Southampton Labour Party. The Archbishop 
of Canterbury also joined in the expressions of sympathy 
by asking for prayers for Hungary on Remembrance Sunday. 
Hungarian exiles in Britain were allowed to take part in 
the Remembrance service in London in 1956 and lay a 
special wreath at the Cenotaph in memory of the freedom 
fighters. There was also the idea of sending a peaceful 
Youth Pilgrimage on foot from London to Hungary in 
protest at the Soviet intervention. 38 
After the arrival in Britain of the first groups of 
Hungarian refugees a meeting was organized at the Royal 
Albert Hall in London by the European-Atlantic group 
under the slogan 'Britain stands by Hungary'. There were 
a number of speakers, including the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, but guests of honour at the meeting were 17 
Hungarian men and women who had fought with the freedom 
fighters. The Hungarians, fearing reprisals on relatives 
still in Hungary, appeared on stage wearing masks to 
avoid recogni tion and received a "thunderous reception" 
from the audience. 39 
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The plight of the Hungarians had grabbed the British 
imagination and this resulted in what the British Council 
for Aid to Refugees described as an "overwhelming 
response" by the public when called on to help the 
refugees. 40 In the House of Commons Dr. Horace King went 
as far as to say: 
"The British people are rising to the 
humanitarian appeal of the Hungarian 
refugees on a scale unequalled, I think, 
in peacetime. "41 
In fact, the response was so overwhelming that on 27 
December 1956 one Hungarian refugee in Notting Hill, 
London was in court for being drunk and disorderly on 
Boxing Day after having been plied with twenty whiskies 
by the "kind English" in one public house. 42 There was 
also the case in Surrey of one former member of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain who was charged with 
being drunk and disorderly after he had felt it necessary 
to 'salve his conscience' with alcohol as a result of the 
guilt he believed all Communist Party members should 
share over the events in Hungary.43 
In addition to these expressions of sympathy it was also 
necessary to cancel a visit to Britain of the Russian ice 
hockey team in "deference to public opinion",44 the 
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Sadler's Wells Ballet company cancelled a planned visit 
to Moscow, and the Bar Council and Law Society cancelled 
an invitation to a delegation of Soviet lawyers who were 
to have visited Britain. 
Society also cancelled 
The British-Soviet Friendship 
some of its events until the 
international situation had improved. By February 1957 
calls started being made for the re-establishment of 
cuI tural exchanges wi th the Soviet Union. It was fel t 
that, although gestures of sympathy for the Hungarian 
people had been important, the suspension of cultural 
exchanges with the Soviet people should not continue 
indefini tely as it was not in the interests of 
international relations. 
There was a resurgent interest in Bri tain towards the 
Hungarians and events in Hungary when news of the 
execution of former Hungarian leader Imre Nagy reached 
the country in June 1958. The matter was discussed in 
Parliament and let ters flooded in to The Times. The 
majority of these letters expressed either shock or 
dismay at the execution, but one writer claimed to have 
no sympathy for Nagy who had "helped create the monster 
which took his life". 45 There was also a protest march 
by 200 Hungarian students in London. The organizers of 
the march intended to present a resolution of protest at 
the Hungarian Legation but were prevented from reaching 
the Legation by the police. Condemnation of the 
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executions of the Hungarian leaders was also forthcoming 
from the British trades unions. The TUC General Council 
passed a resolution expressing "shock and horror" at the 
executions, there being only two dissentients by the Fire 
Brigades' Union. The executive council of the AEU 
expressed "revulsion and horror", whilst Arthur Horner, 
Communist general secretary of the NUM described the 
execution of Nagy and his colleagues as "needless folly". 
The general secretary of the London Typographical Society 
wi thdrew from a Printing and Kindred Trades Federa tion 
delegation to the Soviet Union as he did not want to be 
thought of as condoning the executions. 46 
After 1958 interest in the Hungarian situation dwindled 
and was re-ignited only sporadically. In March 1960 a 
memorial tablet depicting a scene of Budapest in 1956 was 
unveiled at the Polish community club in Princes Gate, 
London. Newspaper interest in the uprising occurred on 
its tenth and twentieth anniversaries with the events of 
1956 being described in letters and articles. 47 
The financial response and charity activities in aid of 
the refugees 
The immediate response to the refugees in monetary terms 
was very positive. By 21 November 1956 the British 
Government had contributed a total of £110,000 for the 
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aid of refugees both here and abroad. 48 This figure had 
risen to approximately £263,000 by 25 January 1957. 49 By 
6 March the total contribution had risen again to equal 
£355,000, of which £230,000 was being spent on the 
resettlement of refugees in Britain. 50 After this, 
despite an appeal on 12 March by the United Nations 
Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Refugees, 
the British Government decided that it could give no more 
money for helping refugees in Austria and Yugoslavia. 
However, it was not only the Government that donated 
money to Hungarian relief, there was also a generous 
response from the general public who had raised £450,000 
by 19 November 1956. 51 There were various organizations 
which made collections for Hungarian relief, the largest 
of these being the fund launched by the Lord Mayor of 
London, Sir Cullum Welch, on 9 November 1956 at a banquet 
at which the Soviet Ambassador was present. By 5 
December 1956 donations to this national appeal had 
reached a figure of £1,145,000. By the time it was wound 
up in September 1958 the fund had reached a total of 
£2,609,434. 52 One-third of this money was to be spent 
outside Britain but the remainder was available to aid 
projects for Hungarians who had found refuge in 
Britain. 53 There was also a collection organized by the 
Trades Union Congress, the leaders of which stated 
"sympathy must now be measured not in words but in 
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pounds".54 Several trades unions contributed to this 
appeal, for example, the Transport and General Workers 
Union had given £5,000 by 16 November 1956 and by 31 
January 1957 the National Union of Mineworkers had 
donated £15,000. The general council of the Trades Union 
Congress did not however accept a proposal for an 
international boycott of Soviet goods and services. This 
was not a reflection of a lack of sympathy for the 
Hungarians but was due to opposition to take industrial 
action on political grounds, difficulties in applying 
such a boycott and the potentially serious economic 
effects on workers in other European countries. An 
appeal was also launched by the Labour Party, and 
restaurants in Soho operated a scheme whereby a small 
dona tion to Hungarian relief was added to the bill. In 
addition to these appeals people also donated money to 
the Red Cross, to which Britain was internationally the 
seventh largest contributor. Donations to Hungarian 
relief came from contributors as diverse as Queen 
Elizabeth, the Bank of England, and the Scottish football 
clubs Glasgow Celtic and Heart of Midlothian. There was 
also a special edition of the Picture Post entitled 'Cry 
Hungary' which gave an account of the events in Hungary 
in 1956, the profits of which were donated to the Lord 
Mayor of London's relief fund. 
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However, this generous response to Hungarian relief was 
not wholly unanimous. Some objections were raised from 
the greeting card industry to sales of a charity card in 
aid of Hungarian relief at Christmas 1956 and there was 
also the case of an unscrupulous individual who stole a 
mail bag from the London headquarters of the United 
Nations Association which contained donations to their 
relief fund. 
The generosity of the general public, both in Britain and 
other Western countries, meant that the immediate needs 
of the refugees were soon provided for. These needs 
ranged from the drugs and medical equipment donated by 
pharmacists, drug-houses and hospitals, to the cigarettes 
provided by the soldier sat an army camp in Colches ter 
for the refugees housed there. As well as donating money 
many people also gave old clothing and bedding for 
distribution amongst the refugees. There was also a call 
by the Library Association for books written in Hungarian 
to be passed on to local libraries. One other basic need 
of the Hungarians, that of information about missing 
rela ti ves, was harder to sa tisfy. However, the problem 
was partly solved when the International Red Cross set up 
a central index of all Hungarian refugees. Also, the 
British Broadcasting Corporation broadcast messages of no 
more than twelve words from refugees to relatives in 
Hungary. This was done using nicknames and pseudonyms so 
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that there would be no reprisals on those still in 
Hungary. 
Hostility towards Hungarian refugees 
One section of the population in which there was a mixed 
reaction to the event s in Hungary and the refugees who 
subsequently came to Britain was amongst the membership 
of the Communist Party of Great Britain. The Communist 
Party itself, like that in France, refused to condemn the 
Sovie t intervention and this resul ted in a number of 
members, particularly trade unionists and university 
members, leaving the party. John Horner, general 
secretary of the Fire Brigades' Union, resigned from the 
Party, and at a three county conference of firemen held 
in Newcastle there were calls for all officials of the 
Fire Brigades Union connected to the Communist Party to 
resign. The executive of the National Union of 
Mineworkers passed a resolution condemning Soviet 
aggression in Hungary. However, miners' leader Arthur 
Horner decided "after careful thought" to remain loyal to 
the Communist Party whilst maintaining that, in his view, 
Communist countries should be allowed to develop in their 
own way without pressures from outside. 55 The Electrical 
Trades Union also kept its Communist president Frank 
Foulkes, but the union itself passed resolutions in 
support of the Hungarian people and condemned the Soviet 
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intervention at its annual conference in June 1957. The 
Communist Club at Oxford University was forced to disband 
after a significant number of resignations. In an 
interview on the television programme 'Panorama' shown on 
10 December 1956 the general secretary of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain, John Gollan, said that 590 
members had resigned since the uprising. The programme 
estimated that three per cent of the total membership of 
34,000 might eventually resign due to the events in 
Hungary. However, the Party believed that those leaving 
the Party "are profoundly mis taken and tha t, as event s 
unfold, many will deeply regret that they took such 
steps. ,,56 In a Daily Mirror edi torial, commenting on 
the acceptance of the Moscow line on Hungary by the 
leaders of the Communist Party of Great Britain and Party 
organ the Daily Worker, asked the question "When are 
these dupes going to come to their senses ?,,57 
Meanwhile, the Ashington branch of the Communist Party in 
Northumberland broke away from national policy and 
decided to condemn the Soviet action in Hungary. 
After the initial sympathy for the Hungarian people there 
was a change in attitude amongst some of the indigenous 
popula tion when the refugees had been in Bri tain a few 
months. Tradi tional Bri tish xenophobia soon reappeared 
in certain sections of the communi ty. One Hungar ian 
refugee of the time later wrote "English people have a 
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tendency to look on foreigners as potential hell-
raisers".58 This resurgence of xenophobic attitudes was 
due in part to the age and gender distribution of the 
refugees. Before their arrival it had been expected that 
there would be a number of unaccompanied children and the 
Save the Children Fund had been inunda ted wi th money. 
There were also many offers of homes for the children , 
coming from both individuals and official organizations. 
For example, Dr. Barnado's offered places for 50 children 
until more permanent homes could be found for them, there 
was an offer of 100 homes by the Church of England 
Children's Society and the Interna tional Help for 
Children organization had received 70 offers to take 
children for varying periods of time. 59 However, by 4 
December 1956 no unaccompanied children had come to 
Bri tain and there were even very few families. The 
majori ty of unaccompanied children had been taken to 
Switzerland, although it was later revealed that 
approximately 100 children had in fact arrived 
unregistered in Bri tain accompanied by adul ts who were 
not their parents. Some of these returned to their 
families in Hungary whilst the remainder were found homes 
by the Bri tish Council for Aid to Refugees. Of the 
refugees who arrived in Britain by 19 December 1956, 77 
per cent were male and of these 89 per cent were under 
the age of 38, and 67 per cent were aged between 18 and 
38. 60 Even by the time of the census of 1961, of the 
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17,938 Hungarians resident in Britain nearly 62 per cent 
were male. 61 This predominance of young, single men 
amongs t the Hungarians resul ted in some young, single 
British men feeling threatened by their presence. One, 
more surprising, source of opposition came from the 
National Conference of Labour Women held in April 1957. 
There was an "unmistakable swell of cheering" when Mrs. 
Vera Pope of Gloucester accused the refugees of taking 
jobs and accommodation from "our own" people. 62 A 
resolution condemning Russia's actions was passed but the 
conference refused to accept the final words of the 
resolution which pledged full support for future measures 
to alleviate the condition of the Hungarian people. 
Hostility towards the Hungarians was further fuelled by 
the behaviour of the unsettled element amongst the 
refugees. Both at the time and in subsequent years, the 
number of 'petty criminals' and 'social misfits' who 
entered Bri tain as refugees has been consistently 
exaggerated. In a PEP broadsheet 'Refugees in Britain' 
issued on 16 February 1958 it was stated that of the 
Hungarian adolescents still resident in hostels some had 
become "so demoralized by their experiences as to present 
a serious delinquent problem" • In his study of 
immigrants in Bedford, Brown states, 
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"The small group of Hungarians proved an 
exception to the general pattern of 
law-abiding European immigrants. Indeed, 
their crime rate in Bedford in relation 
to their numbers has been greater than 
that of any other immigrant group".63 
Brown then described a small group of women responsible 
for "persistent shop-lifting", and a group of young men 
responsible for violence, drunkenness, traffic offences 
and larceny. An official report describing these people 
as 'a parasitic band of layabouts' was thought to be "an 
appropriate summing-up" of their behaviour. However, in 
recent years shoplifting and excessive drinking have come 
to be recognized as often being an expression of the need 
for help from psychologically or emotionally disturbed 
individuals rather than wanton criminality. Brown also 
failed to describe the nature of the violence of the 
Hungarians which could possibly have been provoked by the 
behaviour of others. Exaggerating the levels of 
criminality amongst refugees and immigrants is not 
exclusive to the Hungarians, but is a common accusation 
made by people hostile, for whatever reason, to the 
presence of immigrant and refugee groups in Britain. A 
similar complaint frequently directed at refugee groups, 
including the Hungarians, is that many are in fact 
economic migrants taking advantage of refugee status. 
Whilst this often contains an element of truth, these 
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people often prove to be hardworking citizens and thereby 
help to produce favourable attitudes amongst the British 
towards other refugees of the same nationality. It is 
also sometimes possible for them to provide a stabilising 
influence on other refugees of the same nationality with 
whom they come into contact. 
The Hungarian community in Britain 
Within the existing Hungarian community there was a 
generally supportive stance taken towards the newcomers. 
An organization called the Central Committee of Hungarian 
Exiles in Britain launched its own Hungarian Relief Fund, 
which by 9 November 1956 had already raised over £5,000 
in addition to its collection of clothing and bedding. 
Money was also collected by the Hungarian Freedom 
Fighters' Welfare Association; this fund managed to raise 
£2,000 in total. It was this fund that in April 1958 
became the subject of a Scotland Yard investigation after 
a small group of Hungarian refugees claimed they had not 
received their share of the money.64 
However, a small amount of friction did occur between 
some of the pre-1956 Hungarian exiles and the 1956 
refugees following their arrival in Britain. Although as 
ex-enemy nationals Hungarians had initially been 
ineligible for volunteer worker schemes immediately after 
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the Second World War, the continuing labour shortages 
resulted in the relaxation of restrictions in the 
recruitment of ex-enemy nationals from the displaced 
persons' camps in Europe. However, the EVW scheme was 
tailing off by this time and only 2,110 men and 429 women 
of Hungarian nationality arrived in Britain as European 
Volunteer Workers. 65 In addition, they were joined by 
15 dependants. However, it has been estimated that 
approximately half of the Hungarian EVWs, including 
all of the women, re-emigrated from Britain. 66 A 
number of Hungarians had also settled in Britain during 
the 1930s. In 1953 the Hungarian population in Britain 
was estimated at 7,000. 67 It was calculated that in 1983 
there were approximately 45,000 Hungarian nationals in 
Britain, under half of which can be accounted for by the 
arrivals of 1956 and 1957. 68 The bulk of the rest of 
these Hungarians would have been part of the pre-1956 
Hungarian communi ty in Bri tain. The small amount of 
friction which occurred was due in part to a feeling of 
resentment amongs t the exis ting Hungarian communi ty who 
fel t tha t the 1956 refugee s received a grea t deal more 
support on their arrival in Britain than they themselves 
had experienced. 69 This friction was also a resul t of 
the conflict between an existing Hungarian population 
which had already settled itself well into the British 
lifestyle and the newcomers who were still afflicted by 
an overriding sense of uncertainty. The new arr ivaI s 
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also had to deal with a powerful sense of culture shock 
as Bri tain was completely different from the si tua tion 
they had just left behind in Hungary. The refugees of 
1956 were required to re-evaluate everything, not only 
about their own lives but also about their judgements of 
other people. The categories into which people were 
fi t ted in Hungary and the cri teria for being in those 
categories had suddenly been removed. 70 The Hungarian 
arrivals of 1956 and 1957 had to become accustomed to the 
norms of their newly-adopted society. It has been 
suggested they had unrealistic expectations of what to 
expect from the West on account of the propaganda of 
Voice of America and Radio Free Europe and that as a 
result disappointment was inevitable; it was this 
disappointment which caused the disapproval of the 
existing Hungarian community.71 
These observations should not be taken to mean that there 
was a strongly identified Hungarian community organized 
in Britain before or indeed after the arrivals of 1956. 
It has been suggested that a significant number of the 
Hungarians in Britain were Jewish. This claim could be 
supported in the case of Hungarians who arrived in 
Britain as EVWs because the only Hungarians who qualified 
as displaced persons, and thereby were eligible for 
recruitment to the voluntary worker schemes, were Jews. 
Many of the Hungarians arriving in Britain prior to the 
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Second World were also Jewish, having left Hungary as a 
result of the educational and occupational restrictions 
on Jews within its boundaries. However, that is not to 
say that all pre-1956 Hungarians in Britain were Jewish, 
for example the authoritarian regime of Horthy had also 
caused the emigration of a number of political liberals 
from pre-war Hungary and not all those Hungarians 
entering Britain as EVWs were of Jewish origin. By 1952 
it had been necessary for the appointment of a Hungarian 
Roman Catholic priest in Britain, and there were also an 
estimated 300 Lutheran Hungarians overseen by one 
pastor. 72 Of the first party of 61 Hungarians who 
arrived in London on 17 November 1956 it was known that 
the majority were Roman Catholics, in addition to 'a few' 
Protestants and twelve Jews. 73 
There is some evidence of a Hungarian community in 
London, for example the Hungarian res taurant 'The Gay 
Hussar', was founded by a Hungarian exile even though it 
is no longer owned by Hungarians, but similar evidence in 
the rest of Britain is difficult to find. In October 
1986, thirty years after the uprising, there were just 
. h I I . ... B' t' 74 elg t oca Hungar1an soc1et1es 1n r1 aln. 
Many of the Hungarians who arrived in Britain after the 
events of 1956 maintained few links with other Hungarians 
in Britain but a small number did involve themselves with 
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the World Federation of Hungarian Freedom Fighters. The 
president of this organization was General Veress de 
Dalnoki, a resident of Willesden Green, London. In 
August 1970 The Times carried an article about the 
international conference of the federation, over which 81 
year old Dalnoki was presiding. 75 These conferences were 
not held on a regular basis, there having been six since 
1956. Delegates from nine countries would meet to 
discuss future policy. A major concern in 1970 was for 
the federation to find potential future leaders, as its 
current members were either middle-aged or elderly. 
However, when compared to the political activities of 
other Eastern European groups in Britain the Hungarians 
were relatively quiet. 
In the early 1980s the Hungarian community in Britain was 
forced to fight to keep the remains of General Lazar 
Meszaros in Bri tain after the Hungarian Government had 
applied for his exhumation and reburial in Hungary. In 
September 1980 the Hungarian exiles unveiled a memorial 
at the grave of the General, former defence minister and 
Commander-in-Chief of the army, who had died in England 
in 1858 after fleeing Hungary following defeat by Russian 
and Austrian forces in 1848-9. A request for his 
exhumation made by the Hungarian Government had recently 
been refused by the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, but 
the matter did not end there. The Hungarian Government 
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made two further requests for his exhumation, both of 
which were refused, the second of which occurred in 
January 1982. The Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Federation 
in Britain, the Mindszenty Foundation (UK) and the 
General's last living relative, a great niece living in 
New York, had all opposed the exhumation of the man who 
had come to symbolize Hungary's fight for freedom against 
oppression. However, the campaign to keep the remains of 
General Meszaros in Britain received little publicity, 
particularly when compared to the similar campaign by, 
and on behalf of, the Polish exile community to prevent 
the return to Poland of General Sikorski's remains during 
the period of non-democratic Communist rule in that 
country. 
Language difficulties and English language acquisition 
An initial problem for the refugees was that of language. 
Few of the refugees could speak English when they 
arrived, and for those that could their English was often 
of a very basic nature. This problem was made worse by 
an inadequate number of interpreters, and, according to 
an article in The Lancet, this had an unfavourable 
psychological influence on the refugees as very often 
they received inaccura te informa tion which resul ted in 
disappointment and mistrust amongst the refugees. 76 
However, until the refugees had learned sufficient 
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English to make themselves understood and to be able to 
understand others, interpreters were a necessi ty. 
Interpreters were not only used by the interviewing 
officers who were the refugees' first contact with the 
British authorities but it was also necessary for a 
number of them to be employed by the Ministry of Labour 
for their dealings wi th the Hungarians. In April 1957 
there were 342 interpreters employed on either a full or 
part time basis in connection with the Hungarian 
refugees. Of these, 124 were themselves Hungarian and 
188 British subjects. 77 It is not stated whether any of 
those listed as British subjects were naturalized 
citizens of Hungarian origin. It was felt to be 
important that all of these interpreters were screened 
for security purposes as they were working with a 
vulnerable group of people who were in a position where 
they could easily be threatened if information about them 
were to finish up in the wrong hands. 
Although learning all the nuances of the language would 
take time and experience, for obvious reasons the 
refugees were encouraged to learn as much English as 
they could and as quickly as possible. The Young Men's 
Christian Association, aided by the local education 
authorities and the British Broadcasting Corporation 
which provided textbooks and records, held English 
lessons at its larger hostels and simple phrase sheets 
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were also made available to refugees. Wherever possible 
it was also found useful to place the refugees in 
employment where there was already a Hungarian speaker 
working, usually another Hungarian who had set tIed in 
Britain some years previously. For example, it was found 
at one hospital where there were vacancies which could be 
filled by refugees, that the matron was able to speak 
Hungarian. The Hungarian language newspaper Skegnessi 
Magyar Hirlap also planned to gradually introduce 
articles written in English as its readers learned the 
language. Another Hungarian language newspaper Heti 
Hireck published its last issue on 20 December 1957 as it 
was no longer needed, the campaign for the refugees to 
learn English having been so successful. 
Learning the language was a priori ty for the refugees. 
Firstly there was the economic element; it was easier to 
find work, once a sufficient standard of English had been 
achieved. An individual's prospects also improved. 
There were also more general practical reasons for 
learning the native language, for example it made 
shopping less difficul t. A knowledge of conversa tional 
English was also desirable to prevent the psychological 
effects of isolation; the established Hungarian community 
in Britain was small in number and the arrivals of 1956 
sought integration into British social life at a more 
increased rate than the Eastern European groups who had 
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arrived in Britain 1945-50. The Hungarians tend to speak 
more of assimilation than integration into the British 
community than the other national groups. Ideas of 
returning to live in the country of their birth, whether 
realistic or romantic, were also less common amongst the 
Hungarian community than earlier East Europeans. 
Educational opportunities 
One of the most positive responses to the refugees came 
from students and the educational institutions. 
Hungarian students were flown to Britain on five special 
flights so that they did not get lost amongst the bulk of 
the refugees. The universities offered 150 places to the 
Hungarians although more were welcome if the Government 
could supply sufficient funds. 78 Extra funds were 
provided for some additional students from grants made in 
1957 by the Ford Foundation and the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation. Provision was also made for the financing of 
28 doctors, eight dentists and six pharmacists to 
undertake training for them to requalify and become 
eligible for employment in their professions in 
Britain. 79 Many of the students needed intensive 
language lessons before starting their courses. However, 
not all refugees chose to resume their studies on arrival 
in Britain, many desired to establish themselves in 
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Britain as quickly as possible and financial independence 
was only possible for those who found employment. 
Pitman's Central College in London provided free 
scholarships to 25 Hungarian refugees in November 1956. 
Under the scholarships the Hungarians were to be taught 
English, shorthand, typing, book-keeping and other 
commercial subjects. There would be at least six months 
of training for each student. During their time at the 
college they were also given free meals and the services 
of an overseas students' welfare supervisor were 
available to them with regards to accommodation problems. 
At a lower level, Hungarian children were encouraged to 
start attending local schools as soon as possible, and in 
September 1958 a story was published in The Times of a 14 
year old Hungarian boy who had arrived in Bri tain two 
years previously speaking no English and had recently 
passed four GCEs. 80 
Accommodation provision 
On arrival the refugees were originally housed in army 
barracks which had been placed a t the disposal of the 
Bri tish Council for Aid to Refugees by the War Office. 
The refugees were then moved to hostels situated 
throughout the country which had been provided by a 
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number of different organizations, for example, the North 
Eas tern Divisional Coal Board offered accommoda tion for 
60 refugees and 150 were housed at Donnington Hall in 
Leicestershire which had been cleaned and prepared by 
university students. By January 1957 there were more 
than 100 of these hostels. 81 The availabili ty of such 
hostel accommodation, rather than employment, was the 
deciding factor in the dispersal of the refugees 
throughout the country and it was therefore in the 
interests of employers if they could provide some form of 
accommodation for any Hungarians they proposed to employ. 
However, the ultimate aim was to get the refugees settled 
in private accommodation. This task was the 
responsibility of the British Council for Aid to 
Refugees, which was helped in its investigations as to 
the suitability of potential accommodation by the Women's 
Voluntary Service. Despite initial enthusiasm offers of 
private accommodation were less forthcoming, particularly 
in industrial areas. However, this was primarily due to 
a lack of suitable housing rather than discrimination. 
There was a grea t deal of racial discrimina tion in the 
letting of private accommodation at this time. For 
example, signs in windows which clearly stated 'No 
coloureds' were not uncommon but, in general, this had 
little effect on the Hungarians who benefited from being 
both white and European. 82 This was confirmed in tests 
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undertaken on behalf of the Race Relations Board in which 
English, Hungarian and West Indian applicants applied for 
accommodation. It was found that in two-thirds of the 
cases where English and Hungarian applicants were 
welcomed, the West Indians were ei ther told there was 
nothing available or were offered stiffer terms. 83 
In May 1957 the lack of available private accommodation 
for the Hungarians resulted in plans to convert large 
houses in industrial areas into flats for the refugees, 
and by charging economic rents the scheme would be 
chiefly self-financed. One area where the scheme was 
implemented was Croydon where, although there was 
generally a positive attitude towards the Hungarians 
themselves, there was some bitterness towards the 
refugees securing accommodation so easily at a time when 
local people were suffering themselves from the housing 
shortage in the area. 84 
In la ter years there was a move towards home ownership 
for many Hungarians but few were in a posi tion to buy 
houses of their own soon after arrival. The Bri tish 
Council for Aid to Refugees was able to help some 
Hungarian families in their purchase of houses and by the 
end of 1958 it had made loans, or part-loans, part-
grants, 
However, 
to enable 82 Hungarian families to do this. 85 
for many refugees mortgages remained difficult 
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to obtain, even for those who had saved sizeable deposits 
for a house. Some Hungarians followed the pattern set by 
earlier groups of East European refugees, buying property 
as a joint venture with other individuals or families and 
then living in multiple occupation until able to afford 
houses of their own. 
However, in general, in the initial stages of 
resettlement lodgings remained difficult to find and on 1 
May 1957 there were still 6,000 Hungarians resident in 
hostels. 86 Even by the end of August of the same year 
2,500 refugees remained in 30 hostels. 87 By the end of 
July 1958 there were 735 Hungarians still resident in 
National Assistance Board hostels. 88 The Hungarians were 
made as comfortable as possible during their stay in the 
hostels and, although there are stories of 
disillusionment amongst hostel residents, there are also 
stories of refugees who felt settled there and were 
reluctant to leave. 
The employment of Hungarian refugees in Britain 
As far as employment was concerned, there was a certain 
amount of prestige to be gained by employers sponsoring 
Hungarian refugees, and by 13 December 1956 over 1,000 
employers had notified the Employment Exchanges that they 
had one or more vacancies for Hungarian refugees. 89 This 
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was in contrast to attitudes towards the employment of 
other ethnic minorities within Britain. For example in 
1967 a test was undertaken to discover the degree of 
discrimination encountered by job applicants. In the 
test three men, a West Indian, a Hungarian and an 
Englishman applied for work at a sample of 40 firms who 
were unaware that the test was taking place. Where a 
difference in qualifications existed it was weighted in 
favour of the West Indian. 90 The results of the 
test were as 
follows : 
Tester 
West Indian 
Hungarian 
Englishman 
No vacancy 
37 
23 
10 
Positive job 
offer 
1 
10 
15 
As can be seen from the above figures the Hungarian was 
told more frequently than the Englishman that no vacancy 
existed but did receive ten positive job offers. Both 
the Englishman and the Hungarian fared far better than 
the West Indian who received only one positive job offer 
and was told by 37 of the 40 that there were no 
vacancies. Although some discrimination was encountered 
by the Hungarian it was nowhere near the level of that 
directed at the West Indian. 
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The Ministry of Labour, voluntary bodies, and local 
authori ties worked together to find employment for the 
refugees, and in addi tion some Hungarians found work 
through friends and relatives. In areas where there were 
more refugees than jobs the Employment Exchange managers 
made special approaches to employers on their behalf. 
Some of the Hungarians arriving in Bri tain in 1956 and 
1957 were known to have professional qualifications, for 
example there were a number of engineers, and everything 
possible was done to ensure the refugees secured work 
corresponding to their skills. Those with scientific or 
technological skills were placed on the Technical and 
Scientific Register, whilst vacancies in other types of 
employment available to Hungarian refugees were 
circulated to other employment exchanges to find someone 
wi th the necessary experience or qualifica tions if the 
position could not be filled locally. The agencies were 
aided in their task of finding work for the refugees by 
the fact that in 1956 and 1957 Britain was in a situation 
of full employment and also that most of the refugees 
were young men, many of them skilled. They were 
described by Minister of Labour, lain Macleod, as being 
"comparatively easy to place in employment". 91 By 22 
January 1957 nearly half of the refugees registered for 
work had been found employment 92 and by mid-September 
fewer than 200 of the Hungarians remained unemployed. 93 
However, their limited knowledge of the English language 
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had meant that some of the refugees had been forced to 
accept work which was less skilled than that which they 
had followed in Hungary. Even refugees intending to 
emigrate elsewhere were found temporary employment if it 
appeared that they would have a long wait before 
obtaining their passages. 
It was not uncommon for the Hungarian refugees of 1956/7 
to find employment in businesses owned by Hungarians 
already resident in Britain, and also other previous East 
European arrivals in Britain, for example the Poles. 
The gender distribution amongst types of employment were 
similar to those experienced by the European Volunteer 
Workers in the previous decade. The majori ty of male 
Hungarians were found employment in engineering (both 
skilled and unskilled), foundries, agriculture, building, 
textiles, food processing and packing, hospitals (as 
nurses and porters), and as general labourers in various 
industries. The most common jobs for Hungarian women 
were as general factory workers, laundry and domestic 
workers. The main differences in occupations when 
compared with those of the EVWs is the lack of Hungarian 
men able to enter coalmining, but their more ready 
acceptance into the engineering industry. 
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Although measures were taken to prevent exploitation by 
prospective employers, for example, it was stipulated 
that, like other foreign workers before them, the 
refugees of 1956 must not be paid at rates undercutting 
those of British workers, some Hungarians still left 
their employment complaining of low wages. This was 
mainly due to the unrealistic expectations of some 
Hungarians who had heard stories greatly exaggerating the 
high level of wages in Britain. Others left their early 
placements because they were psychologically and 
emotionally still in a state of turmoil, whilst others 
left their first employment after finding jobs they 
considered more suitable. In some cases these early 
departures of Hungarians, for whatever reasons, alienated 
a number of employers who resolved never again to employ 
Hungarians. However, most employers were understanding 
of ini tial difficul ties and in most cases the refugees 
soon fitted in with their English colleagues. Hungarians 
leaving jobs of their own accord had to wait six weeks 
before being entitled to social security benefits but 
alternative employment was not difficult to find at this 
time. 
To combat concern that Hungarians might take employment 
from British workers the Ministry of Labour worked 
closely with the trades union movement which proved to be 
"very co-operative". 94 The Trades Union Congress had a 
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very positive attitude towards the refugees and was 
involved from the start wi th the Ministry of Labour in 
negotia ting the employment of the Hungarians. It was 
agreed that the regional controllers of the Ministry of 
Labour would inform the secretaries of the regional 
advisory commi ttees of the Trades Union Congress 
concerning the employment of refugees in their regions 
and regarding the industries in which they were being 
placed. Where it was a condition of employment that the 
applicant should be a member of the appropriate trade 
union the HUngarian was asked if he / she wished to join 
and if so was referred to the union concerned. Unlike 
the earlier groups of East European refugees who arrived 
in Britain in the years immediately following the Second 
World War, the Hungarians were not subject to limitations 
on the types of employment available to them and no 
agreements were made tha t in the event of redundancies 
Hungarians should be the first to leave because of their 
nationality but that normal redundancy arrangements of 
'last in, first out' should apply. 
The individual unions themselves also had a positive 
attitude towards the Hungarians, for example the National 
Union of Railwaymen which agreed to the employment of 
suitable refugees. One exception to this was the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, left-wing members of which 
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in some local branches refused to accept Hungarians into 
the closed shop working environment on political grounds. 
However, the most notable anti-Hungarian stance taken by 
a trades union was that of the National Union of 
Mineworkers. The National Coal Board had brought over 
from Aus tria 3,600 refugees who had mining experience 
wi th the intention of employing them in Bri tish pi ts 
after they had undergone the relevant training and 
learned sufficient English. 95 The NCB was to provide the 
men wi th English language and vocational training and 
accommodation in mining hostels. The chairman of the 
National Coal Board, James Bowman, and the executive 
committee of the National Union of Mineworkers assured 
miners tha t the Hungarians would be used to supplement 
rather than displace British workers as possibly 60,000 
new men would be needed in the pits in 1957 to compensate 
for wastage and the refugees would be only a small 
proportion of these new men. 96 However, despite active 
support by the leaders of the National Union of 
Mineworkers for the employment of Hungarians in the 
industry, in many areas, particularly South Yorkshire and 
South Wales, the local miners' lodges simply refused to 
accept the Hungarians so that by July 1957 only ten per 
cent of the Hungarians who had undergone National Coal 
Board training had found jobs as miners, the others 
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having been forced to seek employment in different 
industries. 97 
The figures given for Hungarian employment in coalmining 
in the House of Commons on 30 October 1957 were that in 
total 4,186 Hungarians had been accepted for training for 
work in the mines of whom 891 had completed their 
training with 482 actually employed in coalmining and 249 
in ancillary occupations. There were 644 Hungarians 
still in training centres. The Employment Exchanges were 
helping those who now wished to seek employment in other 
industries to find work. 98 In February 1958 only 821 
Hungarians had been able to find employment in 
coalmining, whilst a further 357 were still training in 
National Coal Board hostels. 
original 4,186 
industries. 99 
had found 
The remainder of the 
employment in other 
Questions were raised in Parliament several times about 
this situation and Labour Party representatives were very 
disappointed by the miners' attitude. Concern was also 
expressed on a number of occasions that public funds were 
being wasted on training as miners Hungarians who would 
never be able to take up employment in the coal industry 
but reassurances were always given that the cost of the 
training and maintenance of these men was to be met by 
the National Coal Board and therefore did not provide a 
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drain on public funds. The position taken by the British 
miners towards the Hungarians gained a grea t deal of 
publicity both in Britain and on an international level , 
for example in German journal Der Spiegel. lOO 
As far as the employment of female refugees was 
concerned, one popular idea amongst Bri tish poli ticians 
was that they be offered nursing and domestic work to 
make up the shortfall of labour in these sectors. 
Similar employment was also some of the first on offer to 
the previous East European refugee groups immediately 
after the Second World War. Unattractive to British 
workers, these jobs were always the first on offer to 
foreign workers of any sort. 
Another area of employment which was unattractive to 
British workers was agriculture and there were calls for 
Hungarians with relevant experience to be made available 
to British farms. Such employment was on offer mainly to 
Hungarian men. Again, this is parallelled with the 
experience of the Poles and European Volunteer Workers 
during the previous decade. However, unlike these 
previous groups of East Europeans, the majori ty of the 
Hungarian refugees of 1956 were either students or from 
urban industrial backgrounds and most tended to remain 
urban-orientated. The National Farmers f Union and a 
number of individual farmers notified many vacancies for 
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agricultural work but as very few of those who arrived in 
Britain were actually suitable for skilled agricultural 
work many of these posts remained unfilled. 
Social attitudes; the effect on assimilation and 
integration 
The arrival of the Hungarian refugees was accompanied by 
much publici ty and popular sympathy but how easy did 
British responses make it for them to achieve a 
significant degree of integration or assimilation within 
the community? Language difficulties, the strangeness 
of their new surroundings and life in the camps initially 
made integration difficult but these were only temporary 
problems. After the first, positive, response of the 
British people there was a change in attitude amongst 
some sections of the community when stories of disorder 
involving the refugees first began to be published in the 
newspapers. There were even cases of gangs of Bri tish 
male youths attacking the refugees. However, by 1959 the 
situation had settled and generally the Hungarians were 
seen by the public to have adapted to the British way of 
life and had been accepted by the population. There was 
also recognition and gratitude from the Hungarians that 
the responses of the British Government and the British 
public had on the whole been posi ti ve. Many of the 
refugees are unwilling to criticize their adopted 
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country. In 1986 the president of the British branch of 
the Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Association wrote to the 
British Prime Minister expressing thanks on behalf of the 
members of the Association for the positive help given to 
them by the British Government and people after the 
uprising of 1956. 
Naturalization 
After five years' residence in Bri tain the Hungarians 
were able to apply for naturalization. Many did so in 
recognition of their expected permanent residence in 
Britain. Few expected Hungary to be freed from Communist 
rule and the "bloody Russians". 101 Moreover, the small 
number of Hungarian women in Bri tain meant tha t many 
Hungarian men now had Bri tish wives and families and 
would therefore be unlikely to return to Hungary even in 
the event of political change. The acquisition of 
British citizenship also made foreign travel easier, 
which was particularly desirable for those wi th family 
connections still in Hungary. It was not until October 
./ / 
1978 that Hungarian emigres were allowed by the Hungarian 
Government to travel to their homeland without first 
receiving special permission. It was also at that time 
tha t a new law was passed in Hungary which approved 
Western travel for those Hungarian citizens who were 
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related to political refugees resident abroad. They 
would previously have been refused passports. 
The naturalization procedure was not always explained to 
the Hungarians as clearly as it could have been. For 
example, one Hungarian recounted his experience of having 
been told to telephone a Whi tehall number and was so 
shocked when Scotland Yard answered that he slammed the 
receiver down. However, on calling back it was explained 
to him that the police needed to ask him a few questions 
because he had applied for naturalization. The questions 
turned out to be the same as those which had been raised 
in his previous two security screening interviews. 102 
The majori ty of the Hungarians feel they have adapted 
well and, although they will always be Hungarian, after 
living in Britain for a number of years the majority feel 
that they could not have returned to live in Hungary 
whilst it was under Communist rule and that now they were 
I . h "[ . B· .] 103 "altogether, someone be onglng ere ln rltaln. 
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